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ABSTRACT 
Societies have established various forms of governance to protect the natural 
environment from the adverse effects of human activity. While direct “command 
and control” regulation has achieved significant improvements in environmental 
protection, concerns for its efficiency have led governments to seek alternative 
approaches to achieve environmental policy objectives. Commentators describe 
a shift from “government” to “governance” as policy makers and regulators seek 
to harness wider social forces beyond government, while risk-based regulation 
is pursued to target constrained regulatory resources for maximum effect. 
However, robust evidence for the effectiveness of different forms of regulation is 
lacking. This thesis addresses this gap, providing an evidence base for 
instrument selection and a data-informed critique of regulatory reform practice. 
Research followed a case study strategy, gathering qualitative data through 58 
in-depth semi-structured interviews, analysed using the NVIVO™ Computer 
Aided Qualitative Data Analysis System (CAQDAS), with senior policy makers 
at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, England (Defra) 
and senior executives in businesses and trade associations in 5 UK sectors.  
(1)  A new typology of regulatory instruments has been compiled, validated with 
sector experts, refined for policy end-users, and published as part of Defra’s 
guidance on instrument selection. 
(2) The critical case of instrument selection in practice at Defra has been 
examined for the first time, revealing factors affecting choice, the use of co-
regulation to develop evidence and the importance of retaining policy maker 
skills for new forms of regulation. 
(3) A multiple-case study of senior business representatives found five strongly 
preferred voluntary regulation, seven expressed significant doubts about its 
effectiveness, and 19 expressed no general preference. While voluntary 
approaches were valued for flexibility and lower burdens, direct regulation 
offered stability and a level playing field. They sought inter alia coherent, 
evidence based regulatory frameworks, delivered through positive regulatory 
relationships. 
This research progresses the better and smarter regulation debate on the use 
of alternatives to direct regulation and has already been used to inform policy 
making in practice. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context and background 
Markets can provide effective mechanisms for balancing supply and demand for 
goods and services, but can also fail (Perman et al., 2003). Businesses can 
produce socially beneficial products, but in the process market failures can 
allow socially unacceptable damage to people and to the natural environment 
on which all life relies. Societies create and enforce rules to protect the 
environment, which governments can codify into laws and statute enforced by 
government agencies. Alternatively, rules may be created and enforced by 
other social actors, for example in the form of agreements between businesses 
along supply chains. These different forms of governance for environmental 
protection are described here as “regulation” in its broadest sense (after 
Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999), to include both the influence of government and 
the influence of other social actors on business behaviour. The term 
“instruments” is used to describe different component parts of regulation, such 
as licences or taxes. 
Government environmental regulation has developed over the last 150 years 
from measures to tackle local pollution (e.g. The UK Alkali Act, 1863) to 
international agreements to tackle global environmental problems. In 1972 the 
Stockholm Conference established the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), since when international agreements have been pursued for example 
to prevent trade in endangered species (CITES, 1973), control ozone depleting 
substances (Montreal Protocol, 1987), protect biological diversity (Rio Earth 
Summit, 1992) and to tackle climate change (Kyoto Protocol, 2005) (UNEP, 
2005). The European Union (EU) has implemented environmental directives 
and regulation across member states, for example to control the management 
of waste (Waste Framework Directive, 2008), water quality and use (Water 
Framework Directive, 2000) and the production and use of chemicals 
(Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), 2007).  
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Over time, government regulation has been supplemented with other forms of 
social control that place greater responsibility for environmental protection on 
the private sector. These forms of governance seek to harness social forces 
other than direct government influence affecting business behaviour, such as 
the buying behaviour of consumers or customer-supplier relationships between 
businesses. Commentators have described this development as a shift from 
“government to governance”, observing the wider adoption of “new 
environmental policy instruments” across the EU (Jordan et al., 2005).  
Modern regulation should be risk-informed, targeting regulatory resources to 
where they can have the greatest impact on outcomes (Hampton, 2005). Risk 
has been defined as “a combination of the probability, or frequency, of 
occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of that 
occurrence”, where a hazard is a “property or situation that in particular 
circumstances could lead to harm” (Gormley et al., 2011). Scholars have 
examined how risk-based regulation can be achieved in practice and how 
analysis of environmental risks should inform the selection of regulatory 
instruments (e.g. Hood et al., 2001; Pollard et al., 2004; Hutter, 2005; Rothstein 
et al., 2006; Gouldson et al., 2009).   Rothstein et al. (2006) note that modern, 
risk-based regulation is likely to deploy mixtures of tools to achieve regulatory 
objectives and may improve effectiveness and efficiency, but anticipate 
epistemic, institutional and normative challenges in its implementation. 
Epistemic challenges may arise from regulation asking the scientific community 
questions it is unable to answer; institutional challenges may arise from the 
difficulties of prioritising regulator resources according to risk, in the context of 
existing resource commitments; and normative challenges may arise from 
stakeholders unfavourably viewing trade-offs of costs and benefits chosen 
through bureaucratic decision-making processes (Rothstein et al., 2006). 
Today, businesses may be subject to a wide range of governmental and non-
governmental forms of regulation, which together influence their environmental 
performance as part of a mix of instruments. This mix of instruments can 
include direct “command and control” regulation, economic instruments such as 
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taxes and emissions trading schemes, information based instruments, co-
regulation, self-regulation and support and capacity building (e.g. Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a; Gouldson et al., 2008). Instruments 
are often compared in terms of the effectiveness in achieving their 
environmental objectives, and the efficiency with which they do so. While direct 
regulation has proved an effective mechanism for reducing environmental 
damage and often presents a strong, clear signal to the market of government 
commitment, it has also been criticised frequently on the grounds of relatively 
poor efficiency (e.g. Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999). Alternative instruments 
typically offer greater flexibility to businesses and may prove more efficient, but 
may offer less certain environmental outcomes.  
Concern that regulation imposes unnecessary costs on businesses, undermines 
their competitiveness and adversely affects economic growth, has led to 
continual effort by governments across the western world to improve regulatory 
design and delivery. Regulatory impact assessment (or analysis) (RIA) is a 
policy analysis method used to assess regulatory impact across economic, 
social and environmental dimensions (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2007). RIA was 
adopted in the USA in the 1970s (Anderson, 1998), monitored by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), and has gradually been adopted by most 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
over the last 30 years (OECD, 2005). The OECD’s Regulatory Policy Division 
aims to promote good regulatory policy among member countries (OECD, 
2005), and in the EU the established “better regulation” agenda has further 
developed into “smart regulation” (European Commission, 2010). In the UK the 
Coalition Government initiated the “Red Tape Challenge” in 2011, a pan-
government review process to identify opportunities to improve or remove 
regulation (Cabinet Office, 2013a) with an emphasis on reducing regulation and 
adoption of non-governmental approaches where possible (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a). 
Under these demands for regulatory reform, government policy makers and 
regulators are faced with the challenge of selecting the best combination of 
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instruments, balancing effectiveness, efficiency and other considerations, to 
achieve environmental goals (Gunningham, 2009). Evidence is required to 
inform these decisions, in pursuit of “evidence-based policy” (Solesbury, 2001). 
Evidence for regulatory effectiveness rests on understanding the complex chain 
of interactions from regulatory intervention, through business and individual 
behaviour change and its impact on the environment, to the harm caused or 
averted. It is intrinsically challenging to isolate these interactions through 
experimentation, and understanding is further clouded by multiple confounding 
factors. While stakeholders may demand “proof” for the effectiveness of 
interventions, science may at best only be able to provide a robust consensus 
and process for ongoing inquiry, testing and revision (Oreskes, 2004). While 
evidence is gradually accumulating for the effectiveness of environmental 
regulatory interventions, it is often lacking. Policy makers and regulators must 
therefore undertake the process of instrument selection under conditions of 
significant uncertainty.  
In this context, this thesis provides an evidence base for instrument selection 
and a critique of regulatory reform, to extend the prior art, and to provide 
assistance to policy makers, regulators and other stakeholders engaged in 
regulatory reform.  
1.2 Problem statement 
There is a lack of evidence to inform the choice of regulatory instruments by 
policy makers and regulators. 
1.3 Aims and objectives 
The research question that this thesis addresses is: 
“What instruments work when, with whom and why?” 
This thesis focuses on the factors that affect the effectiveness, and therefore 
suitability, of regulatory instruments in different business contexts.  
The key research objectives are to: 
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(1) Identify the total range of instruments available to policy makers and 
regulators and the factors thought to affect their effectiveness and 
efficiency in practice. 
(2) Examine the regulatory frameworks in place for illustrative case study 
business sectors in the UK. 
(3) Identify the factors that policy makers believe affect the selection, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of policy instruments. 
(4) Identify the factors that businesses believe affect selection, effectiveness 
and efficiency of instruments. 
(5) Evaluate existing evidence and theory in light of the data gathered from 
these case studies, and develop recommendations for future regulatory 
reform programmes. 
1.4 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2: Presents a review of the relevant literature. A typology of 
instruments is constructed from the prior art and evidence for the effectiveness 
of example instruments is reviewed. While factors likely to affect effectiveness 
can be identified, evidence is often found lacking. The research question is 
formulated from this observation. 
Chapter 3: Describes the methods adopted. An inductive, theory building 
approach, using case studies drawing on data from semi-structured interviews, 
was used to develop and extend theory. Data were stored and analysed using 
the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS,) 
NVIVO™. 
Chapter 4: Presents summaries of the environmental regulatory framework for 
five case study industries, and examines perspectives on their operation 
provided by industry experts.  
Chapter 5: Presents the data gathered from the case study research with Defra 
policy makers. Themes that emerged are described and the frequencies of their 
occurrence among interviewees are presented in tables. Factors thought to 
affect instrument effectiveness and other reasons for instrument selection 
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emerged, and an overall logic model for instrument selection by policy makers 
is presented. 
Chapter 6: Presents the data gathered from multiple-case study research with 
senior representatives of UK businesses and trade associations. Themes that 
emerged are described and the frequencies of their occurrence among 
interviewees are presented in tables and a chart. Factors thought to affect 
instrument effectiveness and efficiency emerged, and respondents provided 
perspectives on the relative merits of different forms of regulation. 
Chapter 7: Compares results from the government and industry case studies 
provided in Chapters 5 and 6, and reviews them in the light of the relevant 
academic literature, assessing their novelty and contribution. Their implications 
for government regulatory reform programmes are considered. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and summary. Describes and summarises the central 
findings of this thesis, highlights novelty and contribution, critically reviews this 
research, outlines suggestions for further research and summarises 
recommendations for government and industry. 
1.5 Contribution 
The novelty and contribution to science of this thesis is summarised here and 
discussed further in Chapter 7: 
 As described in Chapter 3, the research has been undertaken using a 
novel methodology that includes close working with a government 
department through an industrial placement, providing an “insider’s view” 
of the realities of government policy making and regulation. 
 The research developed and refined a typology of regulatory instruments 
based on the prior art (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
2013a; Gouldson et al., 2008; Perman et al., 2003) through validation 
with 67 practitioners from government and industry (Table 5-3, Table 6-3, 
Table 7-1). This has been developed into guidance for practitioners now 
in use at Defra (Appendix E). 
7 
 The research provides new data and insight into instrument selection at 
Defra, which is a critical case for UK environmental policy making 
(Chapter 5), and new data and insight into industry preferences for 
instrument selection in the UK context (Chapter 6). 
 The research provides a considerable body of evidence for the impact of 
a range of factors on regulatory effectiveness in the UK context, including 
the quality of relationships between regulatory officers and the regulated 
(Section 7.3.2), the coherence of the regulatory framework (Section 
7.3.3.1), the suitability of the level of flexibility or prescription in rules for 
regulated businesses (Section 7.3.3.2), and the administrative design of 
regulation at the interface between businesses and regulators (Section 
7.3.3.3). 
 The research provides evidence concerning risk characterisation by 
policy makers, regulators and businesses for regulation, demonstrating 
the challenges of risk-based regulation in practice (Section 7.3.4). 
 The research provides evidence that, to maximise effectiveness and 
efficiency, regulatory frameworks should be tailored to the target 
businesses, utilising a mix of instruments rather than any one 
intervention being more or less effective in general (Section 7.4). 
 The research provides evidence for the tactical development and 
communication of evidence of business environmental impact among 
stakeholders, and the effect of evidence for the effectiveness of 
regulation on motivations for compliance (Section 7.5). 
 The research highlights the need for policy makers and regulators to 
work collaboratively with the business community in the process of 
regulatory reform, to gain insight into the impact of regulation on 
business operations (Section 7.6), and provides new evidence that 
improved processes and skills in business engagement and regulatory 
analysis may be required by government to enable greater use of non-
governmental forms of environmental governance (Section 7.7). 
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1.6 Motivation 
This research adopted a theory building approach, drawing on qualitative data 
gathered through semi-structured interviews for case study organisations 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Payne & Payne, 2004; 
Yin, 2009). This approach has been adopted to provide in-depth insight into the 
perceptions, motivations and behaviours of stakeholders affected by and 
involved in the design of environmental regulation. This research approach 
seeks to develop theory through “analytic generalisation”, analogous to theory 
development through multiple experiments, rather than “statistical 
generalisation” that seeks to characterise a population through sampling and 
statistical analysis. Claims for generalisation of findings in line with this 
approach are reflected in the text. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a synthesis of available literature and a critical literature 
review to identify the range of instruments available to policy makers and 
regulators and the factors thought to affect their effectiveness and efficiency in 
practice, to meet Objective 1 of this research programme. This chapter was 
written for this PhD thesis by the author under normal PhD supervision 
conditions. It was published subsequently in Environmental Policy and 
Governance (Taylor et al., 2012), with supervisors acknowledged as co-authors. 
2.2 Abstract 
There is a lack of evidence on regulatory effectiveness available to support 
policy makers with the selection of appropriate instruments to deliver better 
environmental regulation. We identify the types of evidence required to enable 
regulatory reform, characterize evidence gaps, and explore how these may be 
filled through future research. A typology of regulatory instruments is presented, 
and evidence of what has worked, when and why is examined, drawing on 
international experience and recent cases from the United Kingdom (UK). 
Evidence of the capabilities of good environmental regulators for regulatory 
effectiveness is lacking, and it is proposed that ethnographic research that 
captures the nuances of regulatory practice will prove necessary to address 
this. This paper is of value to policy makers and regulators around the world 
considering the selection and deployment of the full range of environmental 
regulatory instruments to respond to environmental risks and in support of 
economic growth. It can inform the selection of suitable approaches and the 
design of institutions capable of delivering them. 
2.3 Context for environmental regulatory reform 
Demand for regulatory reform has intensified internationally as governments 
seek ways to meet the challenges of stagnant growth levels and debt reduction. 
A sharper focus on the outcomes of environmental regulation has highlighted a 
lack of evidence for regulatory effectiveness available to policy makers to 
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support the selection of appropriate instruments to deliver better environmental 
regulation (e.g. Gouldson et al., 2009).  The aim of this paper is to identify the 
kinds of evidence required to enable regulatory reform, to characterise evidence 
gaps, and to explore how these gaps may be filled through future research. We 
seek to forward the debate on well-designed interventions in a climate whereby 
accountabilities for risk management are being shared more widely and where 
there is intense scrutiny on justifying market interventions. A typology of 
regulatory instruments is presented, including interventions by government 
regulators, non-government regulators and approaches that harness other 
societal influences on environmental behaviour,  and evidence of what has 
worked, when and why is examined, drawing on international experience and 
recent cases from the UK. In principle, many different instruments could be 
deployed to tackle specific environmental policy objectives. This research finds 
that their effectiveness in practice has depended on features of the instrument 
design, the motives and capabilities of the regulated community, and the 
motives and capabilities of the (governmental or non-governmental) regulator. 
Evidence for the impact of the capability of regulators on regulatory 
effectiveness, in terms of outcome, is found to be lacking, and it is proposed 
that ethnographic research that captures the nuances of regulatory practice will 
prove necessary to address this gap. 
In developed countries many governments have established permanent 
institutions to drive regulatory reform across government departments and 
agencies, and the OECD has a long-established programme focussed on 
promoting regulatory reform across its members (Cordova-Novion & 
Jacobzone, 2011). For example, the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) was established in the USA as part of the 1980 Paperwork 
Reduction Act to review all information collection by the Federal Government, 
and under Executive Order 12866 reviews draft regulations across government 
to ensure benefit-cost analysis has been used to assess regulatory policy 
options (Arbuckle, 2011). Presidential Executive Order 13563 (January 2011) 
has recently reaffirmed the government’s commitment to regulatory reform, 
initiating a retrospective review of existing regulations to determine whether 
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they can be improved or removed (Obama, 2011a). Similarly in Australia the 
Department of Finance and Deregulation promotes the government’s better 
regulation objectives through the operation of the Office of Best Practice 
Regulation and the Deregulation Policy Division, which support other 
departments in ongoing regulatory reform activities (Australian Government 
Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2013). The Netherlands, considered a 
leader in regulatory reform, has an ongoing programme of red tape reduction 
driven by a cross-ministerial project team and independently monitored by the 
Advisory Board on Administrative Burdens (Actal) (OECD, 2007). Similar 
initiatives exist outside the OECD. For example, Singapore established the Pro-
Enterprise Panel to cut red tape in 2000 which continues to operate today 
(Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2013). 
Esty and Porter (2005) examined the relationships between environmental 
performance, economic competitiveness, the national environmental regulatory 
regime and national economic and legal context across a sample of developed 
and developing countries. They found strong associations between 
environmental performance and GDP per capita; in general richer countries 
enjoy better environmental quality than poorer countries (Esty & Porter, 2005). 
However, they also found significant variance in environmental performance 
between countries with similar GDP per capita, which may be significantly 
explained by both the quality of the national environmental regulatory regime 
and national economic and legal context (Esty & Porter, 2005). They argue that 
better, more stringent and strictly enforced, environmental regulation is 
associated with more rapid economic growth. Policy makers therefore face a 
choice between “clean” or “dirty” trajectories to increase GDP per capita and 
enhance environmental regulation (Esty & Porter, 2005).  
There is evidence to suggest that policy makers in the rapidly developing 
economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRICs) are actively 
considering alternative mixes of environmental instruments whilst choosing 
different development paths. In response to serious environmental problems 
that have accompanied rapid economic growth, the government of China has 
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shown increasing interest in the use of alternatives to direct environmental 
regulation in policy documents 1999-2008, particularly economic instruments, 
and makes use of various voluntary and information based approaches (Huang 
et al., 2010). Brazil faces particular challenges in protecting natural vegetation 
under pressure from rapid expansion of agriculture. Policy makers are actively 
considering policy mixes including the use of international direct conservation 
payments for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), 
an approach considered only likely to be effective if underpinned by strong 
national command and control regulation (Börner et al., 2010). Since the Bhopal 
accident of 1984 India has significantly strengthened environmental regulation, 
so that the framework is considered now by some to be world class (Mejia, 
2009). However, enforcement remains a significant challenge with low levels of 
compliance in some areas (Mejia, 2009). Mol (2009) has argued that Russian 
policy makers have chosen to prioritise economic growth whilst environmental 
institutions have weakened during the last decade, illustrating that progress 
towards greater environmental protection is far from guaranteed in all countries. 
Yin-Fang Zhang (2010) highlights a dearth of empirical data on the progress of 
regulatory reform in less-developed economies and finds limited progress 
where data are available, and cautions that constraints in regulatory capacity 
and legal, political, administrative and economic processes will present 
significant challenges to transferring practice from developed economies.   
Nevertheless, policy makers around the world have an opportunity to learn from 
a wide range of approaches and experiences in regulatory reform both in 
general and for the specific purpose of improving environmental regulation. This 
paper will be of value to policy makers and regulators considering the selection 
and deployment of the full range of environmental regulatory instruments to 
respond to environmental threats and enable economic growth, providing 
learning from the UK experience. Thus it can inform the selection of suitable 
approaches and the design of institutions capable of delivering them. 
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2.4 Instrument selection for better regulation 
Markets can prove effective mechanisms for balancing the supply and demand 
for goods and services. However, pervasive market failures cause under-
provision of goods and services (Perman et al., 2003). Societies have 
developed rules that describe how people should behave, which can include 
rules to address market failures. Rules may be formalised into laws, written 
down as statute and enforced by governments and their agencies. 
Governments seek to achieve objectives by pursuing strategies and courses of 
action described as policies, designed by policy makers. In the UK, government 
intervention is justified on the grounds of market failure, government failure, 
distributional objectives, or to tackle public risks (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2013a). Regulation is one strategy that policy makers 
might pursue. In line with Gunningham and Sinclair (1999), the term is used 
here in its broadest sense to include the full spectrum of social control, including 
direct “command and control” regulation and more flexible approaches 
harnessing the influence of businesses and other third parties. The term 
“instrument” is used to describe generic components of regulation, such as 
licensing and taxes. 
Regulation has been widely used to reduce and manage public risk, and to 
protect the ecosystems on which we depend from harm arising from human 
activities. Government action may be required at a local, national and 
international level. While early environmental regulation was targeted at specific 
local sources (e.g. The UK Alkali Act, 1863), by 1972 the United Nations (UN) 
recognised the need for international action to tackle environmental risks and 
convened the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, 
Sweden. The Stockholm Conference established the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP), which is responsible for assessing the state of the global 
environment and providing a focal point for coordinating international action. 
Since 1972 UNEP has established international frameworks to target a range of 
issues including the international trade in endangered species (CITES, 1973), 
the control of ozone depleting substances (Montreal Protocol, 1987), the 
protection of biological diversity (Rio “Earth Summit”, 1992) and the reduction of 
14 
climate change (Rio “Earth Summit”, 1992, and Kyoto Protocol, 2005) (UNEP, 
2005). The effectiveness of these international initiatives is dependent on the 
ability of national governments to implement effective environmental policy and 
regulation in response, whilst remaining within international trade rules. 
In England, environmental policy making is centred within the Department for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC). Modern regulation should be risk-informed so 
that interventions are targeted to where they can have most effect in terms of 
outcome (e.g. Hampton, 2005). Defra defines a risk as “a combination of the 
probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude 
of the consequences of the occurrence”, where a hazard is defined as a 
“property or situation that in particular circumstances could lead to harm” 
(Gormley et al., 2011). Defra’s policy responsibilities include the management of 
flood risk, the control of animal disease, waste management, control of water 
quality, monitoring and elements of control of air quality, and policies associated 
with agriculture and fisheries. Defra and DECC set policies intended to 
influence businesses and individuals to achieve the government’s 
environmental objectives, and set the policy framework for a further network of 
government agencies, some of which have responsibility for implementing and 
enforcing environmental regulation. The Environment Agency (EA) is the largest 
of these bodies, and is responsible for managing a wide range of environmental 
issues including flood management and regulation of pollution from industrial 
sites. 
While regulation is intended to deliver net social benefits, it may also impose 
costs on businesses and individuals, including the costs of administration, costs 
arising from changes to business practices such as installing new cleaner 
technologies, and potentially indirect costs arising from constraints on 
competitiveness or innovation imposed by regulation.  
Regulation can be achieved through a wide range of instruments that are often 
compared in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency (e.g. Gunningham & 
Sinclair, 1999). For the purposes of the discussion here, effectiveness is used 
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to describe how reliably an instrument is expected to bring about the intended 
environmental objective. The term efficiency is often used broadly to describe 
how well people use resources to deliver beneficial results. Economists provide 
tighter definitions of the related concepts of economic efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, which will be used for this discussion (e.g. Kolstad, 2000). 
Economic efficiency describes the extent to which the distribution of resources 
in an economy maximises the overall benefits to society. In the context of 
environmental regulation, policy makers may seek to identify the level of a given 
pollutant that is economically efficient, reducing pollution to improve the welfare 
of people adversely affected while imposing abatement costs on polluters. Cost-
effectiveness describes the extent to which the overall costs to society of 
achieving a given objective are minimised. Having identified a target pollution 
level, different regulatory approaches may prove more or less cost-effective in 
achieving that goal. 
Since the early 1990s, governments have sought to improve the delivery of 
public services, including through regulatory reform. Regulatory impact 
assessment (or analysis) (RIA) is a policy analysis method originally conceived 
to assess the burden of regulations on the private sector, which has now been 
broadened to assess regulatory impact across the three pillars of sustainable 
development (economic, social and environmental) (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2007).  
RIA-based approaches were adopted in the USA in the 1970s in response to 
fears that the regulatory burden was becoming excessive and adding to 
inflationary pressures (Anderson, 1998), and since 1995, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) has reported to the United States Congress on 
the benefits and costs of government regulation. The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Regulatory Policy Division aims to 
promote good regulatory policy through a programme of work with member 
countries, and in 2005 published its Guiding Principles for Regulatory Policy 
and Performance (OECD, 2005), building on international experience and 
updating its 1995 Reference Checklist for Good Regulatory Decision Making 
(OECD, 1995). RIA has gradually been adopted by most OECD countries over 
the last 30 years. 
16 
In the UK, the 1999 Modernising Government white paper included a “new drive 
to remove unnecessary regulation” and introduced RIA to assess burdens 
associated with new regulation (Cabinet Office, 1999). The UK Hampton 
Review into reducing administrative burdens of regulatory enforcement and 
inspection recommended that regulatory resources should be targeted 
according to risk, together with better advice provision and streamlined 
processes (Hampton, 2005). Risk-based regulation has continued to be 
developed internationally (e.g. OECD, 2006; Rothstein et al., 2006; Gouldson et 
al., 2009). The international financial crisis of 2008 has precipitated further calls 
for regulatory reform, to tackle inter alia financial market instabilities and the 
threats of climate change, with European Union (EU) calls for the “better 
regulation” agenda to further develop into “smart regulation” (European 
Commission, 2010).  In 2011 the UK Coalition Government initiated the “Red 
Tape Challenge”, a pan-government review process including public 
consultation intended to identify opportunities to improve or remove regulation 
(Cabinet Office, 2013a), with an emphasis on reducing regulation and the 
adoption of non-governmental approaches where possible (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a). Meanwhile the OECD has called for 
“green growth” that both protects the environment and enables economic 
development, and highlights the need for imaginative use of a broad range of 
regulatory instruments to achieve this twin objective (OECD, 2011).  
UK environmental policy is significantly influenced by European Union (EU) 
policy and law. EU directives, such as the Water Framework Directive adopted 
in 2000 (European Commission, 2013a), require transposition into member 
state legal systems, with the potential to add to national stocks of law and 
regulation and increase the costs borne by businesses and government. 
Concerns that the burden of regulation is increasing are reflected in current UK 
Government policies to only allow the introduction of new regulations when old 
regulations are removed so that net costs to business do not increase (“one-in, 
one-out”) and to ensure that burdens are not increased any more than 
necessary during the process of transposition (preventing “gold plating” through 
“copy out”) (H. M. Government, 2011). 
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Efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental regulation 
have led to the development of a wide range of different regulatory approaches 
for tackling environmental risks. Commentators have observed that early 
government action tended to rely on direct regulation based on mandatory 
operating requirements, inspection and enforcement, which in many instances 
has proved successful in reducing the targeted problem. However, over time 
direct regulation has been supplemented with regulatory approaches that do not 
enforce mandatory changes to behaviour on regulated parties, but instead seek 
to harness other social forces, such as the buying behaviour of consumers or 
customer-supplier relationships amongst businesses, to influence business and 
individual behaviour. This development has been associated by commentators 
with a shift from “government” to “governance” (Jordan et al., 2005). While the 
meaning of the term governance varies across branches of social science, 
scholars generally associate it with a decrease in the ability of central 
government to influence society, with greater reliance placed upon the private 
sector to achieve objectives (Jordan et al., 2005). Jordan et al. (2005) examined 
the increasing use of certain “new environmental policy instruments” (NEPIs) 
across nine European Union states to assess whether their adoption 
represented a shift from government to governance, concluding that there is 
some shift towards governance but significant government involvement in 
environmental regulation remains the norm. Gunningham (2009) has charted 
the “shifting architectures” of environmental law, regulation and governance 
since 1970 across various Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions and to a lesser extent the 
EU, finding that while many architectures (combinations of instruments) exist 
and have been effective in different contexts, no single approach would be 
appropriate to apply across the full spectrum of environmental problems. 
Instead he concludes that the objective for policy makers and regulators is to 
achieve substantive compliance using whichever combination of approaches 
works best for a given environmental goal (Gunningham, 2009). 
Other commentators have approached the question of instrument selection from 
the perspective of risk-based regulation (e.g. Hood et al., 2001; Pollard et al., 
2004; Hutter, 2005; Rothstein et al., 2006; Gouldson et al., 2009). Rothstein et 
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al. (2006) note that modern, risk-based regulation is likely to deploy mixtures of 
tools to achieve regulatory objectives and may improve effectiveness and 
efficiency, but anticipate epistemic, institutional and normative challenges in its 
implementation. Epistemic challenges may arise from regulation asking the 
scientific community questions it is unable to answer; institutional challenges 
may arise from the difficulties of prioritising regulator resources according to 
risk, in the context of existing resource commitments; and normative challenges 
may arise from stakeholders unfavourably viewing trade-offs of costs and 
benefits chosen through bureaucratic decision-making processes (Rothstein et 
al., 2006). 
In concert, these conclusions highlight the need for policy makers and 
regulators to apply considerable skill in the formulation of regulation, to move 
from the identification of possible tools in theory into their selection and 
successful implementation in practice. Sparrow (2000, 2008) has described this 
skill set as the “regulatory craft”, and finds that the risk literature has not 
provided practitioners with a well-developed organisational theory for controlling 
risks, which would illuminate the use of “intelligence, analysis, creativity, and 
sensible use of discretion” that can significantly alter the effectiveness of 
operations without any change to the overarching macro-level policy framework 
(Sparrow, 2008). Gouldson et al. (2009) have examined the use of risk based 
regulation at the Environment Agency for England and Wales, and note that 
while risk based regulation has been applied in several policy domains and is 
generally believed to deliver better regulatory outcomes, challenges remain in 
its implementation, most notably with respect to understanding best practice 
and promoting consistency, improving the reliability and responsiveness of risk 
assessment and monitoring, building capacity, assessing the influence of 
different regulatory styles and understanding when and how the regulator could 
delegate some of its powers to the private sector (Gouldson et al., 2009). 
2.5 Using evidence for regulatory reform 
Policy makers need to decide which instruments to use as they design national 
policy frameworks within which regulators will work, in order to provide 
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regulators with the flexibility to decide how and when to use the regulatory 
instruments at their disposal. In order to make these decisions, policy makers 
and regulators need to be able to answer the broad question “what instruments 
work, when and with whom, and why?”  
This question is not easy to answer. Regulatory effectiveness rests upon a 
complex chain of interactions from regulatory intervention, through business 
and individual behaviour change, through the impact of behaviour change on 
the environment, to the harm caused or averted and attributable to the 
intervention discussed. Evidence of how these interactions function is required 
to enable regulatory reform. Ideally, experiments would be devised to identify 
causal factors influencing behaviour at each link in the chain, with control 
experiments used to include or exclude factors to test their significance, and 
environmental, economic and social effects assessed with precise empirical 
measurement (Denscombe, 2007). While such experiments may be possible for 
some parts of the chain (for example to test specific chemical, physical or 
biological processes), they are more likely to be difficult to identify because the 
regulatory instrument in question only exists in one instance in a specific form. 
The presence of a vast array of “confounding factors” that also may influence an 
environmental outcome in addition to a regulatory intervention means that at 
best researchers of regulatory practice and style may only observe an 
“association” between these factors, rather than establishing “causality”. The 
involvement of people and complex systems, and the consideration of 
alternative future scenarios make prediction of the impact of regulation 
intrinsically uncertain. Oreskes (2004) argues that in debate concerning 
environmental issues, opponents of environmental action often claim that 
scientific evidence of harm to the environment is uncertain and unproven, while 
some scientists respond by trying to provide “proof”. She argues that in most 
cases, science does not provide logically indisputable proof about the natural 
world, and instead can at best provide a robust consensus and a process for 
ongoing inquiry, testing and revision (Oreskes, 2004). In cases where scientific 
consensus does not exist science can provide informed opinions about possible 
consequences of actions, and monitor effects. 
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Therefore policy makers and regulators must become adept at decision-making 
under conditions of considerable uncertainty, and select approaches to policy 
development that take this into account. “Evidence-based policy” emerged as 
the UK Government’s preferred approach to policy making during the 1990s, 
with an increased emphasis on the need to understand “what works” in public 
policy leading to a greater emphasis on the use of evidence to inform policy 
making (Solesbury, 2001). “Systematic review”, a tool used to appraise previous 
research to methodically synthesise results, is one approach available to policy 
makers to support evidence based policy (Solesbury, 2001). It has been 
pioneered internationally (Cochrane Collaboration, 2013) in medical science, 
although it is recognised that for the broader question of health policy and 
management, variations of the systematic review approach better suited to 
analysing qualitative and quantitative information are required (Mays et al., 
2005). The Campbell Collaboration has more recently promoted such broader 
systematic review approaches in education, crime and justice, and social 
welfare (Campbell Collaboration, 2013).  
Weighing up multiple lines of evidence to support decision making is a recurring 
requirement in the design and implementation of environmental regulation. 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the evaluation of effects likely to 
arise from a project or action likely to have a substantial impact on the 
environment (Jay et al., 2007). However, for comparing environmental risks and 
designing policy and regulatory responses that apply to multiple cases, an 
approach that can assess classes of harm rather than specific projects is 
required. Prpich et al. (2011) describe a policy-level framework applied at Defra 
to characterise environmental risks, and demonstrate its successful application 
in stimulating debate within the organisation about proportionate mitigation 
actions and allocation of resources. Pollard et al. (2004) describe strategic risk 
assessment approaches that have been developed at the Environment Agency 
for England and Wales, which includes risk characterisation across multiple 
environmental, economic and social dimensions, risk communication, screening 
and prioritization, and options appraisal and risk management. The design of 
policy and regulation is further complicated when other stakeholders are 
21 
involved in consultation and deliberation, who may broker evidence to support 
their own interests (Davies et al., 2010), for example to decide how to handle 
nuclear waste, or the assessment of appropriate policy responses to the threats 
posed by climate change. Established techniques are deployed depending inter 
alia on the political context within which policy development takes place, ideally 
to incorporate both deliberative and participative processes to engage 
stakeholders and tackle political and ethical issues, and a strong analytical 
framework to incorporate scientific evidence  (e.g. Dietz & Morton, 2011). 
2.6 The growing toolkit of instruments 
Various instrument typologies have been proposed to assist in the analysis and 
reform of regulation. For example Hood’s 8-variant typology is based on the 
general purpose of the instrument versus the principle governing resource used 
(Howlett & Rayner, 2007). Five types of regulatory policy appear regularly in the 
literature and are consistent with the categorisation currently in use in UK 
Government: i) direct “command and control” regulation, ii) economic 
instruments, iii) information-based instruments, iv) co-regulation and self-
regulation, and v) support mechanisms and capacity building (e.g. Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a; Gouldson et al., 2008), and this 
provides the overall structure for the typology presented here. Key features of 
these categories are described below, and variations and examples 
summarised in Table 2-1. To inform this paper, a critical review of the prior art 
evaluating UK policy instruments explores the availability of evidence for the 
effectiveness of environmental regulation in the UK. These sources are 
identified in Table 2-1. 
2.6.1 Direct “command and control” instruments 
Direct, or “command and control” regulation, operates by “imposing mandatory 
obligations or restrictions on the behaviour of firms or individuals” (Perman et 
al., 2003).  In the context of air quality emissions control, Brady (1983) defined 
“command and control” regulation as “a regulatory  scheme based on rules that 
apply  specific technical performance standards – generally based on known 
feasible control technology – to each discharge point within a regulated 
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process.” While highlighting the great variety of regulatory systems in place 
around the world, Perman et al. (2003) identify input restrictions, technology 
controls, output quotas, emissions licences, zoning and ambient pollution 
requirements as important elements of command and control regulation (Table 
2-1). 
When enforced, command and control regulation enables government to 
mandate behaviour through law, so it should provide relatively high levels of 
certainty that businesses and individuals will comply. Monitoring and 
enforcement are likely to be resource intensive for the regulator and the 
regulated, so under the principles of risk-based regulation, direct regulation 
would typically be targeted at the largest risks (Pollard et al., 2004). However, 
direct regulation may not be a feasible nor a desirable option in some 
circumstances and for the control of some major risks, such as anthropogenic 
climate change, direct regulation typically only forms part of the policy 
framework, requiring a mix of incentives and interventions (e.g. Simeonova & 
Diaz-Bone, 2005). 
Direct regulation has proved an effective mechanism for reducing environmental 
damage and often presents as a strong, clear signal to the market of 
government commitment. For example, ambient concentrations in the UK 
atmosphere of a wide range of metals have fallen over the last 25 years as a 
result of legislation, alongside abatement strategies and changing fuel use 
(Brown et al., 2008). Similarly, UK atmospheric concentrations of 
polychlorinated biphenols have shown a sustained fall over the last 40 years 
following their ban in production and use, which followed the introduction of 
voluntary restrictions in the 1960s/early 70s (Schuster et al., 2010). 
Direct regulation has been criticised frequently on the grounds of relatively poor 
efficiency because it may limit innovation and constrain the flexibility of 
businesses to choose the most cost-effective way to achieve a given 
environmental objective (e.g. Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999), although smaller 
firms may prefer prescriptive regulation if they lack skills or capacity to design 
their own solutions (Sinclair, 1997). Environmental regulation in general has 
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also been criticised for placing businesses at a disadvantage compared to 
competitors, typically overseas, who do not have to comply with such stringent 
controls. However, in their seminal paper, Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
argued that more stringent environmental controls can also encourage 
regulated businesses to innovate, leading to greater competitive advantage. 
Testing the validity of the “Porter hypothesis” is an active area of research (e.g. 
Rennings & Rammer, 2011; Rassier & Earnhart, 2010; Ramanathan et al., 
2010).  
The limitations of direct regulation have led governments to add the search for 
“alternatives” to direct regulation to their intellectual agenda for regulatory 
reform (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a).  Pivotal 
questions to address in this search include: what are the alternatives to direct 
regulation? Can they reliably provide the level of environmental risk control that 
society requires, more cost-effectively than direct regulation? What determines 
when and with whom they are effective? 
2.6.2 Economic instruments 
Economic instruments operate by changing the incentives faced by firms or 
individuals to encourage them to voluntarily change their behaviour (Perman et 
al., 2003). Varieties include taxes, subsidies, tradable rights and payments. 
Economic instruments are intended to provide flexibility to businesses and 
individuals to decide how to improve environmental performance targeted by 
the instrument, overcoming some of the limitations of direct regulation in this 
respect. It is argued they are generally more cost-effective than direct 
regulation, but less certain to deliver a target outcome because regulatees may 
choose not to respond to market signals in the specific way intended by policy 
makers (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999). Economic instruments may also prove 
politically unacceptable in some circumstances. For example, in the UK, 
environmental taxes have been criticised by some as “stealth taxes” for many 
years (Daily Telegraph, 2011; Jordan et al., 2003). 
Environmental tax reform has sought to shift the tax burden from employment, 
income and investment to pollution, resource depletion and waste, thus 
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encouraging the production of desirable social “goods” while discouraging 
undesirable social “bads”. This shift offers the hope of a “double dividend” of 
better environmental performance and better economic performance (Bosquet, 
2000). Environmental tax reforms were implemented by various countries 
during the 1990s, for example in Sweden (on CO2 and SO2), Denmark 
(gasoline, electricity, water, waste, cars, CO2, SO2, capital income), Netherlands 
(CO2), UK (landfill tax), Finland (CO2, landfill), Norway (CO2, SO2, diesel oil), 
Germany (petroleum products) and Italy (petroleum products) (Bosquet, 2000). 
In a review of available appraisals of these tax reforms, Bosquet (2000) 
concluded that typically they had delivered significant reductions in pollution, 
small gains in employment and marginal gains or losses in production in the 
short term; although longer term impacts are less clear (Bosquet, 2000). 
However, Fullerton et al. (2008) caution that while economic instruments such 
as taxes offer advantages over direct regulation they are not a panacea. They 
can encourage costly avoidance activities such as waste dumping, may have 
significant distributional consequences placing heavy burdens on the poor, 
create distortions raising prices of goods, and in the UK existing large scale 
taxes are already near or at the upper limit of what can be justified on 
environmental grounds (Fullerton et al., 2008).Taxes are likely to be best 
deployed as part of a mix of instruments, and their choice and design have 
been considered to be crucial (Fullerton et al., 2008). 
The effort required on the part of regulatees, government and regulators to 
operate and enforce economic instruments depends on the type and design of 
instrument, but may represent a significant burden. For example, the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (Clò, 2009) requires effort on the part of 
participating operators of power stations and industrial plants to calculate their 
allowance requirements, trade allowances and apply actions to enable them to 
operate within their allowances; while EU ETS regulators must decide on the 
level of allowances to issue during different trading periods, operate the trading 
market and monitor participant compliance with their allowances (Clò, 2009). 
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In recent years, interest has grown in Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), 
where individuals or governments pay ecosystem managers (e.g. farmers) to 
sustain ecosystems from which they benefit (e.g. for flood protection, water 
purification or carbon sequestration) (Engel et al., 2008). The Environmental 
Stewardship Programme in the UK is a PES scheme under which farmers are 
paid to improve land management practices to improve water quality and 
biodiversity. The scheme has been extensively taken up by farmers and some 
stewardship measures have been demonstrated to improve environmental 
outcomes. For example, Kay et al. (2009) have found that some measures have 
been scientifically proven to improve water quality. However they also 
determined that evidence is lacking for the effectiveness of other agri-
environment measures. 
2.6.3 Information-based instruments 
Information-based instruments are intended to improve environmental 
performance of businesses and individuals by providing better information to 
base decisions on. Gouldson et al. (2008) identify three main types of 
information-based instrument: targeted information provision, naming and 
shaming/faming, and registration, labelling and certification schemes. 
Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) expect information-based approaches to be 
unintrusive, non-coercive and generally cost effective, but exhibiting low 
reliability.  
Information-based instruments, particularly naming and shaming/faming, are 
often implemented to complement existing harder direct regulation. For 
example, the US Toxics Release Inventory (Hamilton, 1995) and the European 
Pollutant Emissions Register (Cañón-de-Francia et al., 2008) seek to enhance 
the effectiveness of direct regulation by publishing details of emissions releases 
by regulated businesses, to harness public and investor pressure for better 
environmental performance. Both have been observed to result in a negative 
impact on share prices of listed businesses on inclusion on the emissions 
register (Cañón-de-Francia et al., 2008; Hamilton, 1995), presenting an 
incentive for businesses to avoid being listed through better environmental 
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performance. However, a comparison of pollution transfer and release inventory 
programmes in the USA, Canada, Australia and England concluded it was 
impossible to generalise about the effect of these systems on emissions or risk, 
whilst observing encouraging downward trends in emissions in the USA and 
England (Kerret & Gray, 2007). Naming and shaming has also been used with 
small businesses. For example the UK “Scores on the Doors” scheme publishes 
food hygiene risk assessments for restaurants gathered through direct 
inspection of premises, harnessing consumer pressure on restaurants and 
leading to improved hygiene standards (Stanton et al., 2008). 
Targeted information provision, for example providing advice and training to 
improve environmental performance of businesses, has been highlighted as an 
important component of regulatory activity (Hampton, 2005). However, 
measuring the impact of such educational interventions may prove challenging 
as effects may be slow to materialise and difficult to attribute to the specific 
intervention. The Envirowise Programme (Mattsson et al., 2010) provided 
resource efficiency training to businesses across the UK.  While Mattsson et al. 
(2010) demonstrate positive feedback from participants and value efficiency 
improvements identified, their evaluation approach has no counterfactual, nor is 
it able to confirm independently that reported improvements have in fact been 
achieved. 
Registration, labelling and certification schemes have become widely adopted 
internationally, and rely on buyers preferring labelled goods to exert pressure on 
businesses to adopt associated environmental standards. Some schemes have 
been established with government support (e.g. the EU Ecolabel), some are 
associated with producer trade bodies (e.g. UK Farm Assurance Scheme), 
while others have been established by non-governmental organisations. The 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
certification schemes were both initiated by the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), and provide international standards for fisheries and forestry 
respectively (Eden & Bear, 2010). The effectiveness of certification schemes 
can be difficult to assess if success is measured against participant compliance 
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with process management standards rather than environmental impact. For 
example Gulbrandsen (2009) concludes that MSC schemes are likely to be 
improving management standards, but it is too early to say what impact this has 
on the marine environment, and that MSC alone is unlikely to ensure the 
sustainability of fisheries.  
2.6.4 Co-regulation and self-regulation 
The UK Government describes “self-regulation” as “an approach initiated and 
undertaken by those whose behaviour is to be regulated” and “co-regulation” is 
“similar to self-regulation but involves some degree of explicit Government 
involvement” (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a). Co-
regulation as a descriptive term has not been widely adopted in the literature, 
featuring more commonly as a subset of voluntary regulation which includes 
direct government involvement (e.g. Koehler, 2007). Gouldson et al. (2008) 
identify six variants of “private and voluntary regulation”: voluntary regulation; 
covenants and negotiated agreements; private corporate regulation; private 
professional regulation; self-regulation; and civic regulation. 
Co-regulation and self-regulation provide a significant degree of flexibility to 
businesses to decide how to achieve environmental objectives, with the 
potential benefit that they will choose the most cost-effective approaches. 
However, their flexibility and voluntary nature presents the risk that businesses 
do little if anything more than they would have done in the absence of the 
instrument (“business as usual”), providing the appearance of good 
environmental behaviour without the costs of implementing it or the delivery of 
authentic outcomes for the environment (sometimes referred to as 
“greenwashing”). Voluntary approaches may prove effective when combined 
with the threat of more direct regulation if performance does not improve, as 
avoiding harder regulation provides an incentive to improve now. Evidence of 
the effectiveness of voluntary approaches is mixed, with ongoing calls for 
further research. Bizer and Julich (1999) undertook an early review of four 
voluntary agreements in the Netherlands and Germany and concluded that they 
could form a valuable part of a mix of instruments, but that voluntary 
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agreements in place of direct regulation or economic instruments would 
constitute a deregulatory “trick”. A more recent extensive study of voluntary 
environmental programmes (VEPs) based largely on research from the US 
Environment Protection Agency concludes that based on current knowledge, 
VEPs in the US that target pollution arising from production processes do not 
incrementally yield significant environmental improvement, although they can 
attract participants and should not be discarded; more research is required 
(Koehler, 2007). In a review of EU experience Bertoldi and Rezessy (2007) 
have found that voluntary agreements for energy efficiency can deliver energy 
savings and could play an important part in climate change mitigation, alongside 
other policy instruments. 
As for the certification schemes described earlier, a key challenge to 
understanding the effectiveness of co- and self-regulation has been the 
absence of environmental outcome measures from their evaluation. For 
example, the UK Assured Farms Standards scheme provides standards against 
which farm performance is assessed, but Lewis et al. (2010) were unable to find 
conclusive evidence that compliance with standards led to better environmental 
performance as this was not measured. Dahlström et al. (2003) found that 
although businesses who had elected to adopt the ISO14001 environmental 
management standard exhibited better environmental management processes 
than those who had not, this did not appear to reduce the likelihood of 
environmental incidents or complaints. Again, the accreditation requirement 
focuses on procedural matters rather than an absolute outcome-based measure 
of environmental performance. 
Few examples of private professional regulation have been identified in 
environmental practice, although this is a developing area. The Specialist in 
Land Condition (SiLC) qualification established by the Royal Society of 
Chemistry and other professional bodies provides assurance of expertise for 
land contamination experts as part of the overall land contamination regulatory 
framework (Luo et al., 2009), and now has more than 140 members (CIRIA, 
2013).   The Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management 
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(CIWEM) has a code of ethics for members (CIWEM, 2004) and the Society for 
the Environment has established a “chartered environmentalist” professional 
qualification (SocEnv, 2013). However the contribution of professional 
membership to environmental outcomes would be hard to attribute and has not 
been attempted to date.  
2.6.5 Support mechanisms and capacity building 
Gouldson et al. (2008) identify three forms of "support mechanisms and 
capacity building": research and knowledge generation; demonstration projects 
and knowledge diffusion; and network building and joint problem solving. The 
development of institutions to encourage investment in new technologies, such 
as the Green Investment Bank in the UK (Green Investment Bank, 2013), is 
another variant. Demonstration projects have been used to help overcome 
innovation uncertainties amongst businesses considering adopting or 
developing new techniques or technologies. In the case of technology 
innovation, it is argued that businesses may struggle to engage in extended 
periods of experimentation with uncertain pay-offs, so government intervention 
may be justified to overcome innovation uncertainties (Hendry et al., 2010). 
Evaluation of demonstration projects is difficult as failure of some initiatives is a 
necessary feature of the innovation process. However Hendry et al. (2010) 
found that demonstration projects for solar photovoltaics and wind in the EU, 
Japan, US, Germany and Switzerland had delivered significant benefits to 
businesses innovating in these areas. 
A key challenge for policy makers is ensuring that funding for support and 
capacity building is well targeted. For example, Armsworth et al. (2010) found 
that UK research funding is not always well aligned with the needs of business, 
which they considered to be a missed opportunity to ensure research findings 
see more widespread application. 
2.6.6 Instrument mixes 
In practice, individual instruments are rarely implemented on their own, and 
more typically form part of an overall mix of instruments which act together to 
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achieve multiple objectives within a policy area. Practically, multiple instruments 
may be required where multiple market failures exist or where multiple 
objectives are to be tackled (Braathen, 2007). Many of the instruments 
described above complement direct regulation, and are considered unlikely to 
be effective in isolation. However, it is possible that over time, a complicated 
mix of different instruments is put in place that results in redundant or conflicting 
measures that may unnecessarily increase the burden on regulatees and 
regulators with little net benefit to society. It may also be the case that despite a 
mix of instruments important issues remain unaddressed. 
Howlett and Rayner (2007) described the history of instrument mix analysis in 
terms of three generations of thought. They argue that first generation students 
of instrument choice, citing examples from the mid to late 20th century, focused 
either on technical or on political explanations for choice and on the debate 
between “good” pro-market approaches and “evil” non-market approaches, and 
were detached from practices on the ground. Second generation analysts at the 
turn of the 21st century attempted to become more policy relevant, for example 
by considering the role of policy networks in instrument development, but still 
tended to focus on single instruments, albeit acknowledging that others are 
present. Third generation thinking in the early 21st century has now recognised 
the need to develop “optimal policy instrument designs in complex multi-
instrument settings” (Howlett & Rayner, 2007). Gunningham’s work 
(Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998) is considered particularly influential in calling for 
“smart regulation”, proposing that policy designers should consider all 
instruments available, employ a carefully designed mix responding to context-
specific features, consider non-state options to do more with less, and actively 
consider procedural options such as information-based and network 
management approaches. Howlett and Rayner (2007) describe these designed 
mixes as “new governance arrangements” (NGAs), used to reshape regulatory 
structures where the goals of policy may be incoherent, and mixes of 
instruments inconsistent. They argue that “integrated” NGAs are both coherent 
in goals and consistent in mix, and they caution against attempting to develop 
NGAs by “layering” new instruments on top of old, “drifting” by shifting policy 
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goals leaving inconsistent mixes, or attempting “conversion” of a consistent 
existing set of instruments by adding new incoherent goals. This view builds on 
Howlett’s previous work (Howlett et al., 2006) that explores the challenges of 
identifying what the component parts of a mix of instruments are in reality, 
highlighting the considerable effort required even to establish an inventory of 
instruments in a given policy area, and the lack of data that they found to 
describe each part on which to base reform. 
A useful example is that of UK waste policy, which includes a complex mix of 
instruments of different types targeted at businesses, households and waste 
disposal operators (Braathen, 2007). UK waste strategy is often described in 
terms of a “waste hierarchy”: prevent, reduce, reuse and recycle (Martin & 
Scott, 2003). Interventions are targeted at preventing or reducing the amount of 
waste produced, at reusing material where possible, and recycling what 
remains, so that disposal is minimised. The presence of multiple instruments is 
consistent with this multiplicity of forms of market failure for different actors and 
multiple objectives.  
The UK Landfill Tax was introduced in 1996 to discourage the use of landfill for 
waste disposal, as land for this purpose was becoming increasingly scarce and 
there was concern about the damaging impact of landfill on groundwater, 
amenity for local residents, methane emissions and human health impacts 
(Martin & Scott, 2003). The Landfill Tax is payable by landfill operators and acts 
to increase the cost of landfill to discourage its use, and was established as an 
escalating fee so that incentives become stronger over time. While the Landfill 
Tax can act to disincentivise landfill where the additional costs can be passed 
on to waste producers, this has not been possible for householders, where 
separate legislation prevents householders being directly charged for waste 
production (Martin & Scott, 2003). Therefore additional measures have been put 
in place to tackle household waste production, including information campaigns 
and changes to collection processes to encourage reuse and recycling.
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Table 2-1: Variants of regulatory instruments and examples from use 
Type Variant Description Example applications Examples and sources 
examined for this paper 
Direct 
"command 
and control" 
regulation 
Ambient 
pollution 
requirements 
The regulator specifies required maximum levels of ambient 
pollution, allowing flexibility to polluters to decide how to 
achieve that level. In the EU, ambient targets have been set 
within EU directives, which members states tackle through 
their national policy mix 
Water quality targets, air 
pollution targets  
Ambient metals targets (Brown et 
al., 2008) 
Input 
restrictions and 
output quotas 
Restrictions are applied in the use or output of products. If a 
material or practice is considered to be sufficiently harmful its 
use may be restricted or banned entirely, with penalties 
enforced for violations of the ban. Where banned materials 
remain in use, their disposal will need to be carefully 
controlled. 
Restrictions in pesticide or 
fertiliser use, restrictions in 
production of potentially harmful 
chemicals 
Ban on holding PCBs under The 
Environmental Protection 
(Disposal of Polychlorinated 
Biphenyls and other Dangerous 
Substances) (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2000 
(Schuster et al., 2010) 
Non-
transferable 
emissions 
licences 
Typically a regulator issues a non-transferable licence, in the 
UK often referred to as a permit, to a business that gives 
authorisation to operate according to specified environmental 
performance requirements, for example maximum permitted 
levels of emissions. The regulator monitors the operation to 
ensure compliance, and may enforce penalties for non-
compliance.  
Controls on emissions to air and 
water, controls on waste 
production and disposal 
Permitting under Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control 
(IPPC) in dairy industry 
(Honkasalo et al., 2005) 
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Type Variant Description Example applications Examples and sources 
examined for this paper 
Technology 
controls 
The regulator specifies requirements for how a business 
operates, specifying the use of particular processes or 
technologies. Variations of standards include application of 
“best practicable environmental option” (BPEO), “best 
practicable means” (BPM), “best available techniques not 
entailing excessive cost” (BATNEEC) and “best available 
technique” (BAT) (Gray et al., 2007).  
Mandatory use of catalytic 
converters in road vehicles, use 
of specific pollution abatement 
technologies 
Farming input and process 
standards in Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zones enforced under Nitrate 
Pollution Prevention Regulations 
2008 (as amended) (Worrall et 
al., 2009) 
Zoning/ location 
controls 
Human impacts on the environment in a particular area can 
be controlled through spatial controls. Spatial controls can be 
used to locate polluters away from people and sensitive 
ecosystems, or to prevent clustering of harmful activities, or 
(less commonly) to move people away from sources of harm. 
Low emissions zones in urban 
areas, building development 
controls, national parks and 
conservation areas, controlled 
fishing zones, marine 
conservation areas 
Conservation designations 
including Site of Special Scientific 
Interest, National Nature 
Reserves, Areas of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty (Selman, 2009) 
Economic 
instruments 
Taxes and 
subsidies 
Environmental taxes and subsidies operate by changing the 
market price of a good or service, reducing or increasing the 
quantity demanded and supplied in the market (Perman et al., 
2003 p217). 
Taxes on emissions to air, land 
(Bosquet, 2000) 
Subsidies to support renewable 
energy 
UK Landfill Tax (Martin & Scott, 
2003) 
Tradable rights Tradable rights systems work by specifying a quantity of 
allowances, e.g. to abstract water or to emit carbon, which 
can then be traded amongst users. The system is designed to 
create an opportunity cost of using an allowance, and 
therefore also creates benefits from not using an allowance. 
Trading allows market actors to find the allocation of 
allowances that maximises the cost-effectiveness of using the 
allowance (Perman et al., p223). 
Individual tradable quotas for 
fisheries, water abstraction 
rights, emissions trading e.g. for 
CO2, SOx, discharge to water 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(Clò, 2009) 
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Type Variant Description Example applications Examples and sources 
examined for this paper 
Payments Conditional payments may be made to incentivise a particular 
activity. “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) (e.g. 
Engel et al., 2008) involve beneficiaries (state or private) 
paying ecosystem managers for the benefits delivered by 
those ecosystems. The effectiveness of PES schemes 
depends critically on their design (Engel et al., 2008). 
Agri-environment payments, 
conservation payments, deposit 
return payments 
Agricultural stewardship 
payments (Kay et al., 2009) 
Information-
based 
instruments 
Targeted 
information 
provision 
Information is made available by public or private bodies to 
enable businesses or individuals to make better-informed 
decisions that impact upon the environment. The 
effectiveness of the approach is likely to depend both on the 
capacity and inclination of the targeted group to change their 
behaviour, and on the relevance, accessibility and perceived 
trustworthiness of the source (Gouldson et al., 2008). 
Training programmes, advisory 
bodies (e.g. UK Carbon Trust 
and Energy Savings Trust) 
Envirowise (a UK resource 
efficiency club) (Mattsson et al., 
2010) 
Naming and 
shaming/faming 
Information is made available describing the environmental 
performance of businesses, through for example a publicised 
inventory of toxic emissions, with the intention of incentivising 
better environmental behaviour through avoided damage to or 
enhancement of corporate reputation. The effectiveness is 
likely to depend on the level of external scrutiny a business 
receives, and therefore this approach may be less effective for 
smaller business that receive less attention (Gouldson et al., 
2008). 
Emissions inventories, public 
accolades and prizes, adverse 
publicity associated with 
prosecutions 
“Scores on the Doors” (Stanton et 
al., 2008) 
European Pollutant Emissions 
Register (Cañón-de-Francia et 
al., 2008) 
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Type Variant Description Example applications Examples and sources 
examined for this paper 
Registration, 
labelling and 
certification 
Typically information describing the environmental 
performance of the businesses delivering a product or service 
is made available to consumers using a product label, 
enabling consumers to choose products with better 
environmental performance. The approach may encourage 
businesses to gain certification to enhance their reputation, 
and relies on consumers buying on the basis of better 
environmental performance (Gouldson et al., 2008).  
Food labelling, electrical product 
labelling 
Forest Stewardship Council 
certification scheme; Marine 
Stewardship Council certification 
scheme (Eden and Bear, 2010) 
Co-
regulation 
and self-
regulation 
Voluntary 
regulation 
Gouldson et al. (2008) use "voluntary regulation" to describe a 
group of actors agreeing standards which individual 
businesses can sign up to. 
Responsible Care Initiative in 
chemicals industry 
Assured Food Standards 
Scheme (the "Red Tractor") 
(Lewis et al., 2010). 
Covenants and 
negotiated 
agreements 
In this approach government makes an agreement with 
regulated businesses to achieve particular standards, which 
forms a contract and may incur sanctions if the contract is not 
met (Gouldson et al., 2008). 
Packaging reduction 
agreements, recycling 
agreements, pollution reduction 
agreements 
Climate Change Agreements, 
related to the Climate Change 
Act 2008 (Davies & Makuch, 
2009) 
Private 
corporate 
regulation 
Gouldson et al. (2008) use "private corporate regulation" to 
describe situations where one firm defines standards with 
which suppliers are required to comply in order to maintain 
ongoing business. 
Food retailer sustainability 
programmes, government 
procurement requirements 
Corporate social responsibility 
programmes at Waitrose (a food 
retailer) (Spence & Bourlakis, 
2009) 
Private 
professional 
regulation 
A professional body acts to apply standards through  
conditions of membership (Gouldson et al., 2008). 
Membership of professional 
bodies 
CIWEM code (CIWEM, 2004) 
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Type Variant Description Example applications Examples and sources 
examined for this paper 
Self-regulation Gouldson et al. (2008) use "self-regulation" to describe 
situations when actors choose to apply and comply with 
environmental standards without threat of sanctions for non-
participation or non-compliance. 
Environmental management 
systems, unilateral commitments 
to good performance 
ISO14001 (Dahlström et al., 
2003) 
Civic regulation Gouldson et al. (2008) use "civic (or community-based) 
regulation" to describe situations where community or 
pressure groups agree performance standards with particular 
firms. 
Activities of NGOs and 
community groups 
WWF discourse in sustainable 
Tilapia farming (Belton et al., 
2009) 
Support 
mechanisms 
and capacity 
building 
Research and 
knowledge 
generation 
Governments or other actors may undertake research to 
increase knowledge that informs better environmental 
decision making (Gouldson et al., 2008). 
Funding of university research Activities of Natural Environment 
Research Council (Armsworth et 
al., 2010) 
Demonstration 
projects and 
knowledge 
diffusion 
Governments may choose to invest in demonstration projects 
to demonstrate feasibility, raise awareness and reduce risks 
of new technologies or processes (Gouldson et al., 2008). 
This investment could be managed through a specially 
designed investment institution, such as the UK's Green 
Investment Bank (Green Investment Bank, 2013). 
Carbon capture and storage, 
sustainable agriculture practice, 
eco-homes and buildings 
Solar voltaics and wind 
demonstration projects in EU, US 
and Japan (Hendry et al., 2010) 
Network 
building and 
joint problem 
solving 
Initiatives designed to encourage people to exchange ideas 
and learning to improve environmental performance 
(Gouldson et al., 2008). 
Discussion groups, conferences, 
networking events, best practice 
programmes, industry-initiated 
guidance (e.g. on surface water 
management at construction 
sites). 
Countryside Stewardship  and 
Environmentally Sensitive Area 
schemes knowledge sharing 
(Morris, 2006) 
 
37 
2.7 The availability of evidence for regulatory reform 
The design of environmental regulation requires the prediction of the behaviour of a 
chain of influences from the regulatory intervention, through its impact on business 
or individual behaviour, to the impact that the changed behaviour has on the 
environment, to the harm or benefit that the environmental change has on people. 
Each of the links in this causal chain needs to be understood, where that 
understanding is informed by evidence drawn from a wide range of disciplines 
including the social and physical sciences. Table 2-2 highlights sources of evidence 
available to UK policy makers. 
Table 2-2: Sources of evidence available to UK policy makers 
Information required Potential sources 
State of the environment affected, the pressures upon 
it and their drivers, and the resulting impacts 
Environmental monitoring data. Social and natural 
science research 
Identity of regulations and other policy instruments for 
the policy area 
Statute. Definitions of policy programmes 
Constraints imposed by current legal framework Legal advisors 
Industry’s perspective on where burdens lie, scope for 
improvement and innovative ideas for reform 
Engagement of individual businesses and trade 
associations 
Civil society’s perspective on where burdens lie, scope 
for improvement and innovative ideas for reform 
Engagement of civil society groups. Direct engagement 
with individuals 
Policy makers’/ regulators’ perspectives on where 
burdens lie, scope for improvement and innovative 
ideas for reform 
Consultation and discussion through formal and 
informal organisational links 
Political preferences for different approaches Communication with ministers 
Overall social costs and benefits of specific regulations 
and policies (ex ante and ex post) 
Regulatory impact assessments. Policy appraisals. 
Composition and characteristics of regulated 
businesses and people 
National statistics and surveys. Segmentation models. 
Monitoring and inspection information from regulators. 
Alternative regulatory approaches International comparisons. Comparisons with other 
policy areas, and with non-governmental approaches. 
 
The need for cross-disciplinary evaluation is highlighted by the varying foci of the 
studies examined for this review.  For example, Spence and Bourlakis (2009) review 
the nature of a food retailer’s relationship with suppliers and the mechanisms 
through which this may propagate corporate social (and environmental) responsibility 
along the supply chain from a social science perspective, but do not assess the 
effectiveness of this activity in reducing environmental harm. Meanwhile several 
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physical science studies observe trends in environmental impacts (e.g. Worrall et al., 
2009; Schuster et al., 2010), but do not attempt to assess causal relationships with 
regulation. More comprehensive analyses of evidence do exist in some policy areas, 
but are far less common. For example Kay et al. (2009) have undertaken a broad 
assessment of peer-reviewed evidence for agricultural stewardship measures, 
concluding that while evidence exists for some interventions, for many it does not 
because scientific evaluation has not been undertaken. 
The different interests of researchers may result in a patchwork of evaluations which 
provide policy makers with a partial evidence base for decision-making. In addition to 
incomplete evidence about specific implemented regulatory instruments, in many 
instances evidence is entirely absent from the literature. For example, the Courtauld 
Commitment (WRAP, 2013) is a high-profile and reportedly successful voluntary 
agreement for packaging reduction in the UK retail sector, but no academic 
appraisals of whether and why it has been a success have been identified. Similarly 
the impact of the “What’s in your backyard?” website (Environment Agency, 2013a), 
which may have some impact on operator proclivity to pollute, has not been 
assessed in the literature.  
2.8 Factors that may influence regulatory effectiveness in practice 
The lack of evaluation evidence is one amongst many sources of uncertainty faced 
by policy makers and regulators in regulatory reform efforts. Despite this, some 
recurring factors that may influence the effectiveness of regulation in practice 
emerge from this review. 
2.8.1 Characteristics of instrument design 
Coherence: A lack of coherence with other instruments may limit the effectiveness 
of instruments in practice. For example, Braathen (2007) questions the benefit of 
targeting both the UK landfill tax and the tradable landfill allowance scheme at the 
same issue. Confusing, complex or inconsistent regulation seems unlikely to 
encourage business compliance. Instrument effectiveness may also be affected by 
their consistency over time, as businesses and individuals may prefer clear long-
term signals about policy direction against which they can plan, as reflected in the 
call from business for “long, loud and legal” climate change policy in the UK 
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(CEMEP, 2007). Honkasalo et al. (2005) emphasise the importance of consistent 
requirements and signals that improvements will be needed in the short and long 
term as elements of the ideal permitting process, and these principles seem likely to 
hold for other instruments. Poorly integrated mixes of instruments are expected to be 
complicated, costly to administer, provide conflicting incentives and to be difficult to 
change (Howlett & Rayner, 2007) so the coherence of regulatory design has been 
highlighted as a key factor influencing efficiency and effectiveness. 
Flexibility: A lack of flexibility could result in regulatory instruments ceasing to be 
suitably targeted and their effectiveness diminishing. The necessity for change may 
arise as a result of social, economic or environmental change, or as a result of new 
information becoming available. For example, Selman (2009) highlights the 
possibility of climate change leading to changes in the geographical distribution of 
biodiversity that conservation areas are intended to protect, so that their boundaries 
are no longer appropriate. In the case of the UK Landfill Tax, Martin and Scott (2003) 
highlight the impact that changing commodity prices have on the incentives for 
recycling, and Davies and Makuch (2009) argue that the apparent impact of Climate 
Change Agreements was significantly as a result of the decline of the UK steel 
industry, which may have reduced the pressure on other sectors to achieve as 
significant emissions reductions as they could have done. Policy instruments may be 
deliberately designed to change over time. The EU ETS began with a pilot phase so 
that regulators for the first time were able to establish a measure of the emissions 
levels of regulated industries. While the lack of information about emissions meant 
that emissions permits were over-allocated in the pilot phase, leading ultimately to 
the carbon price falling to zero (Clò, 2009), the new information gathered has meant 
that a more challenging cap can be designed for the next phase of trading.  
Jones (2007) has identified seven approaches in which environmental regulation 
exhibits adaptability to address scientific uncertainty, ranging from simply 
acknowledging that uncertainty needs to be taken into account in decision making, 
through to “adaptive management”. Adaptive management explicitly recognises 
managers’ uncertainty in knowledge about a system, and holds that if no single best 
policy can be chosen a set of alternatives should be trialled and monitored to learn 
about the effects of different courses of action (Linkov et al., 2006). While an 
adaptive management approach has been adopted for various ecosystem 
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management and remediation challenges (Linkov et al., 2006) it is unlikely to be 
appropriate for all regulatory problems, for example where a monitored failure could 
still have a major impact (e.g. the building of a nuclear power plant (Jones, 2007)). It 
has been argued that much environmental law is based on the principles of 
preservation and restoration to their original state (“stationarity”), and on the belief 
that environmental impacts can be accurately anticipated, and are not therefore 
designed to accommodate adaptive management (Craig, 2010; Thrower, 2006). 
Craig (2010) argues that environmental law needs to be reformed to become 
“bimodal”, allowing on the one hand an adaptive management approach to deal with 
unpredictable impacts of climate change, and on the other a precautionary approach 
to reduce all other stressors on the environment (e.g. land, water and air pollution) to 
maximise ecosystem and social resilience. 
2.8.2 Characteristics of the regulated 
Motivation: Much of regulatory design for businesses begins from the primary 
assumption that business behaviour is driven by the desire to maximise profits and 
strategic competitive advantage. This profit motive underlies the design of 
instruments designed to influence input costs and output prices, to influence 
purchasing decisions of customers, to influence reputation, and to influence investor 
behaviour through environmental performance disclosure. The effect of an 
instrument on business behaviour can reasonably be expected to depend on the 
impact it is expected to have on profitability. Martin and Scott (2003) suggest, for 
example, that the Landfill Tax was originally set at too low a level to significantly 
influence business behaviour, so was increased gradually until it presented a 
sufficient economic incentive to drive change amongst operators.  
Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that businesses have become increasingly 
motivated by their position on corporate social responsibility (CSR) rankings, such as 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index or FTSE4Good Index, which seek to reflect the 
businesses’ ethical behaviour and attract considerable publicity. Proponents have 
argued that good CSR performance should be expected on grounds of a company’s 
moral obligation to “do the right thing”, to operate sustainability to protect the 
wellbeing of future generations, to maintain its licence to operate from government 
and society, and to protect and enhance its reputation (Porter & Kramer, 2006). 
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Increasingly it is argued that CSR and good environmental performance should be 
embedded into core business strategy to maximise its benefit for both business and 
society (Porter & Kramer, 2006). The recent United Nations Environment 
Programme Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity initiative (UNEP TEEB) has 
sought to highlight the benefits of biodiversity to human welfare, and the risks 
presented by its degradation, so that  businesses can incorporate analysis of these 
opportunities and risks into corporate strategy (UNEP, 2010). In the UK various 
organisations (e.g. Tomorrow’s Company, and Forum for the Future) seek to help 
businesses embed CSR and good environmental performance into their strategy and 
operations, and many businesses are pursuing good environmental performance 
amongst other CSR commitments (e.g. Marks & Spencers’ Plan A). 
Environmental policy design for individuals is moving increasingly to influence other 
drivers of individual behaviour beyond the financial and economic, informed 
particularly by insights from psychology and behavioural economics highlighting the 
bounded rationality of human decision making (e.g. Kahneman, 2002). The 
MINDSPACE model promoted by the UK Cabinet Office (Dolan et al., 2010) 
identifies nine important influences on behaviour from theory (Table 2-3) and 
emphasises the need to “exemplify” behaviour change in individuals, suggesting that 
people will be influenced by the behaviour of peers, and to “engage” the public to 
increase their commitment. However, economic drivers remain important for 
individuals (recognised by the need to “encourage” in the MINDSPACE model), who 
may be expected to change relative prioritisation of environmental behaviour (e.g. in 
the purchase of goods with good environmental credentials) as their personal 
financial position changes. 
Capacity: The extent to which regulated actors change behaviour in response to 
regulation is also likely to depend upon their ability to understand the implications of 
regulation and to manage related risks and business opportunities. Organisational 
maturity models for assessing this capacity have been developed generically, for 
example the risk management standard produced by risk management institutions in 
the UK (AIRMIC/ALARM/IRM, 2002), and for specific industrial sectors, such as the 
offshore industry (Strutt et al., 2006) and the water industry (MacGillivray & Pollard, 
2008). Support mechanisms and capacity building instruments are specifically 
designed to increase this capacity in businesses, and similarly MINDSPACE 
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recognises the potential need to “enable” individuals to change behaviour (Dolan et 
al., 2010). Other instruments may also increase capacity, for example by providing 
standards that serve to educate the regulated in better environmental management, 
or through advice and guidance provided by regulators. 
Table 2-3: MINDSPACE mnemonic: Influences on behaviour (Dolan et al., 2010) 
Messenger we are heavily influenced by who communicates information 
Incentives our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental shortcuts such as strongly 
avoiding losses 
Norms we are strongly influenced by what others do 
Defaults we “go with the flow” of pre-set options 
Salience our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us  
Priming our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues 
Affect our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions  
Commitments we seek to be consistent with our public promises, and reciprocate acts 
Ego we act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves 
2.8.3 Characteristics of the regulator 
Motivation: The motivations of the regulator, both corporately and individually, may 
affect the overall effectiveness of the regulatory instrument which they oversee, for 
example by influencing the ambition with which targets are set or the rigour with 
which standards are enforced. Government and non-government regulators may 
have incentives to enforce rules more or less strongly. While government regulators 
are likely to face safeguards in place to monitor and prevent “regulatory capture”, 
governments could be influenced by groups lobbying for particular interest groups, 
for example as Sharman and Holmes (2010) have argued has been the case for 
setting biofuels targets in the EU. In the case of non-governmental regulators, NGOs 
may be motivated to demonstrate effective regulation in order to maintain support 
from funders, whereas other non-governmental institutional models may have 
industry interests in the strongest position in decision-making. The MSC and FSC 
certification schemes emphasise the use of peer-reviewed science to inform the 
rules to which certified organisations must adhere to avoid bias towards or against 
industry interests, although Eden and Bear’s (2010) account illustrates how different 
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interest groups within the schemes’ governance have debated how stringent rules 
should be. In a recent review of research on regulatory enforcement Pautz (2010c) 
has argued that while the transition to next-generation environmental policies will 
have significant implications for environmental inspectors, the concerns of regulatory 
capture are overstated. Nevertheless, the motivations of regulators have been 
identified as an important factor influencing instrument effectiveness. 
Risk-based decision-making capability: In the operation of regulation, regulators 
will need to continually gather and assimilate information to inform better strategy 
and tactics, and to inform the allocation of finite resources. This kind of risk-based 
decision-making underpins the regulator’s capacity to apply risk-based regulation, 
and has been frequently called for (e.g. Hampton, 2005). While organisational 
maturity models have been developed for various industries and purposes they have 
not been developed specifically for benchmarking environmental regulator 
performance. Risk-based decision-making elements have been reflected in the 
National Intelligence Model (NIM) for UK policing (Association of Chief Police 
Officers, 2007), which have been applied for environmental regulation on the Great 
Barrier Reef (Weekers, 2011). The NIM highlights processes considered necessary 
to enable effective intelligence-led policing, including intelligence gathering and 
analysis, tasking and coordination of operations, tactical resolution by choosing the 
right interventions for a given problem, and operational review to assess overall 
trends and strategic organisational responses (Association of Chief Police Officers, 
2007). Sparrow (2008) argues that organisations focused on harm reduction are 
most effective when their resources are organised around the identification and 
reduction of specific harms, rather than around processes or skill-based functions, 
while acknowledging that this presents a major challenge to many organisations to 
implement in practice. The capacity of regulators to make risk-based decisions has 
been highlighted as a key factor influencing the effectiveness of regulation, although 
consensus on what this means in practice has yet to be clearly defined. 
Technical knowledge: As discussed earlier, evidence of what works when is 
frequently patchy and contested, and failure to use technical knowledge effectively 
may lead to considerable wasted effort for regulator and regulated, and failure to 
achieve environmental objectives. For example, Kay et al. (2009) emphasise that 
much evidence is lacking to inform the use of agricultural stewardship measures, 
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while Worrall et al. (2009) conclude that the lack of objective success of Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) demands that the approach is rethought, despite NVZs 
having been extensively deployed across the UK. Belton et al. (2009) argue that a 
deep understanding of food production practice overseas is critical to the success of 
any international food sustainability initiative. The capacity of the regulator to 
understand the relationships between regulatory interventions, changes in business 
and individual behaviour, and the ensuing impact on the environment has been 
considered key, and is a major challenge. 
Negotiation skills: Regulators may need to negotiate with the regulated during the 
design of regulation, for example to agree overall objectives for a sectoral 
agreement, or during its operation, for example to agree the terms of a specific 
licence for an operator. The EU ETS has required national negotiations between 
member states and affected industries to agree appropriate emissions caps, and 
between member states to agree how the burden of achieving the overall EU carbon 
reduction target should be distributed across states (Clò, 2009). On a more local 
scale, regulators may need to act as facilitators and negotiators to establish new 
institutions through which groups can self-regulate, for example to further encourage 
the development of Water Abstraction Groups (Leathes et al., 2008). Regulators’ 
effectiveness in undertaking these negotiations has been seen to have a direct 
impact on the overall effectiveness of the instrument concerned. 
2.9 The role of ethnography in research for better regulation 
Many of the factors emerging as important for regulatory effectiveness are subtle, 
nuanced, and concerned with how the regulation is implemented in practice. 
Understanding these softer aspects of regulatory practice may enable the better 
design of both governmental and non-governmental approaches to regulation, but 
they are rarely researched explicitly. A recent literature review by the Environment 
Agency (2011) found relatively little evidence of the effectiveness of regulator advice 
and guidance, boardroom interventions, approaches to regulating good performers 
or third-party activity to deliver regulation, and little analysis of their relative cost-
effectiveness. Better understanding of regulatory practice may play a key part in 
addressing day-to-day frustrations that businesses and the public may encounter 
that may contribute to the perceptions of regulation as bureaucratic “red tape” that 
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are reflected in current UK Government initiatives to deliver better regulation (e.g. 
Cabinet Office, 2013a). 
In order to reveal these nuanced elements of regulatory practice, researchers may 
adopt methods which include an element of “ethnography”. Ethnography was 
originally developed as a method for describing peoples or cultures and is rooted in 
anthropology, but more recently has been adapted for “real life” research in studies 
of the researcher’s own culture, including in business research (Denscombe, 2007). 
Ethnographic research is likely to require that the researcher spends significant 
amounts of time with the subjects of study (government or non-government 
regulators), examining how they understand things and perceive reality, gathering 
research data on all aspects of day to day activities, adopting a holistic approach 
“which stresses processes, relationships, connections and interdependency among 
the component parts”, while acknowledging the researcher’s own role in interpreting 
and explaining what they observe (Denscombe, 2007). Similar research objectives 
can be observed in “service design” practice which has been adopted in private and 
public sector performance improvement contexts (e.g. The Design Council, 2011; 
Maglio & Spohrer, 2008). While lessons can be drawn from these sources to inform 
the design of risk-based decision-making processes for environmental regulation, no 
academic research has been identified that develops an organisational capability 
model for this purpose. Elements of the analysis in this section could form the basis 
of such a model. Furthermore, the model could be used to assess the suitability of 
non-governmental forms of regulation (e.g. to assess whether a particular industry 
group has or could develop the capability to become a non-governmental regulator), 
which may provide a useful decision support tool for policy makers. 
2.10 Conclusions 
This review has explored the range of instruments available to policy makers and 
regulators for the delivery of better regulation, and examined the role of evidence in 
instrument selection. Recurring factors affecting regulatory effectiveness have been 
identified that provide a guide to policy makers and regulators considering regulatory 
reform. Environmental regulation has shifted forms over recent decades, as policy 
makers and regulators supplement direct regulation with economic instruments and 
voluntary approaches, and seek to harness the influence of non-state actors to 
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achieve environmental objectives (Gunningham, 2009). The collective international 
experience that has been accumulated over this period provides policy makers and 
regulators with a wide range of successful regulatory approaches from which to 
learn, and provides ideas for the design of better regulation elsewhere.  
Good policy and regulation should be “evidence based” and “risk informed”. 
However, evidence for the efficiency and effectiveness of specific instruments in 
managing public risks is frequently lacking. It may be limited by incomplete or non-
existent evaluation of existing instruments. Evidence available may be brokered by 
stakeholders to influence regulatory reform, constraining its availability to policy 
makers and regulators. Scientific understanding of risks may be limited, and will 
always be open to change as new evidence emerges. How can policy makers and 
regulators decide what constitutes a sufficient body of evidence on which to base 
instrument selection? Weight of evidence frameworks and systematic review 
methods offer promising ways forward, but current use of such approaches in 
environmental policy lag far behind their use in other domains, such as medical 
science. Howlett and Rayner (Howlett et al., 2006) illustrate the difficulty of even 
identifying the full set of regulations and influences that need to be included in an 
analysis of a policy mix to support regulatory reform. The task is made more complex 
by the range of business motivations and capabilities of different sectors and of 
individual businesses within sectors. Yet this is the task faced by policy makers and 
regulators. How should policy makers go about performing this task? How then can 
they understand the complex system of society, the environment and regulatory 
action that they seek to improve? New approaches are required to support this 
complex task. 
It seems clear, as Sparrow (2008) has argued, that in many cases rather than 
attempting to identify standard approaches to managing environmental risk across 
the whole industries or sectors, instead regulators must become expert in the 
process of picking important problems, and fixing them, using whatever methods are 
appropriate to tackle a specific harm. Whether designing national frameworks or 
local solutions, policy makers and regulators need to understand the subtleties and 
nuances of how different actions undertaken by regulators (state or otherwise) 
influence business behaviour in practice. This remains a significant gap in research 
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that needs to be urgently addressed, and will require ethnographic approaches to 
reveal.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the choice and use of methods for this research. Section 3.2 
explains methodology selection, addressing the chosen approach to social science 
and logical reasoning, the selection and approach to qualitative research, and the 
use of the case study approach, concluding with a summary of the overall research 
approach. Section 3.3 explains data collection, management and analysis methods, 
ethical considerations, and the evolution of the methods during the course of the 
research. Finally Section 3.4 discusses potential methodological weaknesses and 
how these have been addressed.  
3.2 Methodology selection 
3.2.1  Approaches to social science 
Neuman (Neuman, 2003) describes three approaches to social science: i) positivist, 
ii) interpretive, and iii) critical social science. Broadly defined, positivist social 
science, or positivism, is the approach of natural sciences such as chemistry and 
physics, and sees social science as “an organised method of combining deductive 
logic with precise empirical observations of individual behaviour in order to discover 
and confirm a set of probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general 
patterns of human activity” (Neuman, 2003).  Positivism was developed by Auguste 
Comte (1798-1857), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), 
and researchers following this approach prefer to use quantitative data and often use 
statistics, surveys and experiments. 
The approach of interpretive social science is “the systematic analysis of socially 
meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural 
settings in order to arrive at understanding and interpretations of how people create 
and maintain their social worlds” (Neuman, 2003). Interpretive social science 
originates from the work of Max Weber (1864-1920) and Wilheim Dilthey (1833-
1911). While positivists assume that everyone shares the same meaning system and 
experiences the world in the same way, the interpretive approach assumes that this 
may or may not be the case and places importance on understanding the meaning 
people place upon social interactions. Interpretive researchers may seek to 
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understand meaning through close analysis of transcripts of conversations, or 
through participant observation and field research, obtaining detailed qualitative data 
to gain in-depth understanding of the motivations for why people have behaved as 
they have (Neuman, 2003). 
The critical social science approach sees social science as a “critical process of 
inquiry that goes beyond surface illusions to uncover the real structures in the 
material world in order to help people change conditions and build a better world for 
themselves”, and can be traced to Karl Marx (1818-1883), Theodor Adorno (1903-
1969), Erich Fromm (1900-1980) and Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) (Neuman, 
2003). In common with interpretive social science, the critical social science 
approach criticises positivism for failing to address the meanings people ascribe to 
events, their capacity to feel and think and their social context. Furthermore, the 
critical social science approach criticises positivism for assuming an unchanging 
social order and, therefore, defending the status quo, and criticises interpretive social 
science as immoral and passive without a strong value position to help people see 
“false illusions” around them so that they can improve their lives (Neuman, 2003). 
The critical social science approach is often adopted by community action groups, 
political organisations and social movements; the researcher should be a 
“transformative intellectual” (Neuman, 2003). 
This thesis has adopted a predominantly interpretive social science approach, in so 
far as the research has examined meanings and motivations of social actors through 
qualitative analysis, and has tended towards a relatively neutral view on the rights or 
wrongs of opinions expressed by participants. However, in common with a more 
positivist approach, the research has sought to build on existing theory so that better 
decisions can be made by policy makers, regulators and other stakeholders to 
improve environmental regulation in future. 
3.2.2 Inductive and deductive reasoning 
When developing theories about the social world, researchers may begin with an 
abstract hypothesis and seek data to test it, an approach described as “deductive”. 
Alternatively, the researcher may begin with data from observations of the world and 
seek to move towards more abstract generalisable theory, an approach described as 
“inductive” (Kelle, 2005).  
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In their 1967 book “The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research”, Strauss and Glazer criticized what they saw as the over-emphasis of 
theory testing using the deductive approach in sociology, and the accompanying de-
emphasis of discovering the concepts and hypotheses that best describe the subject 
of research (Kelle, 2005). This they believed perpetuated “great man” theories, and 
reduced researchers to a mass of “proletariat testers” (Kelle, 2005). In their 
“grounded theory” approach, Strauss and Glazer intended to create a research 
method that allowed theory to “emerge” from the data rather than “forcing” data to fit 
with preconceived theories. The researcher must make use of their “theoretical 
sensitivity” to draw on the their pre-existing knowledge, though Strauss and Glazer 
diverged in their views on how to achieve this in practice (Kelle, 2005). 
The case study research described in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis has pursued an 
inductive, grounded approach, seeking to develop explanatory theory from the 
qualitative data gathered through interviews with case study participants. 
3.2.3 Qualitative and quantitative social research 
Payne and Payne (Payne & Payne, 2004) distinguish between quantitative and 
qualitative methods of social research. Quantitative methods look for regularities in 
peoples’ lives by identifying empirical components of the social world that can be 
described numerically and whose associations with each other can be examined 
through statistical techniques. Quantitative methods tend to be associated with 
deductive reasoning. In contrast, qualitative methods produce non-quantitative, 
descriptive accounts of small numbers of people, aiming to understand the meanings 
people make of their lives. Qualitative methods are based on the belief that “social 
interactions form an integrated set of relationships best understood by inductive 
procedures” (Payne & Payne, 2004). 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods of research are relevant to the study of 
environmental policy and regulation. For example, quantitative analyses have been 
used to examine the relationship between environmental performance of firms and 
their adoption of specific environmental management standards (Dahlström et al., 
2003), and the relationship between stock market valuation of firms and the 
publication of their environmental performance (Cañón-de-Francia et al., 2008; 
Hamilton, 1995). Qualitative analyses have been used to examine why particular 
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voluntary agreements have been effective (Bizer & Julich, 1999), and to understand 
the interactions between regulatory officers and regulated businesses (Pautz, 
2010b).  
The research described in this thesis has drawn on both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence to address the research question. However, the new research undertaken 
for this thesis has been qualitative, as it has sought to examine the perceptions of 
different stakeholders involved in regulatory reform to explain why they behave as 
they do. These perceptions would not be readily accessed through quantitative 
methods. 
As explained in Section 2.9, during the course of the literature review for this thesis 
ethnography was identified as a suitable methodology for examining the practice of 
regulatory officers. Close working with Defra officers during some stages of this 
research has provided the author with something of an “insiders view” of the realities 
of policy making in government, reflecting some aspects of the ethnographic 
approach. However, as the research objectives required a broader consideration of 
factors affecting policy and regulatory effectiveness beyond the practice of policy 
makers and regulators, a more traditional interview-based approach was adopted for 
the formal research presented in this thesis. 
3.2.4 Qualitative data analysis techniques 
Miles and Huberman (Miles & Huberman, 1994) describe an iterative process for 
analysing qualitative data, as illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1: Iterative process for qualitative data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994)  
Field notes (e.g. notes made during interviews, or recordings of interviews) are 
written up into a form that can be understood and analysed (e.g. through 
transcription of recorded interviews into a text transcript). The next stage, called 
“coding”, is the process of adding tags or labels (“codes”) to chunks of text, that are 
field notes write up coding display data conclusions outline report
[iterate]
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used to retrieve and organise this data for analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Miles 
and Huberman (1994) identify various types of code, that may be “descriptive” 
entailing little interpretation by the researcher, or more “interpretive” reflecting the 
interpretation of the meaning of the data by the researcher, or “pattern” codes may 
be used to identify recurring patterns in the data. Various coding strategies have 
been proposed by social researchers over recent decades. The data display stage 
involves presenting information systematically in a visual format so that the 
researcher can draw valid conclusions. At this stage the researcher is likely to need 
to return to earlier stages in the process to gather further field notes and/or refine 
coding, through an iterative process, until finally data can be summarised into and 
outline, which is finally written up as a report (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Miles and 
Huberman also suggest an alternative process where an outline of the final version 
of the study is developed before field research begins, to help structure the enquiry 
from the outset. 
3.2.5 Case study research 
There are various social science research methods, including experiments, surveys, 
archival analysis, histories, and case studies. Yin (2009) defines a case study as 
follows: 
“(1) A case study is an empirical enquiry that 
 investigates a phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
 (2) The case study inquiry 
 copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
 relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
 benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis.” 
Yin (2009) argues that three conditions distinguish the appropriate method, as 
summarised in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1: Relevant situations for different research methods (Yin, 2009) 
METHOD Form of research 
question 
Requires control of 
behavioural events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary events? 
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, why? No No 
Case study How, why? No Yes 
 
Firstly, the form of the research question differentiates between methods. “What” 
questions may be exploratory (e.g. “what can be learned from a study of a start up 
business”), in which case any of the methods may be used, or about prevalence 
(e.g. “what have been the ways that communities have assimilated new migrants?”), 
when surveys or archival analyses will be appropriate. Similarly surveys or archival 
analyses are appropriate to address “who”, “where”, “how many” and “how much” 
questions, as they are also concerned with incidence or prevalence. “How” and 
“why” questions are more explanatory, and are likely to require the use of 
experiments, histories or case studies to trace operational links over time. 
Secondly, if the researcher is able to manipulate behaviour of the studied subjects 
directly, precisely and systematically, an experimental method may be feasible, in a 
laboratory setting or in the field. For example, randomised field trials, where different 
groups of individuals are subjected to an intervention while others are not and the 
resulting changes in behaviour are compared, can be valuable for examining the 
effectiveness of social policy. Randomised field trials are more difficult to use when 
examining changes in communities rather than individuals (as is often the case in 
social policy) because the design of the experiment becomes limited by the number 
of participating communities rather than the number of individuals, and communities 
may change during the course of the experiment. If the researcher is unable to 
control behavioural events then surveys, archival analyses, histories and case 
studies remain feasible options. Finally, histories focus on past events where the 
researcher has virtually no access to individuals involved and must rely on 
documentary evidence, whereas experiments, surveys and case studies can also 
gather evidence from direct observation and interviews. 
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The central research question for this thesis, “what forms of policy and regulation 
work when, with whom and why?”, combines “what” and “why” questions concerned 
with contemporary events, suggesting that a survey or archival analysis method to 
address the “what” would need to be combined with experimental or case study 
methods for the “why”. Since the researcher lacked control over behavioural events 
studied, a case study approach is the feasible option to explore “why”. 
Yin (2009) identifies various sources of evidence for case studies, including 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-
observation and physical artefacts. 
Findings from case study research may be used for “analytic generalisation”, where 
each case study is analogous to a new experiment to test theory with new empirical 
data. If a case study provides support for a theory then replication may be claimed, 
and results may be considered more potent if they support one theory and do not 
support an alternative plausible theory (Yin, 2009). “Analytic generalisation” is 
different to “statistical generalisation”, where an inference is made about a whole 
population from a sample. 
Case studies may follow single case or multiple-case designs, and in either design 
the study may be holistic (a single unit of analysis is studied within each case) or 
embedded (multiple units of analysis are studied within each case) (Yin, 2009). 
Rationales for single case designs include when (i) the case is considered critical in 
so far as in itself it can confirm, challenge or extend a well defined body of theory, (ii) 
the case is extreme or unique, for example examining a case of a rare disease (iii) 
the case is representative or typical, (iv) the case is revelatory, analysing a 
phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science, or (v) the case is longitudinal, 
examining theories of change over time (Yin, 2009). For this research, the case of 
instrument selection at Defra described in Chapter 5 is a critical case for theories of 
environmental policy making; if theories do not reflect the realities of policy making at 
Defra then their value in the UK context should be seriously questioned. 
The rationale for multiple-case designs is analogous to the rationale for completing 
multiple experiments which test the same set of theories while varying some 
elements of the experimental conditions; each case should be selected either 
predicting similar results (a literal replication), or to predict contrasting results for 
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anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication). This “replication” logic is different 
from the “sampling” logic used for surveys, where the data from the sample surveyed 
is assumed to reflect the entire universe or pool under examination, and inferential 
statistics are used to assess confidence intervals for the results (Yin, 2009). For this 
research, to gain insight into the perceptions of businesses and trade associations 
on instrument selection, a multiple-case study design was adopted examining 
perspectives from five different industry sectors. 
3.2.6 Summary of research lines of enquiry 
The overall research question for this study is “what policy and regulatory 
instruments work when, with whom, and why is this the case?”.  
This question has been explored through a literature review, high-level case studies 
of regulatory frameworks for example industries, a detailed case study of policy 
making in practice, and a multiple-case study of business and trade association 
perceptions of the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation. Yin (2009) recommends 
defining questions asked of case studies at a number of levels, ranging from those 
asked of individual participants, to those asked of individual cases, those concerned 
with patterns across multiple case studies, questions asked of the entire study, and 
normative questions about policy recommendations and conclusions. The structure 
of this research and associated questions are illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure 3-2: Summary of lines of enquiry for this thesis 
Stage 1: Defra’s sponsorship of this PhD research programme allowed the author to 
participate in a placement with the Department during the summer and autumn of 
2012. During this time the author provided research support to the Smarter 
Environmental Regulation Review (SERR) (Defra, 2013a), developing a set of case 
studies describing the environmental regulatory framework for 5 industries (Chapter 
4). This included 15 interviews and 1 workshop with business and trade association 
representatives. 
Stage 2: The purpose of this case study (Chapter 5) was to examine policy makers’ 
perspectives on what policy and regulatory instruments work when and why. Policy 
leads across all Defra policy areas (see Table 5-2) were invited to participate by the 
PhD programme sponsor at Defra, and all who were invited agreed to participate. 
Thirty-three policy makers were interviewed in 28 discussions. 
Stage 3: The purpose of this multi-case study (Chapter 6) was to examine industry 
perspectives on instrument selection and the factors affecting effectiveness of 
Literature review
Stage 1
High-level case studies 
of regulatory 
frameworks
Stage 2
Case study of 
instrument selection in 
practice at Defra
Stage 3
Multiple-case study of 
industry perceptions 
of environmental 
regulation
Development of 
recommendations for 
regulatory reform 
programmes, including 
validation workshop
Chapter 2
What policy and regulatory instruments have been identified in the literature?
What evidence exists for their effectiveness and efficiency?
What factors are thought to affect effectiveness and efficiency in practice?
What are the gaps in existing knowledge?
Chapter 3
Appendix A
How is environmental regulation implemented in practice?
How do businesses find out about their regulatory obligations?
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regulation in practice. Interviewees were typically policy leads in trade associations, 
senior managers or heads of environmental compliance in businesses. Thirty-four 
individuals were interviewed in 30 discussions.  
The process of developing conclusions and recommendations included the design 
and delivery of a validation workshop held with senior Defra and Environment 
Agency representatives, a leading environmental consultant, and senior academics 
in the field of environmental policy and regulation, in June 2013. Interim findings from 
the research were presented thematically for discussion, and feedback provided has 
been incorporated into the discussion presented in Chapter 7. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Data collection methods 
The following sections explain why and how data were collected and managed for 
the research presented in this thesis. 
3.3.1.1 Case selection 
Stage 1: The high-level case studies presented in Chapter 4 were completed during 
the author’s placement with Defra as part of a Defra research project. The industries 
examined for these case studies were selected to include sectors that have a 
significant environmental impact, are subject to a complex set of regulations thought 
to impose a significant burden, that interact with multiple government departments, 
include a range of business sizes, are thought to have significant potential for 
economic growth, and that are representative of both urban and rural economic 
activity (Defra, 2013a). For the purposes of the research presented in this thesis, 
these cases provide additional contextual information to supplement the literature 
review presented in Chapter 2, and informed the design of later stages of the 
research. 
Stage 2: Defra was selected for the case study of instrument selection by policy 
makers presented in Chapter 5 because Defra has primary responsibility for policy 
making and regulation for a wide range of environmental objectives in England, and 
as such may be considered a “critical case” for theories of environmental policy 
making (Yin, 2009). Other critical cases in the context of this research would include 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Department for 
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Communities and Local Government (DCLG) for central government instrument 
selection, and the Environment Agency for England, the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) and local authorities for instrument selection carried out by regulatory 
agencies. Examination of these cases, and for the equivalent bodies in devolved 
administrations and other national jurisdictions, is left to future research. 
Stage 3: Industry sectors for the multiple-case study of business and trade 
association perceptions of environmental regulation presented in Chapter 6 were 
selected to span a wide range of environmental regulations and types of 
environmental risk: (i) Construction and construction products; (ii) Food and 
agriculture; (iii) Personal care products; (iv) Waste management and (v) Water 
collection, treatment, supply and management. This selection is not intended to be 
representative of all industries in the UK; rather it provides a range of contexts in 
which theories concerning environmental regulation can be developed and tested, in 
pursuit of a theory-building research strategy. The sectors selected illustrate both 
product based and operational site based regulation; sectors with large and small 
businesses; environmental risks arising from waste, emissions to air, ground and 
water; and dispersed and point source pollution. Summaries of key elements of the 
regulatory framework, illustrating the diversity of regulatory instruments 
encompassed by each of these industries, are provided in Appendix B. 
3.3.1.2 Case study data collection and management 
Yin identifies three principles of data collection for case study research: (i) using 
multiple sources of evidence to develop converging lines of enquiry through 
“triangulation”; (ii) creating a case study database, that separates the data or 
evidentiary base, and the investigator’s reports about those data; and (iii) 
maintaining a chain of evidence, to allow an external observer to follow the derivation 
of any evidence (Yin, 2009). 
Principle 1 - Drawing on multiple sources of evidence: Case studies developed 
for Stages 1, 2 and 3 have drawn primarily from three sources of evidence: 
interviews, academic literature, and “grey” literature, to provide triangulation. The 
high-level case studies describing business experiences of the environmental 
regulatory framework (Stage 1) addressed two types of questions: (i) what is the 
regulatory framework for the case study industry? and (ii) what do industry 
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representatives consider to be its strengths and weaknesses?. The first question is 
factual and can be examined through review of the academic and grey literature; the 
second question examines perspectives which can be obtained primarily from 
industry representatives. Triangulation for the case studies in Stages 2 and 3 has 
been pursued through comparison of opinions expressed by respondents with each 
other, and with existing grey and academic literature.  
Principles 2 - Creating a case study database: Interview transcripts for the case 
studies for Stages 2 and 3 have been stored in two separate NVIVO™ database files 
(Bazeley, 2007). NVIVO™ is Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS) and provides functionality to enable coding of source documents that 
separates the coding from the source. Summaries of codes applied are provided at 
Appendix C. Reports based on this coding form Chapters 5 and 6. Triangulating 
sources of evidence are referenced via citations within the report text, linked to the 
references provided at the end of this thesis. 
Principle 3 - Maintaining a chain of evidence: This thesis has been structured to 
provide the chain of evidence to support the final conclusions as illustrated in Figure 
3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3: Chain of evidence provided by this thesis, after Yin (2009) 
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3.3.1.3 Interview methodology 
Narrative data were gathered through semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured 
interviews have predetermined questions, but order, wording and associated 
explanation can be modified, and questions can be added or omitted, according to 
the interviewer’s perception of what seems most appropriate (Robson, 2002). This 
interviewing approach allows open discussion without straying too far from the 
research topic, and explanations to be elicited (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Interviews 
were either conducted face-to-face or by phone, recorded with the permission of the 
interviewee, and transcribed verbatim. 
The high-level case studies for Stage 2 were completed during the author’s 
placement with Defra as part of a Defra research project. Respondents were invited 
to participate by Defra as part of the informal consultation process for the project. 
Participating organisations selected the respondents to participate, who were 
generally heads of policy in trade associations or senior managers with responsibility 
for environmental regulatory compliance in businesses. 
Participants for the Stage 2 case study of instrument selection by policy makers were 
identified with the support of the Defra sponsor for the research, targeting heads of 
policy across all Defra’s policy areas (Table 5-2). Respondents were typically senior 
civil servants, or Grade 5 or 7 managers. Respondents were invited to participate via 
email, and provided a briefing note explaining the purpose of the research, research 
questions and the typology of regulatory instruments to be discussed (Appendix A.1). 
For the Stage 3 multiple-case study of business and trade association perceptions of 
environmental regulation, organisations that had previously contributed to a Defra 
regulatory reform programme were invited to participate under a covering letter from 
the Department, explaining the research was being undertaken independently, 
explaining its purpose, the research questions to be discussed and the typology of 
regulatory instruments (Appendix A.2). Respondents were supplemented with 
organisations selected for their complementary perspectives, including recruitment 
through a personal care products trade show, and membership of waste industry 
professional association. Interviewees were typically policy leads in trade 
associations, senior managers or heads of environmental compliance in businesses. 
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Interviews were conducted in line with Robson’s (2002) recommendations for 
interviewing style: 
 Listening more than speaking; 
 Putting questions in a straightforward, clear and non-threatening way; 
 Eliminating cues which lead interviewees to respond in a particular way; 
 Enjoying it (or at least appearing to do so).  
3.3.1.4 Additional sources of data 
In addition to data obtained through interviews, publicly available sources were used 
to gather information to support the discussions and inform the research, particularly 
in the following areas: 
 The key regulatory instruments relevant to the sector under discussion, 
including statutory instruments and industry-led initiatives (Appendix B); 
 Characteristics of the industry sector e.g. number and size of businesses, 
recent growth rates, key environmental issues; and, 
 Characteristics of the respondents’ organisations e.g. key lines of business, 
size, operating locations, customers, suppliers. 
3.3.2 Data analysis 
This research pursued a strategy of “theory building” from case studies, which 
involves using one or more cases to create theory or propositions from case-based, 
empirical evidence (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Theory is developed inductively, 
and is “emergent” in the sense that “it is situated in and developed by recognizing 
patterns of relationships among constructs and across cases and their underlying 
logical arguments” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
Yin (2009) describes five analytical techniques for case study research. “Pattern 
matching” compares an empirically based pattern (e.g. a pattern of behaviour in an 
organisation) with predicted patterns. “Explanation building” is a special type of 
pattern matching mainly relevant to explanatory case studies, where case study 
evidence is examined and theoretical positions are revised, and then evidence is 
examined again from this new perspective, for a number of iterations. “Time series 
analysis” involves tracing changes over time to examine empirical trends against 
those suggested by theory. “Logic models” stipulate a complex chain of events over 
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an extended period of time, and analysis consists of matching observed events to 
those predicted by theory. Logic models are typically presented diagrammatically as 
a kind of flow chart. “Cross case synthesis” is used to aggregate findings across 
individual case studies.  
For this research the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS) NVIVO™ (Bazeley, 2007) was used to support an iterative process of 
coding and analysis to support theory building, drawing on a number of the 
techniques proposed by Yin (2009), as illustrated in Figure 3-4. 
 
Figure 3-4: Analysis approach, from Taylor et al. (2013) after Summerill et al. (2010) 
As described in more detail in Chapter 5, the case study of instrument selection 
among policy makers at Defra focused on explanation building, leading to the 
development of a simple logic model describing the process of instrument selection 
described by respondents (Figure 5-4). 
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The multiple-case study examining business and trade association perspectives on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of regulatory instruments described in Chapter 6 
also focused on explanation building, making extensive use of cross-case synthesis 
to identify recurring patterns in respondents’ narratives (e.g. Table 6-4 and Table 
6-5). 
3.3.3 Ethical considerations 
Varying degrees of anonymisation have been applied to each stage of research 
presented in this thesis. 
Stage 1: The high-level case studies presented in Chapter 4  were completed during 
the author’s placement with Defra as part of a Defra research project. It was agreed 
with Defra and participating organisations that responses provided by trade 
associations would be attributable to their organisation, but responses from 
individual businesses would be anonymised. The case studies were checked with 
participants to ensure accuracy and to gain their consent before publication (Defra, 
2013a). 
Stage 2: The case study of instrument selection by policy makers names Defra as 
the case study organisation. Policy makers interviewed contributed anonymously 
although the policy areas for which they spoke at the time are identified in the case 
study text. To ensure accuracy, references to policy-specific issues described in the 
text and direct quotes were checked with respondents before the case study was 
published as a journal article (Taylor et al., 2013). 
Stage 3: The multiple-case study of business and trade association perceptions of 
environmental regulation has been anonymised at both the organisational and 
individual level. Data were anonymised to encourage respondents to be open and 
honest in their responses, while the nature of their roles and organisations has been 
described in sufficient detail to support the analysis presented. To ensure accuracy 
and gain consent for publication direct references to points made by respondents, 
direct quotes, and the summaries of responses provided in Table 6-5 were checked 
with respondents via email. 
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The Cranfield University Ethics Policy (Appendix F) was followed during the conduct 
of this research, which requires that in their research all staff and students will 
endeavour to: 
 Maintain professional standards including honesty and integrity; 
 Properly document all results; 
 Evaluate critically all results; 
 Attribute honestly the contribution of others; 
 Wherever possible report all results openly, bearing in mind the University’s 
commercial considerations and sponsors’ needs for confidentiality.  
In addition all staff will endeavour to: 
 Educate and develop new research workers to an understanding of good 
research practice; 
 Secure and store primary data for an appropriate period of time. 
3.3.4 Evolution of methodology 
The evolution of methods during the course of the research is discussed below. 
Stage 1: The process of developing these case studies demonstrated that it is a 
time-consuming process to document the regulatory framework for a specific 
industry, and that businesses and trade associations were generally keen to 
participate in research that they believed would have a direct influence on 
government policy. It also highlighted the importance of preparation time before 
undertaking interviews to ensure that the researcher was ready to discuss industry-
specific, technical issues at a level that reassured the interviewee of the interviewer’s 
competence for the task in hand. 
Stage 2: 28 interviews were conducted face-to-face over a 2 month period, which 
provided limited time to analyse responses between interviews. Interviews were 
analysed and an explanatory case study in the form of a journal article was produced 
during the period November 2011 to August 2012, reflecting the time-consuming 
process of iteratively coding approximately 28 hours of recorded interviews, 
amounting to around 180,000 words of transcribed text (for comparison, “Great 
Expectations” by Charles Dickens is approximately 184,000 words in length 
(Feedbooks.com, 2013)). In retrospect, spreading the interviews over a longer period 
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to allow more time to analyse and begin to code transcripts would have allowed 
more time for ideas and insights to form in the mind of the researcher, and increased 
the enjoyment of the task by providing greater variety in the structure of day to day 
research work. A further learning point was that coding primarily at a line-by-line 
level within transcripts made stepping back from the analysis to see the overall 
emerging picture difficult at times, and  could have been assisted with greater use of 
higher-level summary notes of insights from each interview. 
Stage 3: The purpose of the third stage of research was to examine perspectives on 
instrument selection of case study industry and trade association representatives. 
The experience of the preceding stages was reflected in various aspects of the 
method adopted for this stage:  
(1) Selection of case study industries: In choosing the number of industries 
included within the multiple-case study a balance was struck between 
providing diversity in the industries examined and the amount of background 
research required to allow the researcher to engage with interviewees at their 
level of understanding of the issues discussed. 
 
(2) Selection of case study respondents: Respondents who were as 
experienced as possible in the design and function of environmental 
regulatory frameworks were sought to maximise the breadth and depth of 
knowledge on which they could draw. To this end, interviewees were required 
to be policy leads in trade associations, or senior managers or heads of 
environmental compliance in businesses. 
 
(3) Recruitment of case study respondents: Respondents were invited to 
participate through a Defra-branded invitation (see Appendix A.2) to reassure 
them that their contribution was likely to be heard by government. 
 
(4) Familiarisation with relevant regulatory frameworks before interviews: 
The researcher ensured that time was devoted to preparation for interviews 
through background research into key industry characteristics and important 
elements of the regulatory framework. This understanding was validated with 
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interviewees at the beginning of the discussion, in part to reassure them that 
the interviewer was able to understand their views in context. 
 
(5) Staggering interviews and starting to code early in the process: Learning 
from Stage 2 of the research, interviews were staggered over a longer period 
to allow time to reflect on and begin to code transcripts between interviews. 
This also proved necessary as interviewee recruitment proved more time-
consuming than for Stage 2.  
 
(6) Use of higher-level summary notes: More extensive use of high-level notes 
to summarise each interview was made, which made understanding overall 
trends in the data easier. In addition, a short summary statement on each 
respondents’ views on direct and voluntary regulation was synthesised by the 
researcher and checked with each respondent following the interview (see 
Table 6-5), providing a mechanism for checking that the researcher had 
successfully understood respondents’ views of the world, which as discussed 
above is a key objective of interpretive social science. 
3.4 Potential methodological weaknesses 
3.4.1 Potential criticisms of case studies 
Yin identifies, and counters, a number of criticisms of case study research (Yin, 
2009). Criticism that case studies lack rigour can be countered through following a 
rigorous case study methodology as outlined in this chapter. Criticism that case 
studies provide little basis for scientific generalisation requires a more complex 
response. In short, case studies are best viewed as experiments to expand and 
generalise theory (analytic generalisation), rather than seeking to enumerate 
frequencies across a population (statistical generalisation). Care has been taken to 
pursue analytic rather than statistical generalisation throughout the analysis 
presented in this thesis. Criticism that case studies take too long and result in 
massive unreadable documents are also misdirected; while ethnographic or 
participant-observer methods may require extensive time in the field, Yin asserts that 
a high quality case study could be completed using the telephone and internet, 
depending on the topic (Yin, 2009). 
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3.4.2 Validity and reliability 
Four tests have been commonly used to establish the quality of social research: (i) 
construct validity, (ii) internal validity, (iii) external validity and (iv) reliability (Yin, 
2009). How these quality measures have been addressed in this research is 
summarised in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2: Tactics to ensure quality of this research, after Yin (2009) 
Quality test Description Tactics adopted in this research 
Construct 
validity 
Requires that the correct operational 
measures are identified for examined 
concepts. 
Using multiple sources of evidence. 
Establishing a chain of evidence. 
Internal validity Requires that causal relationships are 
distinguished from spurious relationships. 
Using explanation building. 
Addressing rival explanations. 
Using logic models. 
External validity Requires that the domain to which a 
study’s findings can be generalised is 
correctly defined. 
Using theory in single case study. 
Using replication logic in multiple-case study. 
Reliability Requires that the operation of a study 
can be repeated with the same results. 
Documenting research methods. 
Developing case study database. 
3.4.3 Potential bias 
Miles and Huberman (Miles & Huberman, 1994) identify two possible forms of bias: 
(A) the effects of the researcher on the case, and (B) the effects of the case on the 
researcher. 
Bias of type A is considered first. For the Defra case study, respondents were invited 
to participate explaining that the research would contribute towards guidance 
materials for policy makers as well as this PhD thesis, and generally appeared to the 
researcher to contribute their views in the spirit of candidly sharing experience and 
good practice. However, they did so in the knowledge that findings would be 
published, so may have withheld information that they thought could be damaging. 
For the high-level case study research with businesses and trade associations 
presented in Chapter 4, respondents were providing opinions to influence 
government policy, potentially for their business advantage. These case studies 
were created for publication (Defra, 2013a) and were subject to public scrutiny, so 
were required to provide a balanced summary.  For the multiple-case study research 
with businesses and trade associations presented in Chapter 6, the invitation to 
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participate made it clear that the research was being undertaken independently by 
Cranfield University, with Defra’s sponsorship, and providing anonymity. In this case, 
respondents appeared to generally speak candidly, although sometimes showed 
awareness of Defra’s involvement. 
Miles and Huberman and others have described bias of type B as arising from the 
researcher “going native” (Miles & Huberman, 1994). While the researcher has spent 
time working with Defra during the course of the research, exposure to the often 
contrasting perspectives of businesses and trade associations, combined with the 
majority of time being spent based at Cranfield University, have provided some 
balance in influences on the researcher’s perspective. 
While these sources of bias are difficult to eliminate, a method that provides a 
transparent chain of evidence between data and conclusions has been used to make 
clear to the reader the nature of the data gathered and how it has been used to draw 
conclusions. Findings have also been triangulated with other sources of evidence 
(e.g. academic research, grey literature) where possible. 
3.5 Summary 
This research adopted a theory building approach, drawing on qualitative data 
gathered through semi-structured interviews for case study organisations 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Payne & Payne, 2004; Yin, 
2009). This approach has been adopted to provide in-depth insight into the 
perceptions, motivations and behaviours of stakeholders affected by and involved in 
the design of environmental regulation. This research approach seeks to develop 
theory through “analytic generalisation”, analogous to theory development through 
multiple experiments, rather than “statistical generalisation” that seeks to 
characterise a population through sampling and statistical analysis. 
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4 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the regulatory frameworks in place for illustrative case study 
business sectors in the UK through a review of grey literature and interviews with 
industry sector experts, to meet Objective 2 of this research programme. These case 
studies were developed by the author during an industrial placement at Defra, 
providing evidence to inform the work of the Smarter Environmental Regulation 
Review (SERR) programme (Defra, 2013a). In line with the Terms of Reference of 
SERR, the purpose of the case studies was to examine the regulatory framework for 
a set of sectors, particularly with regard to the environmental legislation that applies, 
the guidance available to businesses from government or other sources, the 
associated obligations for businesses to provide information to government, and the 
processes of compliance assurance.  
4.2 Methodology 
The case study sectors were selected for SERR to illustrate varied impacts of 
environmental regulation, to include: 
 Sectors that have a significant environmental impact; 
 Sectors subject to a complex set of regulations thought to impose a significant 
burden; 
 Sectors that interact with multiple Government departments and agencies; 
 Sectors that include large businesses, small and medium sized enterprises 
(SME) and micro-businesses; 
 Sectors that are thought to have potential for significant growth or steady 
demand (as indicated through their inclusion in the UK Government’s 2011 
Growth Plan (H. M. Treasury/ Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
2011)); 
 Sectors representative of both urban and rural economic activity.   
The full set of case studies developed for the SERR project is included in Table 4-1 
below. Case studies developed by the author and included in this thesis are marked 
with an asterisk. 
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Table 4-1: Case studies developed for SERR 
Case study sector  Key sector characteristics  
Mix of large, 
SME and micros  
Urban or rural 
activities  
Links to Growth Plan 
Themes  
1: Quarrying*  Mix  Mainly rural  Construction  
2: Arable farming  Mix  Rural  Rural Economy  
3: Soft drinks manufacturing  Mix  Both  (indirectly, Rural 
Economy)  
4: Waste management  Mix  Both  Low carbon 
investment  
5: Commercial construction  Mix  Both  Construction  
6: Personal care product 
manufacturing*  
Mix  Both  
7: Non-ferrous metals and surface 
treatment*  
Mix  Both  Advanced 
manufacturing  
8: Biofuels manufacturing*  Mix  Both  Low carbon 
investment  
9: Electronic product 
manufacturing*  
Mix  Both  Advanced 
manufacturing  
10: Water collection, treatment and 
supply  
Mainly large  Both  
11: Dairy product manufacturing  Mix  Mainly rural  (Indirectly, Rural 
Economy)  
Desk research was used to gather information on key features of the industry and its 
regulatory framework. Businesses and trade associations were invited to provide 
their views on the regulatory framework through a series of semi-structured 
interviews. The purpose of this research was to provide illustrative case studies to 
inform more in-depth work later in the SERR programme, rather than to provide a 
representative sample of all UK businesses in each sector. However, consultation 
with industry trade associations as well as individual businesses aimed to provide a 
wide cross-industry view.  In total the author independently undertook 15 interviews 
across 5 industry sectors. For the quarrying sector the author then designed and led 
a workshop with 5 business and trade association representatives to feed back 
findings. Case study reports were written on the basis of background research and 
interview notes, and then reviewed by interview participants and relevant policy 
leads and regulators to ensure accuracy. Comments received were incorporated into 
final versions for publication. 
Some research assistance was provided to the author in initial desk research by 
WSP, a consultancy providing research support to Defra for SERR. More than 80% 
of the written material presented here (and a greater proportion of the total research 
71 
effort expended to produce these high-level case studies) is the author’s original 
independent work. The completed case studies as they appear in this thesis have 
since been published in the SERR Phase 1 report (Defra, 2013a). 
4.3 Case study: Quarrying 
4.3.1 Industry characteristics 
Quarrying is the extraction of useful materials from the ground. This case study 
focuses on the quarrying of construction aggregates which includes sand, gravel and 
crushed rock. The UK typically needs 205 million tonnes of aggregates per year, or 
approximately 4 tonnes per head of population, of which around 150 million tonnes is 
extracted, the remainder being from recycled or secondary sources (Mineral 
Products Association, 2013a). Around 90% of aggregates are used in construction, 
for houses, other buildings and structures, roads, railways and by the water industry 
(Mineral Products Association, 2013b). 
UK quarrying businesses range in scale from large multinationals to micro-
businesses. In the UK there are over 2,000 quarries and associated manufacturing 
sites. The sector supplies approximately £9 billion of products and services each 
year, and is an essential input to the construction industry. It provides nearly 30,000 
jobs directly, many in rural areas (Mineral Products Association, 2013c). 
4.3.2 Environmental regulatory framework 
Although the total UK land use committed to mining and quarrying is relatively low 
(0.9%) compared to other uses (e.g. farming at 71%), the environmental and amenity 
impacts of quarrying can be significant (Beddington et al., 2009), and consequently 
the sector is subject to significant regulation. Prevention of pollution to land, water 
and air, control of noise, dust and vibration, protection of biodiversity and protection 
and creation of habitats are core environmental management objectives for the 
quarrying sector. While quarrying operations can significantly disrupt natural habitat, 
the restoration of quarrying sites after use can provide new valuable habitats such as 
wetlands and offer other benefits for water and flood management, and public 
amenity. 
Operators tend to manage environmental regulations alongside development 
planning, and manage site health and safety as a separate issue. The businesses 
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we spoke to told us that planning and environmental regulations have a significant 
impact on investment in quarrying.  For example, the permissions obtained control 
the activities allowed at a given site in line with sustainable development, 
environmental and social objectives. Some thought that changes to regulation of 
water abstraction within quarries may encourage different/ better water 
management, whilst the importance of efficiently integrating controls on abstraction 
with existing planning and permitting regulations, through co-design with the 
industry, was emphasised. For operators producing processed products 
environmental regulation and societal demands are reportedly important drivers for 
product development (e.g. with low embodied carbon, permeable paving). There 
may be scope to improve materials reuse and quarry restoration by modifying waste 
policy to enable the wider use of suitable "waste" material as an input to products 
and for use in restoration.  
Figure 4-1 provides a summary of the environmental regulatory framework for the 
sector. In order to establish a quarry, operators must obtain planning permission 
from the local planning authority, which one business told us can take as long as 10 
years. To obtain planning permission environmental impact assessments are 
undertaken and a restoration plan developed. Planning permission will include 
conditions on how the quarry is managed, including requirements for environmental 
protection. Environmental permits will also be required from local authorities 
(Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR) Part A2 and B) and the Environment 
Agency (EPR Part A1, waste management, water management), and species 
licences from Natural England. 
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Figure 4-1: Summary of environmental regulatory framework for quarrying 
4.3.3 Legislation  
Important pieces of legislation that apply to quarrying businesses include the 
Environmental Permitting Regulations1 (England and Wales) 2010 (as amended), 
Water Resources Act 1991,  Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and National 
Planning Policy Framework 2012 (which includes technical guidance on flood risk), 
the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 
                                            
1
 In England and Wales the permitting requirements as set out in article 7 of the Mining Waste 
Directive have been transposed through the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2010 (Environment Agency, 2010). 
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2011, Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010 (as amended), the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 (Part 3 - statutory nuisances) and the 
Contaminated Land2 (England) Regulations 2006 (as amended). One business we 
spoke to told us there are 150 pieces of legislation that apply to their quarrying 
operations. 
Businesses we spoke to identified a range of problems in the design of the 
regulatory legislative system including issues arising from: 
 The interface between the planning permission process and environmental 
permitting process3. 
 Inconsistency of definitions, e.g. definition of waste in different contexts. 
 Duplicative provisions for species protection. 
Ideas raised during this review for improving legislative aspects of the regulatory 
framework included (most important to businesses first4): 
 Industry should be involved as standard practice in the design of new 
regulatory regimes and have greater influence over the final decisions made. 
 Improve alignment between the planning process (led by local planning 
authorities), environmental permitting requirements (led by the Environment 
Agency), and species licensing (led by Natural England). 
 Resolve inconsistencies in definitions and rules concerning the management 
of waste, particularly with regard to when material use is treated as “disposal” 
or “recovery”.  
 Identify areas of ambiguity in the regulatory framework and develop position 
statements to clarify. 
 Integrate Local Authority Pollution Prevention and Control (LAPPC) Part A 
and Part B permits where they apply to the same site. 
                                            
2
 Contaminated Land Regulations would not apply to quarrying as a general rule, but when dealing 
with legacy contaminated land or activities that have caused land to become contaminated. 
3
 Work is underway to address this issue, so it is not discussed further here (Environment Agency, 
2013l). 
4
 Rankings of importance here and for other issues later in the case study were established through a 
workshop discussion with participating businesses. 
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4.3.4 Guidance 
According to the businesses we spoke to, large quarrying businesses tend to have 
teams of specialists in-house focused on monitoring and influencing regulatory policy 
and ensuring compliance. Smaller operators are more likely to rely on external 
consultants to advise them. Businesses we spoke to use the Defra, Environment 
Agency and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC, for Landfill Tax 
information) websites as well as legislation.gov.uk and the Planning Portal. They 
generally found these sites to be acceptable, although some complained that the 
Environment Agency website could be hard to search and navigate but had shown 
some recent improvement. The former Netregs/Business Link site, which had areas 
structured around sectors, was thought to have been the right sort of idea. They also 
benefit from information and networking provided by the Mineral Products 
Association and British Aggregates Association, and informal professional networks. 
Businesses typically commented that they could find out about environmental 
regulation because they have already invested time in getting to grips with it, but 
thought it would be very challenging for someone seeking to understand their 
environmental obligations for the first time. 
Ideas raised during this review for improving the design and communication of 
environmental regulatory obligations included (most important to businesses first): 
 More proactive dialogue with regulators to discuss upcoming issues and 
current problem areas. 
 Improving the consistency in the design of guidance materials, so that they 
are written for the quarrying audience, in plain English. 
 Government co-developing guidance materials with industry bodies or 
consultants who understand the quarrying industry to maximise relevance. 
 Establishing a clear distinction between guidance materials that set out 
regulatory requirements and those that are best practice.  
 Developing a single website providing a summary of, or pointing to, relevant 
regulations, guidance, permits and a forward plan of relevant consultations. 
 Industry providing single named contacts to regulators to improve 
communications. 
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 A “rate this guidance” function on websites so that industry users can provide 
direct feedback to guidance authors on its usefulness. 
4.3.5 Information obligations 
Quarrying businesses have to report to local authorities for both planning and 
environmental health, the Environment Agency and Natural England, though there is 
reportedly relatively little duplication in the information provided. Ideas raised during 
this review for improving the reporting of regulatory information to Government 
included (most important to businesses first): 
 Developing a Planning Portal style website for environmental permits, 
providing greater transparency of the application process and details of 
permits granted. 
 Implementing a single consolidated annual quarrying monitoring report, 
including both operational environmental performance data and other 
information about environmentally beneficial activities such as habitat 
creation. This would be designed to ensure that reporting effort required was 
reduced. 
 Developing a single place to which reporting information is provided, although 
noting that this could impose costs on business to establish new reporting 
processes.  
 Ensuring that the emphasis of information reported is on indicators aligned 
closely to intended environmental performance outcomes rather than 
standardised monitoring requirements. 
 Establishing a standard data interface definition to enable direct reporting 
from electronic information management systems into Government systems. 
4.3.6 Compliance assurance 
Quarry operators are inspected by the Environment Agency, local authority 
environmental health officers and local authority mineral planning authority officers. 
Planning permission conditions may need to be discharged prior to operations 
commencing or at certain points during the life of a development, and are monitored 
on site visits by the local planning authority or the Environment Agency to ensure 
compliance. Businesses told us that while site visits are necessary for regulation to 
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be effective, both the Environment Agency and local authorities may visit the same 
site to inspect different activities, which can cause confusion and sometimes results 
in different advice or comments being provided. They reported inconsistencies in the 
perceived quality of inspection carried out. Good inspectors maintain good 
relationships with local sites, allowing for pragmatic decision-making. Poor 
inspectors can come unprepared, lacking knowledge of the site and the permits that 
apply. Businesses perceived problems of inconsistency in discretionary decisions. 
Ideas raised during this review for improving Government compliance assurance 
activities included (most important to businesses first): 
 Increasing the recognition of actions to address issues when they occur, 
providing a more proportionate response rather than prosecuting for problems 
that were resolved. 
 Examining the scope for recognising compliance with environmental 
management standards (e.g. ISO14001) with reduced inspections, although 
some expressed concern that this approach could be too “tick-boxy” and 
system focused, and insufficiently focused on environmental outcomes. 
 Greater use of 3rd party assurance and reporting. 
 Introducing annual compliance statements to reduce reliance on site-based 
inspection. The relevance of this approach would depend on company size, 
among other things. 
 Introducing a single quarterly joint inspection that includes (as necessary for a 
given site) the Environment Agency, local authority environmental health and 
local planning authority officers in one meeting. 
4.4 Case study: Personal care product manufacturing  
4.4.1 Industry characteristics 
Personal care products include toiletries, perfumery and fragrances, hair care, skin 
care, and decorative cosmetics (make-up). The European Commission defines a 
cosmetic product as  “any substance or mixture intended to be placed in contact with 
the external parts of the human body (epidermis, hair system, nails, lips and external 
genital organs) or with the teeth and the mucous membranes of the oral cavity with a 
view exclusively or mainly to cleaning them, perfuming them, changing their 
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appearance, protecting them, keeping them in good condition or correcting body 
odours” (European Commission, 2013b).  
According to the Cosmetic, Toiletry & Perfumery Association (CTPA), of the 500 
million people living in the EU most will use a minimum of 5-7 cosmetic products on 
a daily basis (Cosmetic Toiletry & Perfumery Association, 2013a). More than 4,000 
companies operate in the EU cosmetics industry providing jobs for over 500,000 
people; two-thirds of these are SMEs (Cosmetic Toiletry & Perfumery Association, 
2013b, 2013c). In 2011 the UK cosmetics market saw a 4.1% increase in value at 
retail sales price taking the total market to £8,356 million (against £8,028 million in 
2010) (Cosmetic Toiletry & Perfumery Association, 2013d).  
The trade associations we spoke to for this research were the CTPA, the British 
Association for Chemical Specialities (BACS) and the British Aerosol Manufacturers’ 
Association (BAMA). One multinational and one smaller personal care manufacturing 
business were also consulted for this research. 
4.4.2 Regulatory framework 
All cosmetic products placed on the market in the EU are regulated by the Cosmetics 
Directive (76/768/EEC) (implemented in the UK through the Cosmetic Products 
(Safety) Regulations 2008 (as amended)), the primary purpose of which is to protect 
human safety (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013b). From 11 July 
2013, The European Union Regulation on Cosmetic Products (Regulation (EC) No 
1223/2009) has full effect and the directive and UK regulations will be superseded. 
Enforcement powers in the UK will be enacted via the Cosmetic Products 
Enforcement Regulations 2013. The manufacturer or supplier of the cosmetic 
product is responsible for ensuring it is safe, and must collate information about the 
product including its ingredients and proof of any claimed effect. Under the 
Cosmetics Directive/Regulations substances are listed that must not be present in 
cosmetics products, and substances that may be used as ingredients subject to 
particular restrictions. For example, some ingredients must not exceed a certain level 
or may only be used in rinse-off products (Cosmetic Toiletry & Perfumery 
Association, 2013e).  The safety of the finished product, all of the ingredients and 
how the products will be used must be assessed by a qualified professional. 
Assessors must be registered pharmacists, medically qualified, chartered biologists 
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or chartered chemists, and have appropriate experience to make the assessment. 
These assessments may be inspected at any time by the enforcement authorities, 
usually local authority Trading Standards in the UK. Environmental claims made 
about personal care products must also be substantiated in accordance with 
advertising standards and consumer protection law (Defra, 2011a). 
As illustrated below, key environmental management objectives for the sector 
identified by the trade associations and businesses we spoke to are prevention of 
pollution to land, water and air, control of chemicals and hazardous substances, and 
reduction of production and packaging waste. Larger personal care manufacturers 
may undertake manufacturing processes that use significant energy and water, for 
which reduction of emissions of green house gases and control of water abstraction 
are also important environmental objectives.  
Important items of legislation therefore include the Environmental Permitting 
Regulations (England and Wales) 2013 (as amended), the EU Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation (EC) No 
1907/2006 (as amended) and the REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008, the 
Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011 (as amended), Packaging (Essential 
Requirements) Regulations 2003 (as amended), Producer Responsibility Obligations 
(Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 (as amended) and potentially the Water 
Resources (Abstraction and Impounding) Regulations 2006 (as amended) and the 
Climate Change Act 2008. The Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) 
Regulations 1999 (as amended) will apply to some personal care product 
manufacturers, for example if they store large volumes of aerosols or ecotoxic 
chemicals. Personal care products that contain biocides may also be subject to the 
Biocidal Products Regulations 2001 (as amended) if the primary claim is a biocidal 
claim. Personal care product manufacturers blend together ingredients purchased 
from manufacturers, and must ensure that chemicals used are permitted under 
REACH. 
Environmental obligations may have implications for product design and for 
production processes. The businesses we spoke to told us that these tend to be 
separate functions within a personal care products manufacturing business, and both 
functions will manage some aspects of environmental compliance. In smaller 
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businesses these responsibilities may be addressed by the same person. Often 
environmental issues and health and safety issues are managed together. 
Businesses and trade associations we spoke to reported that environmental 
regulation can affect both strategic and operational decisions of personal care 
product manufacturers. For example, we were told that the industry made a 
significant change in product design in response to environmental concerns by 
moving away from the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in aerosols. Now under 
REACH, as "downstream users" personal care product manufacturers may need to 
change ingredients and/or suppliers depending on the REACH status of the 
ingredients suppliers provide. Some objectives of environmental regulation, such as 
packaging light-weighting and energy efficiency improvement, are reportedly well 
aligned to business objectives to reduce costs, and interviewees thought that 
significant improvements have been achieved by some members of the industry in 
these areas. For a large business we spoke to, carbon legislation (through the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme (CRC EES), the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and Climate Change 
Agreements (CCAs)) is significant and is being monitored as UK and EU 
requirements develop. 
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Figure 4-2: Summary of environmental regulatory framework for personal care 
product manufacturing 
4.4.3 Legislation 
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legislation were mixed. One respondent aspired to legislation with text that was clear 
enough to not require separate guidance notes to explain what it means, and 
considered the Environmental Permitting Regulations to be a good example of this 
nearly being achieved. On the other hand, one respondent who had been working in 
environmental regulation for a large multinational for 20 years commented that the 
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regulation was still complex and difficult to understand, and therefore found 
supporting guidance essential.  
The businesses and trade associations we spoke to noted that changes to the 
legislative framework  could demand substantial business effort to understand and 
become compliant, citing the introduction of REACH and the CRC EES as examples. 
Some problem areas or areas of uncertainty were highlighted, including: 
 Animal testing requirements for personal care product ingredients under 
REACH and the Cosmetic Products Regulation. 
 The potential for dual regulation under the Biocidal Products Regulation.  
 Forthcoming changes to COMAH regulations that may capture more 
businesses in the sector. 
 Tensions between safety and environmental objectives for the management 
of volatile organic chemicals (although it was noted that some of these issues 
had been tackled through some positive joint working between the industry 
and Environment Agency). 
For REACH, the HSE leads on registration for the whole of the UK (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2013), while the Environment Agency leads UK-wide intelligence-
led REACH enforcement activities (Environment Agency, 2012a). However, BAMA 
commented that in general having separate laws and enforcement agencies in 
devolved administrations would inevitably lead to more compliance workload for 
businesses, even though they are all complying with the same EU rules and 
regulations.  
One respondent emphasised the great value to businesses of better advance 
warning of anticipated changes to regulatory requirements, to enable planning for the 
next financial year. The value of a mixed approach to communicating regulatory 
changes to businesses was also emphasised, combining website updates with face-
to-face presentations and discussions.  
4.4.4 Guidance 
Respondents use both the Defra and Environment Agency websites to find out about 
environmental obligations, and most felt they were clear and accessible. For 
simplicity, all REACH-related guidance is provided through the HSE website. Some 
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considered the HSE website to be very good and well thought out. Some 
commented that while in general guidance documents were clear, finding the right 
material could be challenging and a general overview to guide people new to the 
subject is lacking.  
BAMA thought the apparent need for businesses to seek advice from trade 
associations and consultants was related to the quality of guidance available from 
Government, observing that while the issues and resultant regulations are 
intrinsically difficult, the guidance can also be tricky to understand. They thought that 
trade associations and consultants usefully share knowledge between businesses 
and provide specialist advice, and that small companies are unlikely to have in-
house expertise for very specific issues. It can be more efficient to use external 
advisers, and the need is compounded by the fact that businesses are leaner and 
fitter with fewer staff and more generalists. Businesses will also use professional 
networks, trade associations and Government/industry groups to help them 
understand their obligations and keep up to date with developments. 
One small business was supportive of the idea of a trustworthy "one stop shop" 
website that would explain environmental obligations. One large business thought 
that update emails similar to those provided by HSE would be helpful. Trade 
associations wanted to be able to give members weblinks pointing to the right areas 
of the Defra and EA websites that would continue to work as new information was 
added, but this did not seem to be possible at the moment. 
4.4.5 Information obligations  
Reporting requirements identified by interviewees included packaging returns, waste 
returns, emissions reporting (including for CRC) and reporting requirements 
associated with environmental permits. Reporting about producer responsibility 
obligations and waste generated (e.g. waste transfer notes) were considered the 
most significant requirements by BAMA. BACS noted the Environment Agency’s 
recent consultation on pollution inventory reporting as an example of the 
Government seeking to reduce reporting requirements. Duplication of reporting to 
Government did not appear to be a major issue for respondents. However, some 
commented that the environmental reporting requirements of product retailers can be 
significant and may overlap with Government reporting requirements. 
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On the question of whether it was clear why data were gathered by Government, one 
respondent commented “If there is a clear link between an environmental benefit and 
the data required then that is OK. You’re never going to love all this reporting, but if 
you can see a clear rationale then you’ll understand why you have to comply”. 
One respondent noted that while electronic methods for submitting information would 
generally be preferable, there are significant costs to business in putting these 
systems in place, and smaller businesses may not have such well integrated IT 
systems, so reporting could remain onerous. One large business would "love" a 
consolidated list of annual data reporting requirements, so that businesses could be 
aware upfront of what they needed to do. 
4.4.6 Compliance assurance 
Compliance assurance is primarily carried out by inspections and audits conducted 
by the Environment Agency, HSE, and local authority environmental health officers. 
The Environment Agency and HSE coordinate activities for REACH to avoid placing 
conflicting demands on business and to ensure that the body with the best specialist 
skill targets the highest risk activities.  
Respondents generally considered inspections and audits to be necessary to assure 
compliance with environmental regulations, and argued that inspection should be 
more risk-based, streamlined and coordinated. Several respondents reported 
positive relationships with the Environment Agency and HSE, finding them helpful 
and supportive, although some concerns were raised about inconsistencies in 
decisions made. 
4.5 Case study: Non-ferrous metals and surface treatment 
4.5.1 Industry characteristics 
Under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (England and Wales) 2010 
(Schedule 1 Part 2) the processing and treatment of metals is divided into three 
sections: ferrous metals (e.g. iron and steel works), non-ferrous metals, and surface 
treating metals and plastic materials (The Environmental Permitting (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2010). Non-ferrous metals are used to take advantage of their 
desirable properties such as low weight (e.g. aluminium), high conductivity 
(e.g. copper), non-magnetic properties or resistance to corrosion (e.g. zinc). Non-
85 
ferrous metal regulated activities include production of non-ferrous metals from ore, 
concentrates or secondary materials by metallurgical, chemical or electrolytic 
activities, and melting of specified metals above specified capacity thresholds.  
Surface treatment of metals and plastics can change their surface properties for 
decoration and reflectivity, improved hardness and wear resistance, corrosion 
prevention and as a base to improve adhesion of other treatments such as painting 
or photosensitive coatings for printing. Surface treatment therefore plays an 
important role in extending the life of metals, and in increasing equipment safety or 
reducing its consumption of other raw materials (European Commission, 2006). 
Currently, surface treatment is particularly important in the automotive industry and 
transportation, packaging, building and construction, microelectronics and printing 
(European Commission, 2006), and surface treatment of thin sheet steel (with tin) 
remains an activity of importance to the food and drink and packaging industries. 
The surface treatment sector can include operations in both the ferrous and non-
ferrous sub-sectors, but is treated by the Environment Agency as a separate activity 
in its own right. 
In the UK primary non-ferrous metal production is undertaken at a very small number 
of sites, with the majority of business activity focused on manufacturing metal 
products (e.g. cars, packaging, extrusions) and recycling. There are approximately 
26,000 enterprises in the UK manufacturing fabricated metal products, of which 
nearly all are SMEs or micro-businesses (Office for National Statistics, 2012). 
According to the Surface Engineering Association (SEA, a trade association for a 
range of surface treatment processes) there are around 600 surface engineering 
companies in the UK that offer processing skills to component manufacturers, most 
of which are SMEs and specialize in specific processes (Surface Engineering 
Association, 2013). In addition, a number of larger companies have in-house surface 
engineering capability, and in total SEA members represent £1 billion of annual sales 
and employ over 10,000 people in the UK (Surface Engineering Association, 2013). 
The Environment Agency regulates around 65 non-ferrous metal sites and 110 
surface treatment sites, while a significant further proportion of these businesses are 
regulated by local authorities (Environment Agency, 2013b). 
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4.5.2 Environmental regulatory framework 
Important potential environmental impacts of non-ferrous metals production include 
emissions to air (e.g. of dust, metal compounds, dioxins, volatile organic chemicals), 
energy consumption, and solid waste production, although their significance varies 
considerably between types of process and metals produced, and controls put in 
place (European Commission, 2001). For surface treatment of metals and plastics 
the main potential environmental impacts relate to energy and water consumption, 
the consumption of raw materials, emissions to surface and groundwaters, solid and 
liquid wastes and the site condition on cessation of activities (European Commission, 
2006).  
Environmental obligations are likely to have a significant impact on businesses in the 
non-ferrous metals and surface treatment industries, reflecting their potentially high 
environmental impact.  The Non-Ferrous Alliance (NFA), a trade association we 
spoke to for this research, argued that regulation will always be needed to ensure 
businesses meet their environmental obligations, and that it is not realistic to 
deregulate. Instead the focus should be on ensuring that regulation can be easily 
understood, with minimum burden, not to the disadvantage of UK businesses, and 
sensibly administered to resolve issues. 
The NFA explained that for a number of significant processes undertaken by 
members the potential for improving energy or waste efficiency is limited by their 
physical or chemical properties, so efficiency improvement is only likely through 
major technological innovations.  For NFA members the rate at which technology 
can be changed is often dependent on the commercial lifecycle of existing 
equipment, which may be between 7 and 18 years. They argued that regulators 
need to show flexibility in requiring compliance with Best Available Technique 
Reference Documents (BREFs) to reflect these commercial constraints. It should be 
noted, however, that under the EU Industrial Emissions Directive (2010/75/EU) the 
time allowed to achieve new Best Available Techniques is set in the Directive 
(European Commission, 2013c). The NFA also stressed the importance of risk-
based rather than hazard-based regulation, and expressed concern that EU 
regulation tending towards hazard-based regulation could lead to some 
manufacturing processes becoming impossible in the EU in coming years, even 
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though hazardous materials could be handled to reduce risks to an acceptable level. 
The NFA also expressed concern that increasingly stringent carbon legislation in the 
UK could push energy intensive industry overseas.  
The SEA told us that “Businesses now spend more time in ensuring they are 
compliant than they do in trying to develop and grow. Environmental regulatory 
obligations are having a negative impact on investment decisions, particularly the 
uncertainty associated with the REACH regulations. Arbitrary threshold[s], such as in 
the Environmental Permitting Regulations, dissuade companies from expanding their 
operations.” 
As illustrated below, the non-ferrous metals manufacturing and surface treatment 
sectors mainly report to the Environment Agency which is responsible for regulating 
some part of the majority of the sector’s key environmental objectives through 
permits and authorisations. The Environment Agency generally inspects data 
recorded during ongoing monitoring of the regulated activity on-site during integrated 
inspections.  Other key regulators are local authorities which inspect ongoing site 
records and inspect compliance with permits for lower risk sites, and the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). 
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Figure 4-3: Summary of environmental regulatory framework for non-ferrous metals 
and surface treatment 
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are subject to the Climate Change Levy (CCL) (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2013a) (introduced by the Finance Act 2000). Businesses in energy-
intensive industries may qualify for a discount in CCL payments if they are 
signatories of a Climate Change Agreement (CCA) (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2013b). Umbrella Climate Change Agreements (CCAs) have been 
arranged for various parts of the metals sector including foundries, metal forming, 
metal packaging, non-ferrous metals, steel and surface engineering (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, 2011). 
The SEA told us that the most important items of legislation for the surface 
engineering sector are the Environmental Permitting Regulations, EU REACH 
Regulations, Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH), EU Regulation of 
Persistent Organic Pollutants, controls of ozone-depleting substances, control of 
substances hazardous to health, and measures under the Climate Change Act.  
The NFA argued that the clarity of legislation could be improved so that businesses 
could understand immediately what they were required to do, but at the moment saw 
the need for guidance to interpret the meaning of legislation into plain English. 
The NFA raised particular concerns about the increasing use of brownfield sites for 
residential development leading to conflict between new residents and existing 
businesses over local noise and air pollution. The NFA argued that recent cases of 
no-win-no-fee law firms taking businesses to court on behalf of local residents were 
undesirable, and that instead problems should be resolved in such a way that 
businesses would implement a managed improvement plan rather than risk being 
put out of business by punitive damages being awarded. 
4.5.4 Guidance 
Guidance on the applicable environmental regulation for the metals manufacturing 
sector is available to businesses through various websites including the sector 
specific regulation guidance pages on the Business Link web pages5, the 
Environment Agency and www.gov.uk. The Environment Agency currently provides 
                                            
5 http://www.businesslink.gov.uk content has now moved to www.gov.uk 
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information specifically about non-ferrous metals and surface treatments 
(Environment Agency, 2013c). 
The NFA noted that the EA website has improved and contains some very good 
guidance, but that it could still be difficult to find. They emphasised the importance of 
businesses keeping on top of regulatory obligations as they change (e.g. for 
COMAH) for which short simple accessible guidance is required. They highlighted 
guidance developed by the EA for its own officers to explain the meaning of 
regulatory ‘legalese’ in plain English, which they considered to be very good, and 
argued that this kind of information needs to be available for all regulations. The NFA 
highlighted the case of REACH data sheets which contain important information 
produced by manufacturers for the safe management of chemicals, but can be long 
(perhaps 100 pages would be typical for a plant handling 10 chemicals). They 
argued that this presents a significant challenge for the successful communication of 
risks to employees. 
The SEA told us that for their surface engineering members, environmental 
obligations are often not very clear, and that in their view regulations have been 
designed for large multi-national businesses rather the SMEs that make up much of 
their membership. This reportedly leads to a great deal of frustration and uncertainty 
about what is required. While they thought that Netregs was helpful, they reported 
that typically their members do not use Government guidance material because it is 
too general and not targeted at their sector, and not specific enough for SMEs. 
Instead the SEA reported that members often rely on organisations like theirs, or the 
EEF, to make them aware of obligations.  
The NFA reported that in some cases (e.g. with Defra) consultation about regulatory 
change has been very effective, ensuring that industry can genuinely affect the 
outcome, but in other cases the dialogue has been poor.  
The NFA thought that a web-based tool that provided sector-specific information on 
environmental obligations would be ideal, and preferable to having to phone 
someone up. They also expressed concern at the idea of environmental guidance 
being absorbed into www.direct.gov.uk (now www.gov.uk) arguing that instead the 
EA should focus on improving the structure, access and content of their website. 
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4.5.5 Information obligations 
Businesses have to report to multiple organisations and may be required to report 
information on emissions to air, water abstraction, discharge to water, waste transfer, 
dust and noise monitoring and breaches or non-compliances with permits. 
Businesses may also need to report on energy efficiency and greenhouse gas 
emissions for production plant. 
The NFA commented that for a lot of processes businesses need to employ 
someone full time to keep on top of obligations and deal with the bureaucracy of 
providing information, and reported some duplication in reporting for energy use, raw 
materials use and waste production. The SEA told us that for their surface 
engineering members there is significant duplication in information reporting to 
Government, citing duplication between information required by the Environment 
Agency and DECC for energy consumption.  
The NFA thought that reporting should be through an approach based on templates 
and electronic submission, while noting that auditing would be required to ensure it is 
correct. They also highlighted that reporting publically some environmental data (e.g. 
on carbon emissions) could expose commercially sensitive information leading to 
predatory pricing. 
4.5.6 Compliance assurance 
Non-ferrous metal and surface treatment businesses are inspected primarily by the 
Environment Agency or local authority environmental health officers for 
environmental issues, and potentially the HSE (e.g. for COMAH). Businesses can 
adopt the Environment Agency’s MCERTS certification scheme for emissions 
measurement to give the EA confidence in the monitoring of emissions that they 
undertake (Environment Agency, 2013d). 
The NFA reported very positive and constructive relationships with Defra officers and 
the EA sector lead. However, the NFA also reported very mixed feelings among 
members about inspectors at an operational level. Experienced expert inspectors are 
highly valued by members, but relationships with inexperienced inexpert inspectors 
could be quite negative. The NFA thought that the knowledge and expertise of 
inspectors could be improved through inspectors with different levels of expertise 
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visiting sites together, and through an exchange of staff between the regulator and 
industry (within a manageable time commitment). The NFA thought the best 
approach to compliance assurance would be based on requiring and auditing 
environmental management systems of regulated businesses. They thought that 
auditing could be undertaken by Government or private sector assurance 
organisations, but that Government must retain effective enforcement powers. 
The SEA suggested that the Government should require that all businesses above a 
certain size become members of a trade association (as is reportedly the case in 
other European countries) which would allow the trade body to operate a compliance 
scheme, and enable the Government to obtain necessary performance information 
via the trade body. 
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4.6 Case study: Biofuels manufacturing for transport 
4.6.1 Industry characteristics 
Biofuel is a term used to describe liquid, solid or gaseous fuels produced from 
organic matter, which can be used for heating, energy generation and transportation. 
The three key types of biofuel used in transportation are biomethane, biodiesel and 
bioethanol. Biomethane is typically produced from purified gases from bacterial 
anaerobic digestion of waste materials (such as agricultural manure and slurry, food 
waste and sewage sludge) or non-waste feedstocks grown for the purpose (such as 
miscanthus or maize crops) (Environment Agency, 2013e). Biodiesel can be used as 
a substitute for diesel fuel in road vehicles, and can be produced using either 
chemical or physical processes from waste or virgin cooking oil (Environment 
Agency, 2013f). Bioethanol is produced from the fermentation of sugar or starchy 
crops, and can be used as a substitute for petrol in road transport vehicles 
(Environment Agency, 2013g). This case study focuses on environmental regulation 
relating to the manufacture of biofuels from feedstocks. Additional regulations apply 
to the growing of crops for biofuels which are not addressed here. 
Biofuels have the potential to provide a renewable source of fuel while delivering a 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. There is a risk, however, that unregulated 
production may cause social and environmental damage and lead to a net increase 
in carbon emissions. This is particularly true if produced from cultivated feedstocks 
grown on land which previously held high carbon stocks such as forest or peatland. 
As well as this direct impact, there is also potential for indirect effects if competing 
land uses are displaced by biofuel production (Department for Transport, 2013a). 
Biomethane can be produced from anaerobic digestion in small-scale systems (e.g. 
on farms, or by businesses with large amounts of food waste) and in large-scale 
systems (e.g. treating municipal food waste diverted from landfill, or manures and 
slurries from several farms) (Environment Agency, 2013e). Biodiesel can be 
produced on a small scale for personal use or for small businesses, up to large scale 
production in large chemical plants. There are approximately 75 permitted biodiesel 
installations across England, although many of these are not operational at present 
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due to economic conditions6. Bioethanol production is typically a large scale 
industrial process, currently undertaken at a small number of sites in the UK, 
although new sites are planned7. 
4.6.2 Environmental regulatory framework 
Potentially hazardous chemicals (e.g. methanol) are used in the manufacture of 
biofuels, which can cause significant air and water pollution and land contamination. 
Harmful by-products such as glycerol are also produced from some processes 
(Business Link, 2012a). Therefore, the main environmental objectives when 
manufacturing biofuels at any scale are centred around appropriate waste 
management and handling and storage of chemicals, solvents and oils so as to 
prevent pollution to air, land and water, and preventing the spread of disease if 
animal by-products are being used (Business Link, 2012b). 
As outlined in Figure 4-4, businesses manufacturing transport biofuels interact with a 
wide range of Government bodies. The Environment Agency is responsible for 
regulating manufacturing processes through the Environmental Permitting 
Regulations. Other key regulators are the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories 
Agency (AHVLA) which address health and safety, collection of duties, and control of 
animal disease in the movement and use of animal by-products respectively.  
The Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO) Order which came into force in 
2008 is the principal legislation in the UK specifically for the regulation of biofuels 
produced commercially for transport in the UK (Department for Transport, 2012). The 
RTFO obligates fossil fuel suppliers to produce evidence showing that a percentage 
of fuels for road transport supplied in the UK comes from sustainable renewable 
sources or that a substitute amount of money is paid. The RTFO Unit at the 
Department for Transport (DfT) issues certificates that permit the sale of verified 
renewable biofuels by fuel suppliers who supply at least 450,000 litres of fuel per 
year (Department for Transport, 2013a). Owners of biofuel at the duty point are 
awarded one Renewable Transport Fuel Certificate (RTFC) per litre of biofuel 
                                            
6
 As advised by Environment Agency 
7
 As advised by Environment Agency 
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(Department for Transport, 2013a). In December 2011, the RTFO Order was 
amended to implement the sustainability criteria of the Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED), the principal EU regulation on biofuels which commits Member States to a 
target whereby 10% of all land transport fuels should come from renewable sources 
by 2020. This introduced mandatory sustainability criteria which biofuels must meet 
for those fuels to be eligible for Renewable Transport Fuel Certificates including 
requirements to ensure that they deliver greenhouse gas savings, that the cultivation 
of their feedstocks did not damage areas of high carbon stocks or high biodiversity, 
and to encourage the use of waste materials (Department for Transport, 2013a). The 
amendment also introduced double rewards for some types of fuel, including fuels 
derived from waste materials like used cooking oil. 
The Hydrocarbon Oils Duties Act 1979 requires oils duty be paid to Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) on motor and heating fuels produced, imported or 
used in the UK. The duty has historically been payable at varying rates dependent 
on the type of fuel favouring biofuel use, although from 1st April 2012 this no longer 
applies (H. M. Revenue and Customs, 2013). 
The Renewable Energy Association (REA), the trade association we spoke to for this 
research, considered the policy framework to have a “massive” effect on the 
strategic decisions made by biofuel businesses that they represent. For example the 
overall policy objectives for increasing the use of biofuels by 2020 fundamentally 
influence their investment decisions, and without Renewable Transport Fuel 
Obligation (RTFO) mandate transport biofuel businesses cannot operate. 
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Figure 4-4: Summary of environmental regulatory framework for biofuels 
manufacturing 
4.6.3 Legislation 
Important items of legislation for production of biofuels include the Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (as amended), the Waste 
(England and Wales) Regulations 2011 (as amended), the Control of Major Accident 
Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999 (as amended), the Control of Pollution (Oil 
Storage) Regulations 2001, the Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO) 
Regulations 2007 (as amended), the Hydrocarbon Oils Duties Act 1979 and 
associated regulations, and the Animal by-Products (Enforcement) (England) 
Regulations 2011 (as amended). 
The storage of waste and its recovery through anaerobic digestion to produce 
biomethane and digestate is regulated by the Environment Agency under the 
Environmental Permitting Regulations, depending on the scale of production and 
compliance with standards (Environment Agency, 2012b, 2013e; WRAP, 2009). 
Biodiesel production is also regulated by the Environment Agency under the 
Environmental Permitting Regulations, depending on the scale of operation. Small 
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scale production (below 5,000 litres p.a.) is exempt from regulation. Production of 
biodiesel for commercial purposes is a regulated chemical activity; small to medium 
sized operations may qualify for “low impact status”, reducing fees and charges, 
whereas large scale production may require a bespoke permit (Environment Agency, 
2013h). The Biodiesel Quality Protocol developed by the Environment Agency and 
WRAP clarifies when quality biodiesel ceases to be waste and waste management 
controls are no longer required, provides users with confidence in the quality of 
biodiesel produced and sets standards and describes best practice for its use to 
protect human health and the environment (WRAP, 2009). Bioethanol producers 
must comply with the Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2000 for chemical installations and obtain a permit under the 
Environmental Permitting Regulations from the Environment Agency (Environment 
Agency, 2013i). 
The REA commented that the biofuels industry has been formed from agriculture 
and oil businesses, so people working in the sector have had to familiarise 
themselves with legislation designed for both sectors, which has been a steep 
learning curve and can create the perception of there being a significant amount of 
regulation. 
4.6.4 Guidance 
Guidance on the applicable environmental regulation for the biofuel manufacturing 
sector is available to businesses through various websites including the sector 
specific regulation guidance pages on the DfT (Department for Transport, 2012) and 
the Environment Agency (Environment Agency, 2013j) web pages.  Business Link8 
also includes information on best practice.  There is also guidance documentation 
specifically on the RTFO available from the DfT (Department for Transport, 2013b) 
which also encourages stakeholder engagement for planning and implementation of 
the RTFO (Department for Transport, 2013c), which the trade association we spoke 
to thought was very positive.  The HMRC website offers guidance on duty 
requirements (H. M. Revenue and Customs, 2013). 
                                            
8 http://www.businesslink.gov.uk content has since been migrated to www.gov.uk 
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The REA commented that the RTFO guidance provided by DfT provides the starting 
point for members seeking to understand their obligations, and whilst “copious” it is 
clear once it has been read. Ensuring compliance with RTFO is typically a full time 
job for a person in a large or medium size business, but would probably be one 
among a number of responsibilities for a responsible person in a small business. 
Businesses reportedly use the trade association to gain clarification of their 
environmental obligations, as well as discussing issues among colleagues from other 
businesses. 
4.6.5 Information obligations 
Biofuels manufacturers have to report to a variety of agencies. They are required to 
report information on duty of care requirements with regard to any feedstock which 
may be classed as waste (including separate records for any animal by-products 
used), the volumes of fuel produced and records to demonstrate compliance with 
any environmental permits.  
Duplication of reporting had not been raised as an issue with the REA. However, 
they raised concerns about the lack of public access to information contained in the 
RTFO returns, which have not been made public since December 2011. This 
information is very valuable to the sector to allow it to understand RTFO compliance, 
and whether it needs to take action to tackle any compliance problems that may be 
highlighted. 
4.6.6 Compliance assurance 
Biofuel manufacturers may be inspected by the Environment Agency and HSE acting 
together as the COMAH Competent Authority, the Environment Agency under the 
Environmental Permitting Regulations (depending on the scale of operations), HSE 
under the Health and Safety at Work Act and the AHVLA. HMRC excise officers 
monitor bioethanol plants to ensure appropriate duties are paid. Compliance with 
RTFO requirements can be assured through participation in existing environmental 
assurance schemes, such as Red Tractor, which the trade association we spoke to 
considered to be a good approach that avoids duplication of compliance 
requirements on businesses. RTFO returns must be independently verified.  
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The REA highlighted a case concerning waste cooking oil from UK registered tourist 
vessels where it had proved very difficult to establish which agency or Government 
body was responsible for the decision to ban its use for conversion into biodiesel, 
which had resulted in the closure of a biodiesel business. No agency seemed willing 
to take responsibility for the decisions, resulting in the trade association and the 
affected business being passed from one agency to the next, illustrating a lack of 
joined-up thinking across Government. To help address this problem, they thought 
that the Environment Agency should be more frequently involved in cross-
Government discussions on biofuel regulation led by DfT. 
4.7 Case study: Electronic product manufacturing 
4.7.1 Industry characteristics 
The design, manufacture, assembly, distribution and support of electronic products 
make a significant contribution to the UK economy. In use they enable numerous 
labour-saving devices and high-speed communications and information processing, 
and are fundamental to health, energy, defence, transport, entertainment and 
business technology, among many other applications. The value of the global 
electronics market is estimated to be $2 trillion per year. Semiconductors account for 
$275bn revenue worldwide, with growth predicted at 6% to 8% annually. Over 
250,000 people in the UK are involved in the design, production and distribution of 
electronic products, employed by 11,000 companies. In the UK a large proportion of 
electronics employers are SMEs, with 91% of companies employing fewer than 50 
people and only 2% employing 200 people or more (Skills Funding Agency, 2013). 
4.7.2 Environmental Regulatory Framework 
The key environmental obligations for the electronics industry relate to the efficient 
use of energy at a product and organisational level, prevention of emissions to land, 
water and air, the management of chemicals and hazardous materials, the 
improvement of product energy efficiency (and associated labelling) and the end of 
life treatment of waste electronic equipment. The same environmental regulations 
cover all electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and related products, such as 
batteries, electric lighting, cables, computers and electrical appliances (Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013c). Manufacturing processes related to the 
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production of electronic equipment are primarily regulated under the Environmental 
Permitting Regulations. 
Intellect UK, the trade association we spoke to for this research, considered 
environmental regulation to have quite a significant impact on decision making 
among members. Some members have found benefit in reducing waste, and others 
have identified opportunities for new business as a result of environmental 
legislation. Carbon policy was also highlighted as an important factor influencing 
business decisions, including through its effect on energy prices. 
 
Figure 4-5: Summary of environmental regulatory framework for electronic product 
manufacturing 
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Waste Batteries and Accumulators Regulations 2009, the Producer Responsibility 
Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 (as amended), the Restriction on 
the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(RoHS) Regulations 2008 (as amended), Ecodesign for Energy-Related Products 
Regulations 2010 (as amended), EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (as amended) and 
REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008 and the Waste (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2011 (as amended). 
Intellect UK also emphasised the importance of legislation targeting reduction of 
emissions of greenhouse gases, which they considered to also be part of 
“environmental regulation” from the perspective of their members. Intellect UK have 
identified approximately 220 items of legislation relevant to their members, and 
commented that it is complex to understand as members undertake a wide range of 
manufacturing processes. Overall, they thought it was very difficult to identify 
environmental obligations, and that regulations that might be considered 
“environmental” were often considered separately (e.g. waste, emissions and 
energy). They also commented that the system is complex for businesses that 
operate across borders of the UK devolved administrations. 
They have found that typically environmental obligations are managed by their 
members alongside health and safety obligations. Larger organisations tend to have 
resources dedicated to understanding obligations and therefore know what they are, 
whereas smaller businesses may not have dedicated resource and may find out 
about obligations only when a compliance problem arises. 
4.7.4 Guidance 
Guidance on the applicable environmental regulation for the electronics 
manufacturing sector is available to businesses through various websites including 
the sector specific and general manufacturing regulation guidance pages on the 
Business Link website9 and the National Measurement Office website (Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013d). Defra and Environment Agency web 
                                            
9 http://www.businesslink.gov.uk content has since been migrated to www.gov.uk 
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pages also provide guidance on relevant regulations but are not targeted specifically 
at the sector.  
The influence of businesses on each other along supply chains was also thought to 
play a significant role in informing them of their obligations. Consultants are also 
used by some members, particularly on specialist subjects such as packaging waste 
obligations. 
Intellect UK expected larger members to come directly to the trade association to 
keep up to date with changes to environmental obligations, and expected smaller 
businesses to use websites as their first source of information. The trade association 
itself tends to use the Defra website as it is focused on policy developments, using 
the Environment Agency less frequently as it is focused on compliance and 
enforcement. Navigating the Defra website was reportedly difficult, but content is 
generally clear and well structured once found. They thought the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment guidance was still too long and did not address some key issues for 
members. Overall the trade association found their experience of dealing with 
government varied significantly between departments and agencies, with some good 
and bad experiences, and said they found it difficult to know where to start when 
engaging with government.  
They thought a single website tailored to the sector covering relevant regulations, 
upcoming consultations, and permits for businesses would be very useful, as would 
1 page summaries that explained what legislation is coming in, what it is aimed at, 
what levels of funding are coming in and where they are coming from. 
4.7.5 Information obligations 
Each operator must sign up to WEEE and/or battery compliance schemes through 
which they are required to report on the amount of electronic equipment or batteries 
they place on the market.  Operators also need to report the amount of packaging 
placed on the market via the National Waste Packaging Database.  These 
regulations additionally place a requirement on the producer to pay for the recovery 
and recycling of products they place on the market. As a potential user of chemicals, 
the operator may also have REACH reporting requirements in the form of 
notifications. 
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An electronic manufacturer must retain a pack of technical documentation to prove 
they are conforming to the Ecodesign, RoHS, WEEE and batteries regulations which 
often require external sampling or testing.  This documentation is not required for 
reporting to regulators but kept on site and must be available for inspection.  
Intellect UK reported that members had found REACH registration problematic, and 
had also encountered intellectual property and awareness problems as this relatively 
new area of legislation had started to affect the sector. They also noted that the 
producer responsibility obligation regime was under review separately from this 
research, so opportunities for improvement in this area were not discussed in detail. 
4.7.6 Compliance assurance 
The industry is principally regulated by the Environment Agency and local 
authorities.  The Environment Agency conducts a number of process installation 
audits and inspections using a risk based approach to assess compliance with 
environmental permit conditions. Local authorities perform similar roles for those 
facilities that have a less-significant impact. Desk-based audits are regularly carried 
out by the Environment Agency in relation to producer responsibility returns and risk 
based on-site visits may be required to justify quantities of 
WEEE/batteries/packaging placed on the market. The National Measurement Office 
requires that manufacturers hold documentation for Ecodesign (National 
Measurement Office, 2013a) and RoHS (National Measurement Office, 2013b) 
compliance, which must be produced on request. 
Intellect UK reported that relations between their members and regulatory agencies 
were often not positive, although noted that it was rather like “going to the dentist”, 
that is necessary but not expected to be pleasant. They were unsure of the 
experience of smaller businesses as they are not well-represented among members. 
They thought that a combination of spot-checks, and use of self- and third-party 
certification should be used to assure environmental performance. They believe that 
communication is improving up and down supply chains and companies are seeking 
increasing levels of assurance. If an electronics company says its complying it is 
likely to be as the reputational and supply chain pressures are significant, although 
consumers (e.g. of TVs) are often more concerned about safety than environmental 
performance. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
These high-level case studies illustrate a number of characteristics of regulatory 
frameworks in practice. It is apparent that for these sectors businesses typically are 
required to fulfil a large number of environmental regulatory obligations, originating 
from multiple laws and implemented through multiple government agencies. 
Understanding these obligations requires expertise and resources, which in large 
companies are likely to be found in specialist teams, though for smaller businesses 
may be concentrated in a few people alongside other responsibilities. Problems 
identified by respondents included those arising from incoherence in obligations and 
processes between regulatory regimes, lack of clarity in requirements and 
definitions, and difficulties in finding information about obligations through multiple 
government channels. While in some cases respondents found government officials 
easy to contact and helpful, others’ experiences were less positive. Various 
proposals for improving regulatory frameworks were made, including to the design of 
statute (e.g. to clarify definitions and remove duplicative or conflicting provisions), to 
the responsibilities ascribed to implementing agencies (e.g. to unify inspection 
regimes, or to make greater use of 3rd party assurance schemes), and to the design 
of regulatory processes and information provision (e.g. improving the design of 
information provided through websites, consolidating reporting requirements, making 
data submission electronic). 
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5 CASE STUDY: INSTRUMENT SELECTION AT DEFRA 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study based on 28 semi-structured interviews with 33 
Defra policy makers examining the choice of policy and regulatory instruments 
available for their use and the decision-making processes they adopt to choose 
between them, to meet Objective 3 of this research programme. This chapter was 
written for this PhD thesis by the author under normal PhD supervision conditions. It 
was published subsequently in Science of the Total Environment (Taylor et al., 
2013), with supervisors acknowledged as co-authors. 
5.2 Abstract 
Better regulation seeks to extend existing policy and regulatory outcomes at less 
burden for the actors involved. No single intervention will deliver all environmental 
outcomes. There is a paucity of evidence on what works, why, when and with whom. 
We examine how a sample (n=33) of policy makers select policy and regulatory 
instruments, through a case study of the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra), UK. Policy makers have a wide range of instruments at their 
disposal and are seeking ways to harness the influence of non-governmental 
resources to encourage good environmental behaviour. The relevance of each 
influence varies as risk and industry characteristics vary between policy areas. A 
recent typology of policy and regulatory instruments has been refined. Direct 
regulation is considered necessary in many areas, to reduce environmental risks 
with confidence and to tackle poor environmental performance. Co-regulatory 
approaches may provide important advantages to help accommodate uncertainty for 
emerging policy problems, providing a mechanism to develop trusted evidence and 
to refine objectives as problems are better understood. 
5.3 Defra’s role in environmental policy and regulation in the UK 
Around the world policy makers, who design and implement policy and regulation, 
face the challenge of choosing among a range of policy and regulatory instruments 
to achieve their governments’ environmental and economic objectives, pursuing 
“clean” or “dirty” development paths as their economies grow (Esty & Porter, 2005). 
The term “regulation” is used here in its broadest sense to include all forms of social 
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control, including those that harness wider social forces beyond government, 
including the influence of businesses and other actors in society (Gunningham & 
Sinclair, 1999). “Instrument” is used to refer to a component part that makes up 
regulation, such as licensing, taxes or public information campaigns. Instruments 
include traditional direct regulation typically based on licensing and inspection, 
economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies, approaches intended to change 
behaviour through better information provision, approaches negotiated between 
government and industry, relying on industry self-regulation, and seeking to increase 
knowledge and capacity. Variants exist within each of these broad categories (Table 
5-1). 
Table 5-1: Typology of policy and regulatory instruments (Taylor et al., 2012) 
Type Variant 
Direct “command and control” 
regulation 
Ambient pollution requirements 
Input restrictions and output quotas 
Non-transferable emissions licences 
Technology controls 
Zoning/ location controls 
Economic instruments Taxes and subsidies 
Tradable rights 
Payments 
Information based instruments Targeted information provision 
Naming and shaming/faming 
Registration, labelling and certification 
Co-regulation and self-regulation Voluntary regulation 
Covenants and negotiated agreements 
Private corporate regulation 
Private professional regulation 
Self-regulation 
Civic regulation 
Support mechanisms and capacity 
building 
Research and knowledge generation 
Demonstration projects and knowledge diffusion 
Network building and joint problem solving 
 
Direct (“command and control”) regulation has been associated with significant 
improvements in environmental conditions in industrialised nations. However, 
concern that direct regulation may inhibit innovation and international 
competitiveness has led governments to seek alternative approaches to achieving 
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environmental objectives (see, e.g. UK Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills, 2013d). Governments have sought to improve the implementation of 
regulation using a risk-based approach, targeting regulatory effort towards the 
greatest risks (e.g. Gouldson et al., 2009; Pollard et al., 2008, 2004; Hampton, 
2005). Commentators have also observed a shift from “government” to “governance” 
as governments seek to harness the influence of wider social forces to influence the 
behaviour of individuals and businesses (Gouldson, 2008; Jordan et al., 2005) by 
sharing responsibilities for managing public risk and associated costs. In practice, 
instruments rarely operate in isolation; instead forming a complementary mix that 
influences behaviour through different levers across multiple actors. 
In Europe, the European Commission has a long-established programme for 
regulatory reform across member states and in recent years has sought to further 
the ambitions of the “better regulation” agenda towards “smart regulation” (European 
Commission, 2010). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) similarly has promoted regulatory reform across its members (OECD, 2008). 
Emerging economies experiencing rapid industrialisation and economic growth are 
also tackling the challenge of designing effective regulatory frameworks to deliver 
sustainable development. For example, China has recently announced its Plan for 
Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for the 12th Five-Year Plan Period 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection People’s Republic of China, 2012), which 
includes strengthened pollution controls and reduction targets for specific sectors, as 
well as the promotion of environmental management labels for vehicles. 
In England, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
develops environmental policy and regulation across multiple policy domains. 
Regulation is implemented by a network of regulatory agencies including the 
Environment Agency (EA) and regulators in local government. Programmes of work 
that drive regulatory reform have been pursued by successive United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) governments over recent decades. The 
current “Red Tape Challenge” (Cabinet Office, 2013a) seeks to reduce regulatory 
burdens through a process in which policy makers, politicians and the public 
scrutinise existing legislation to identify “what should be scrapped, what should be 
saved and what should be simplified”. Simultaneously, the UK government is aiming 
to reduce government spending while devolving more decision-making to a local 
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level, including through voluntary civic action (Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2011). 
Policy makers and regulators face the challenge of selecting suitable instruments to 
encourage green growth, reduce regulatory burdens, support wider government 
fiscal and social objectives, and maintain or improve environmental quality. However, 
they are hampered in their pursuit of “evidence based policy” (Solesbury, 2001) by a 
lack of evidence on which policy and regulatory instruments work, why, when and 
with whom (Taylor et al., 2012). Our research seeks to help address this gap by 
answering the following research questions for a sample of policymaking 
practitioners: (i) What types of policy and regulatory instrument can policy makers 
choose between?; (ii) Which factors influence the effectiveness of these instruments 
in practice?; (iii) How do policy makers select instruments to deliver better policy and 
regulation?; (iv) What does this imply for the skills and tools required by policy 
makers? 
Answers to these questions are likely to set a richer context for the Red Tape 
Challenge programme for environmental policy and regulation and inform a route 
map by which a revised mix of interventions, of lower burden, can be designed and 
defended. 
5.4 Method 
5.4.1 Rationale 
The research used a case study approach (Summerill et al., 2010; Yin, 2009) using 
semi-structured interviews with policy makers to gather qualitative data. This 
interview approach allows open discussions to reveal nuances of policymaking 
practice without straying too far from the research objectives. Cycles of coding were 
used to elicit results from these data. 
5.4.2 Selection of interviewees 
The case of a single government department (Defra) was studied. Defra has primary 
responsibility for English environmental policy development across a wide range of 
policy domains, and may be considered a critical case (Yin, 2009) for testing theories 
of environmental policy practice. Interviewees (Table 5-2) were senior policy makers 
selected to provide insight into the practices within their policy domain. It should be 
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noted that policy makers in UK government often circulate between policy domains 
during their career, so some interviewees drew on wider experience. In line with 
Yin’s (2009) rationale for single case study research, the aim was not for statistical 
generalisation, rather, to determine whether established theory provides correct 
propositions for this critical case, or whether alternative explanations are more 
relevant, challenging or extending theory. 
Table 5-2: 33 policymakers were interviewed in 28 interviews across a range of policy 
domains  
Policy domain Number of interviewees 
Exotic animal disease control 1 
Climate change adaptation planning 1 
Sustainable Consumption and Production 2 
Local environmental control 2 
Farming Regulation Task Force 2 
Biodiversity 1 
Food 2 
Marine strategy 1 
Common fisheries policy 1 
Peat and Soils 1 
Contaminated Land 1 
Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA) 1 
Noise 1 
Chemicals 3 
Marine licensing 1 
Livestock and livestock products 1 
Cross-cutting 1 
Water in the environment 1 
Water quality 1 
EU negotiation coordination 1 
Landscape and forestry 1 
Crops and Agricultural Products 1 
Flood risk management 2 
Animal welfare 1 
Waste management 2 
5.4.3 Collection of data 
Semi-structured interviews (33 individuals in 28 meetings) were conducted to collect 
narrative during September and October 2011, and lasted between 30 minutes and 1 
hour.  Interviews were conducted using open-ended questions, structured around 
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research questions examining the range of policy and regulatory interventions 
available to policy makers, their experience of effective and ineffective policy and 
regulation in practice, and the factors influencing instrument selection and 
effectiveness. Prior to each interview, interviewees were provided with a briefing 
note explaining the purpose of the research and assuring their anonymity, listing the 
questions to be addressed during the discussion and presenting a typology of policy 
and regulatory instruments established through a prior literature review (Taylor et al., 
2012; summarised in Table 5-1). Interviews were recorded with permission using a 
digital voice recorder and transcribed verbatim. Relevant documentation concerning 
the policy and regulation within policy areas was obtained, and was supplemented 
with direct observation, conversation and collection of field notes. 
5.4.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis was performed through a systematic process of coding, annotation 
and memoing using NVIVO 9™ Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS) (Bazeley, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994). A stepwise 
approach (Figure 5-1) was used for coding narrative data to identify descriptions of 
characteristics of or interactions between actors (e.g. policy makers, regulators, 
businesses) that affect instrument selection or effectiveness, and recurring concepts 
(e.g. cost, fairness, risk) used to explain the choice of policy instruments. 
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Figure 5-1: Analysis approach, after Summerill et al. (2010) 
This coding approach was used to ensure that a representative range of interactions 
and explanatory concepts referred to by interviewees was captured, providing a well-
grounded data set to inform inductive theory development. The coding was then 
reduced to a set of explanatory themes. The development of these themes reflects 
the “theoretical sensitivity” (Kelle, 2005) of the researchers, informed by a literature 
review undertaken prior to the interviews (Taylor et al., 2012). Comparison between 
the themes identified through the literature review and the themes reduced from the 
interview data have been used to corroborate the relevance of existing theory to the 
interviewee’s explanations of policy and regulatory instrument selection in practice. 
The results of this analysis are reflected in the text. 
5.5 Results and discussion 
Table 5-3 summarises respondents’ opinions on the range of policy and regulatory 
instruments they can choose from, with reference to the typology of instruments 
Record interview
Transcribe 
verbatim
Load into NVIVO
Code
Annotate
Memo
Themes, 
concepts, 
questions, theory
Explanation 
building
Logic models
Each interviewee forms a single sub-
case
Categorisation to facilitate analysis e.g. 
‘risk’, references to actor interactions
Critical commentary and explanatory  
notes
Memory aid, record observations
Arise through iterative cycles of coding
Stipulates cause-and-effect chain of 
events between policy design and 
regulatory effectiveness
Stipulate causal links e.g. how and why 
policy maker skills and resources 
influence regulatory effectiveness
Iterative 
process
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provided during the interviews. Table 5-4 lists factors identified by policy makers that 
influence the effectiveness of instruments and how many respondents discussed 
them, and summarises the benefits and limitations of these factors. Figure 5-2 
illustrates the actors and interactions policy makers consider during instrument 
selection. Table 5-5 lists other factors affecting the choice of instruments, the 
number of respondents who discussed them, and summarises respondents’ views 
on these factors. 
5.6 Typology of instruments available to policy makers 
Interviewees were asked to comment on the typology of instruments provided at 
Table 5-6 (including revisions applied following interviews). In general, policy makers 
felt the typology provided an accurate summary of the range of interventions 
available, and were able to identify examples of different variants used in practice by 
reference to it (Table 5-3). 
Table 5-3: Summary of respondent opinions on instrument typology 
Number of 
interviewees 
Summary of opinions Detailed comments and illustrative quotes 
14 Considered typology to 
be representative of 
options available to 
policymakers, or raised 
no objections 
“I think you look like you’ve covered, yes, all the different 
categories in quite a useful way” 
 
“I’m sure some of them would probably span more than one 
category but I imagine that they’re fairly comprehensive one way 
or another” 
15 Provided proposals for 
refinements 
Include “codes of practice” (3) 
Include “insurance” (3) 
Include “do nothing” (1) 
Other clarifications (10) 
3 No comment One person in group responded on behalf of others present 
1 Questioned logic of 
existing structure 
Thought the categorisation and naming of instruments should be 
further refined. Highlighted the example of “voluntary regulation”, 
which is a term generally used to describe an overall regulatory 
strategy rather than to specify a type of instrument (like “taxes 
and subsidies” or “technology controls”) as it has been used in 
the typology. 
Several respondents commented that the typology would be a useful prompt for 
policy makers considering options for regulatory reform. One respondent was 
concerned that if the typology was used as an instrument selection check-list by 
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policy makers, it could constrain their creativity and openness to new ideas. It was 
also clear from the discussion that the presentation of instruments in a list fails to 
communicate the reality of instruments working in an interrelated mix. 
The policy areas covered during interviews were primarily concerned with the 
management of risks to the environment (e.g. biodiversity loss, unsustainable 
consumption of natural resources) and risks to humans arising from environmental 
conditions (e.g. flood damage, losses from animal disease, health risks arising from 
pollution). Defra also has responsibility for the regulation of economic performance of 
some sectors (e.g. the water industry), but economic regulation was rarely 
discussed. In one case the interviewee felt the typology was not very relevant for 
their policy area because it concerned environmental rather than economic 
regulation. 
The typology of instruments, including recommended amendments (highlighted in 
Table 5-6), may be considered to be a useful aide-mémoire for discussions about 
regulatory reform for environmental risks, and a workable structure for organising 
evidence about regulatory practice. However, it was also apparent the process of 
instrument selection in practice is not formalised, and is complex and nuanced. 
Analysis of discussions revealed a range of considerations that policy makers take 
into account when developing or changing environmental policy, including:  
 the suitability of instruments to tackle different types of market failures and to 
manage public risks; 
 the extent to which instruments harness the influence of industry, civil society 
and government actors to maximise their impact; 
 the design of instruments to provide necessary degrees of flexibility and to 
reinforce each other in the overall policy mix; 
 the alignment of instruments with wider social and political requirements. 
Respondents also commented on the evidence and skills required for effective 
policymaking. These findings are discussed in detail below. 
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5.7 Selecting instruments to tackle market failures and manage 
public risks 
5.7.1 Use of economic concepts (e.g. market failure) to explain 
instrument selection 
When discussing reasons for choosing particular instruments, 12 respondents 
explicitly referred to economic concepts (public goods, information failures, market 
failures, externalities, property rights, polluter pays principle) as reasons for public 
intervention, or reasons why a particular instrument had been selected. These 
economic concepts were used in discussion about sustainable consumption and 
production, noise, waste management and food and agriculture. 
Under UK government guidance, government intervention may be justified to tackle 
market failures, government failures, or to manage public risks (H. M. Treasury, 
2003). Experience suggests that different instruments are appropriate for different 
forms of market failure (Perman et al., 2003). For example, market failures due to 
asymmetries of information may be tackled through interventions that improve the 
availability of information, such as mandatory business performance reporting 
through company accounts, or labelling schemes to improve information available to 
consumers. These results indicate that models of instrument performance from the 
environmental economics literature (e.g. Perman et al., 2003) form part of policy 
makers’ conceptualization of policy problems and rationale for instrument selection. 
5.7.2 Use of risk concepts to explain instrument selection 
23 of 33 interviewees discussed risk concepts extensively when discussing the 
selection of appropriate instruments, notably in the context of contaminated land, soil 
erosion, animal and plant disease control, climate change adaptation planning, 
chemicals regulation, flood risk management, reservoir safety and investment in 
infrastructure. Risk characteristics raised that reportedly influence the choice of 
instruments are summarised below (parenthesised numbers throughout indicate the 
number of respondents who commented on a theme). 
Spatial characteristics (13): risks that vary spatially were argued to require 
approaches that include local assessment of risks (e.g. flooding, land contamination, 
diffuse pollution, biodiversity, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), river pollution), and may 
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require national coordination or international agreements where impacts cross 
administrative boundaries; 
Impact and likelihood of risk (13): higher impact risks were argued to require more 
certain regulatory measures to control them, normally assumed to be achieved 
through direct regulation (e.g. reservoir safety, chemicals, pesticides, air pollution, 
drinking water quality, release of invasive species); 
Who is affected by risk (6): where the impact of a risk is constrained to the person 
or business causing the risk, it was generally argued that government need not 
intervene. However, where risks caused by one party impose impacts on others (e.g. 
the introduction of animal or plant disease) or where risks to society remain 
unmanaged (e.g. risks arising from climate change not managed by private sector 
organisations) it was argued that government intervention may be justified. 
Number and variety of actors and mitigation actions (3): for problems involving 
multiple actors and risk mitigation actions (e.g. soil management, climate change 
adaptation planning, diffuse pollution) more complex regulatory approaches using a 
range of interventions targeted at different actors was reported to often be 
necessary; 
Understanding of risk (6): risks that are not well understood (e.g. with respect to 
their sources in the case of diffuse pollution, with respect to impact in the case of 
land contamination and nanotechnology) may require different regulatory 
approaches compared to well understood risks. Interviewees discussed adopting a 
“precautionary approach” or seeking to establish a better evidence base before 
direct regulation is adopted as potential strategies to deal with a lack of knowledge 
about risks. 
Persistence and irreversibility (3): some environmental risks may have impacts 
that persist in the environment for many years, or are irreversible (e.g. some 
chemicals, invasive species), in which case stronger controls to reduce residual risk 
were reported to be appropriate;  
Speed of action required (3): where rapid government action is required to control 
the spread of animal disease after an outbreak, direct regulation was argued to be 
required, alongside planning and skills development to improve emergency 
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response. Flood management also requires measures (e.g. emergency planning, 
flood alerts) to enable a rapid response. 
An extensive literature exists on the relationship between characteristics of risks and 
the forms of regulation that are appropriate to manage them (e.g. Pollard et al., 
2004). In concert, these results indicate that theories and concepts emerging from 
both economics (e.g. Perman et al., 2003) and risk analysis (e.g. Kaplan, 1997; 
Short, 1984) are used by policy makers at Defra to conceptualize explanations for 
instrument selection, but to varying degrees by different interviewees. This could 
indicate, among other things, that economic and risk management theory are of 
varying relevance in different policy domains, or that expertise in risk analysis and 
economics is not spread evenly among policy makers, or reflect a deliberate 
avoidance of technical terminology to aid communication clarity. 
5.8 Harnessing the influence of industry, civil society and 
government 
Interviewees described a wide range of actors, characteristics of actors, and 
influences between actors that influence the effectiveness of instruments in practice. 
Table 5-4 shows the number of interviewees who discussed particular actor 
characteristics or interactions and provides a summary of how these factors 
reportedly affect the effectiveness of environmental policy and regulation. 
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Table 5-4: Summary analysis of impact of factors influencing achievement of environmental policy and regulatory objectives 
Factor influencing effectiveness 
(number of interviewees referring 
to factor) 
Potential benefits to achieving environmental objectives from 
policymaker perspective 
Potential limitations to achieving environmental objectives 
from policymaker perspective 
Industry motivations and attitudes 
towards compliance (28) 
Leading businesses may pursue positive environmental behaviour 
independently, e.g. in pursuit of corporate social responsibility 
objectives. 
Policy objectives may conflict with business objectives, 
undermining regulatory effectiveness. 
Deliberate non-compliance undermines regulatory effectiveness. 
Individual motivations, capabilities 
and attitudes towards compliance 
(26) 
Pro-environmental attitudes of public may influence other actors. 
 
Direct regulation often infeasible as not possible to enforce. 
Bounded rationality may inhibit behaviour change; “behavioural 
interventions” may be required. 
Influence of conditions along supply 
chains (23) 
Can extend policy influence beyond national boundaries. 
Powerful influence in some sectors (e.g. food retail, government 
procurement). 
Businesses unlikely to enforce standards to extent of limiting 
supply. 
Higher procurement standards may be expensive for 
government. 
Regulator capability (23) Can prove more credible than central government in providing 
advice and guidance to influence behaviour change. 
Can provide expertise to address localised problems. 
Lack of capability or resources directly limits effectiveness. 
Industry capability (20) Greater capability may reduce need for government intervention. Lack of capability reduces regulatory effectiveness. 
Strength of public buying decisions 
and other public influences (19) 
Considered very powerful in some sectors where public concern is 
high, and retailers compete on basis of environmental claims (e.g. 
food). 
 
Sensitive to loss of trust in environmental claims or low levels of 
public concern. 
Consumers may become confused as environmental claims 
proliferate. 
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Factor influencing effectiveness 
(number of interviewees referring 
to factor) 
Potential benefits to achieving environmental objectives from 
policymaker perspective 
Potential limitations to achieving environmental objectives 
from policymaker perspective 
Regulatory threats, of harder 
regulatory regime or enforcement 
action (14) 
Can motivate action to avoid harder regulation, or to avoid 
punishment. 
Impact may be undermined by lack of political will to regulate. 
Credibility and therefore impact may be undermined by lack of 
enforcement resources. 
Measures may not bring about behaviour change despite being 
easy to inspect and enforce (e.g. “tick box” exercises). 
Industry capacity to self-regulate (10) Self-regulation may reduce the need for government involvement. Self-regulation may not be viable in large diverse industries. 
Scrutiny of business environmental 
performance by NGOs and media (7) 
 
Can publicise successes and failures.  
Can have stronger influence than government in some policy 
domains. 
May lack focus on lower-profile policy objectives. 
Objectives or activities may conflict with government objectives. 
 
Investor and insurer influence on 
businesses (7) 
 
Can act directly on business financial drivers.  External investor influence not relevant for privately owned 
businesses. 
Investor risk perceptions may lead to lack of investment. 
Insurer risk perceptions may lead to lack of private insurance 
provision. 
Politicians extolling better 
environmental performance (5) 
Can catalyse action. Can publicise positive initiatives. May misdirect effort. 
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Commentators argue that modern environmental regulation has been 
characterised by a shift from government (the State) to governance (formalised 
management, irrespective of actor), with policy makers increasingly seeking to 
harness the influence of non-governmental actors to strengthen the 
effectiveness of interventions (see, e.g. Lange & Gouldson, 2010; Jordan et al., 
2005; Gunningham, 2009). It is clear from these results that policy makers 
believe the effectiveness of policy and regulation is affected by a wide range of 
social and political forces as summarised in Figure 5-2. The extent to which 
these factors are relevant varies between policy domains. For example, UK 
supermarkets driven by consumer preferences are considered powerful 
influencers of environmental behaviour in their supply chains. However, in other 
domains (e.g. local pollution control) consumer choice appears less relevant, 
where instead direct regulatory intervention and co-regulation feature more 
prominently. 
 
Figure 5-2: Actors and interactions policy makers consider during instrument 
selection 
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5.9 Design objectives for policy and regulatory frameworks 
5.9.1 Coherent mix of instruments 
27 respondents discussed the interaction between instruments in a “mix” as 
being an important factor in their selection and effectiveness in practice. 
Instruments work in a complementary mix (14): respondents highlighted 
various examples of mixes in action. For example, the regulation of grass-
burning uses direct regulation combined with a voluntary code; the Landfill Tax 
has worked in conjunction with the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS; 
now discontinued) and infrastructure investment subsidies to improve waste 
management; and various instruments are used to reduce flood risk including 
development control and public awareness building. 
Instruments interfere with each other (6): in some policy areas (e.g. fisheries 
policy and agriculture) respondents explained that existing regulatory 
frameworks needed to be simplified, to make them simpler and easier for 
regulatees to understand.  
Instruments enable other instruments (7): cases of individual instruments 
enhancing the impact of existing instruments included introducing recognised 
standards in carbon footprinting and sustainable production, which could then 
be used to enable further measures such as procurement standards or 
differential taxation. 
Instruments preclude other instruments (4): in other cases the existing 
regulatory framework can prevent the addition of new instruments, for example 
if existing direct regulation prevents additional direct regulation, or the scope for 
additional tax measures may be constrained by the existing tax system. 
Policy makers need to work to coordinate design (12): Defra policies 
interact with other departments’ policies, for example with the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (CLG) and Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) on standards for domestic boilers, or with CLG for 
planning policy that can affect future incidents of noise and nuisance (a Defra 
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responsibility). While some coordinated policy was thought to have worked well, 
it remains a challenge in other areas.  
Regulators need to work together to coordinate implementation (2): 
coordination is also required at the level of regulatory interventions. For 
example, the Environment Agency is a statutory consultee for planning 
applications managed by local authorities to assess flood risk impacts. Better 
coordination of inspections for farmers is an objective that has arisen from the 
Farming Regulation Task Force. 
While early commentators tended to focus on the relative merits of individual 
instruments to tackle environmental problems, in recent years attention has 
turned to the design of complementary instrument mixes (Howlett & Rayner, 
2007). The need for such mixes is widely recognised among the policy makers 
interviewed here. While the Tinbergen Rule would suggest that one instrument 
is needed for each policy target (Braathen, 2007), policy makers did not 
explicitly refer to the application of this rule in policy design. Policy makers 
report some successes in working together to coordinate the design of mixes 
across policy areas and departments, but for more complex policy areas 
understanding the existing mix in full remains a significant challenge. 
5.9.2 Flexibility 
21 respondents discussed ways in which instruments need to exhibit flexibility 
to remain effective as environmental and economic conditions vary spatially and 
temporally, and discussed ways in which this flexibility can be accommodated in 
design. 
Incorporating flexibility to industry characteristics (7): respondents referred 
to the need to vary rules according to different industry characteristics. For 
example, the local pollution control regime has guidance for 80 different sectors. 
The use of licensing based on Best Available Techniques allows regulators to 
be flexible to specific business circumstances.  
Incorporating flexibility to environmental variation (4): interviewees 
identified examples where local environmental conditions vary, for example in 
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fisheries, in land contamination, or in countryside biodiversity. As local 
environmental conditions vary, appropriate regulatory interventions also need to 
be varied.  
Reducing regulation according to risk of business (6): at present, the 
Environment Agency can vary inspection charges and frequency depending on 
their assessment of the environmental risks posed by specific businesses. A 
similar approach described as “earned recognition” is under consideration in 
farming, reducing government regulation if other inspection regimes are in place 
(e.g. under supermarket animal welfare schemes). 
Using case law to refine regulation (2):  One respondent described how in 
animal welfare, case law has been used to define acceptable treatment of 
animals, rather than attempting to define rules to cover all cases in statute 
which would have proved infeasible. In contrast, another respondent described 
the case of contaminated land, where case law has not proved an effective 
route to clarify legislation. In this case, UK legislation sets a test of “significant 
possibility of significant harm” to identify when land should be considered 
contaminated, and provides for statutory guidance to explain what this means. 
However, before 2012 statutory guidance did not provide this clarification, 
leaving regulators, businesses and other stakeholders uncertain over the 
definition and therefore the need for action. No cases went to court to provide 
case law to clarify the definition, partly reflecting fear among stakeholders of the 
implications of a single case decision for the management of other potentially 
contaminated sites. A clarification of statutory guidance by government has 
instead been necessary, giving greater legal certainty and creating conditions 
that might enable case law to further refine the test in future.   
Modifying policy and regulation over time - flexibility vs certainty (11): 
policy makers discussed how policy can be changed over time as conditions 
change. In the case of the Courtauld Commitment, the flexibility afforded by this 
co-regulatory approach was seen by two respondents as advantageous, 
allowing objectives to change as government and industry understanding of 
environmental impacts improved. However, clear unchanging regulation was 
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also reportedly advantageous, allowing businesses to make long term 
investment decisions. One respondent considered the Landfill Tax to have 
worked well because it provides long term certainty on the increasing cost of 
landfill. Balancing flexibility with clear long term signals is a challenge for policy 
makers. As one respondent put it:  
"And it’s that balance....there was a report from the Advisory Committee on 
Business and the Environment in the late 90s and that said businesses want 
both certainty and flexibility. I quote that back at business from time to time and 
they say yes that’s right. One minute they’ll be asking for one and the next 
they’ll be asking for the other." 
These results indicate that accommodating flexibility while providing clarity and 
certainty for businesses is a significant challenge for Defra policy makers. Some 
considered the flexibility afforded by co-regulation to be a significant advantage 
of this approach. Extending the use of “earned recognition” is an active area of 
policy development, particularly in farming. 
5.10 Social, legal and political preferences and constraints 
affecting instrument selection 
In addition to the factors affecting effectiveness and instrument design 
considerations highlighted above, respondents discussed a range of other 
considerations that influence the choice of instruments. The frequency of these 
factors being raised is described in Table 5-5. A lower number of coding 
occurrences cannot be interpreted as reflecting a lower level of importance 
being placed on that factor by Defra corporately. For example, the relatively low 
frequency of explicit discussions of “ethics” does not indicate a low level of 
concern about ethics at Defra; only that ethical considerations were explicitly 
prioritised in discussion in a relatively small number of policy contexts.  
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Table 5-5: Summary analysis of other factors affecting choice of instruments 
Other factors affecting 
choice of instruments  
Summary of respondent views 
Cost (31) Achieving cost-effective regulation was a central theme in all discussions. 
Benefit-risk trade-offs were discussed in regulation of contaminated land, soil 
erosion, animal and plant disease control, climate change mitigation planning, 
chemicals, flood risk management, reservoir safety and investment in 
infrastructure (e.g. for recycling). Benefit-cost tradeoffs were discussed in 
regulation of catchment sensitive farming, animal welfare, payments for 
ecosystems services (e.g. water companies paying land owners to prevent 
water pollution and agri-environment schemes), footpaths, forestry 
management, energy efficient products, waste reduction and resource efficient 
production. 
European Union (EU) 
and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) 
compliance (27) 
The EU, and to a lesser extent the WTO, play a significant role in the choices 
made by policymakers in the UK, and policy makers, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and industry seek to influence policymaking at the EU 
level. While many policymakers feel constrained by the existing stock of EU 
regulations, others identified scope for flexibility in how EU rules are 
implemented nationally and believed that future EU policy design would make 
more use of approaches not solely based on direct regulation. 
Industry and public 
preferences (19) 
Views of industry and public reportedly influence the choice of regulatory 
approach through both direct formal engagement channels (e.g industry 
advisory panels, statutory consultation processes), and indirectly through 
political influence (at a local, national and international level). 
Political preferences (17) Politicians reportedly play an active role in policymaking, often working directly 
with policymakers. The current government's preference for non-regulatory 
policy approaches featured in narratives of approximately one third of policy 
makers interviewed. 
Fairness (12) Interviewees raised fairness as an important characteristic of environmental 
policy or policymaking, primarily because regulations that are considered 
unfair are less likely to be accepted by stakeholders, who will make demands 
for change. Regulated industries reportedly value a “level playing field”, where 
businesses that comply with standards are not placed at a disadvantage by 
non-compliant businesses. 
Impact on innovation (5) One respondent emphasised that the use of Best Available Technique 
requirements in licensing should not limit innovation. Instead regulators should 
be flexible in licensing to ensure the intended environmental outcomes are 
achieved, whilst allowing the use of innovative technologies. Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and restriction of Chemicals (REACH) regulation 
includes stimulating innovation within the EU chemicals industry as one of its 
three objectives. 
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Other factors affecting 
choice of instruments  
Summary of respondent views 
Ethics (3) One respondent argued that some supermarkets have identified that their 
customers want them to behave ethically, and that they therefore offer 
Fairtrade products. One believed that water companies had pursued 
ecosystem-based approaches to improving water quality for both cost and 
ethical/ corporate social responsibility reasons. In the case of animal welfare, 
ethical considerations were considered to be central to how government policy 
has been designed and implemented; thinking has moved on from treating 
animals as property to treating animals as sentient beings. 
 
In addition to its effectiveness in achieving environmental objectives, 
environmental policy and regulation will also be assessed in terms of its 
economic/financial and social impacts (Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills, 2011), and these considerations were reflected in policy makers’ 
narratives. Given the strong emphasis placed by commentators on the 
importance of technological innovation to address social and environmental 
challenges and the potentially deleterious effect of direct regulation on 
innovation (e.g. Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999), it is perhaps surprising that 
innovation was not discussed more frequently by policy makers. However, 
technology innovation is perhaps less relevant in some Defra policy areas than 
it is in the areas where it was mentioned, notably those concerned with 
production and use of technology such as REACH and pollution control. 
5.11 Impact of the state of knowledge upon instrument 
selection 
27 respondents referred to the role that evidence (or the lack of evidence) plays 
in instrument selection and the strategies adopted to enable effective policy and 
regulation under conditions of uncertainty. 
Research and policy evaluation (23): many policy areas identified 
government research as an important mechanism for increasing society's 
capacity to understand and manage environmental risks. Some policy makers 
expressed confidence in the quality of evaluation evidence available for 
regulation in their policy areas, whereas others found evidence to be lacking. 
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For some, policies had not been in place long enough to show their impact. In 
others, measurement of impact was considered to be very challenging.    
Evidence may be contested (7): interviewees noted cases where evidence of 
harm may be contested, which can reduce regulatee's willingness to comply 
with regulation based on the evidence.  
Strategies for dealing with uncertainty - gradual policy development (7): 
interviewees discussed how the impetus for government action on some issues 
gradually increases over time, so the initial government response to an 
emerging issue may be limited to seeking further information or producing a 
position statement. For example, one respondent highlighted the gradual 
hardening of smoking regulation over time as public attitudes and evidence 
have evolved. Another characterised the development of global cooperation on 
illegal fishing as follows:  "…my experience of that was that you get like a 
zeitgeist effect. You know government is doing something on illegal fishing, 
Sainsburys and Marks and Spencers and Waitrose get interested...someone on 
TV...internationally...an NGO does it; and we all feed each other so you get that 
movement together...is it business already doing it or is it government? 
Probably in the real world these things feed off each other"  
Strategies for dealing with uncertainty - adopting a precautionary 
approach (4): respondents described the regulation of nanomaterials, aspects 
of chemical regulation under REACH, and of land contamination as 
"precautionary", where hazards are known to exist but the risk is unknown. 
Respondents described a case by case approach to assessing the controls 
required for specific nanomaterials and chemicals. In land contamination, site-
specific assessments need to be undertaken effectively, requiring a suitable 
regulatory framework and measures to inform the decisions of individual 
regulators through knowledge sharing and capacity building. 
Strategies for dealing with uncertainty – co-regulation (6): respondents 
noted that co-regulatory approaches can be beneficial where evidence is 
lacking or contested. For example, some voluntary programmes for improving 
the sustainability of products have initially focused on establishing an agreed 
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evidence base and building buy-in from businesses, so that then improvement 
targets can be agreed. A new “catchment based approach” for regulating water 
pollution and use reportedly shares similar features, where evidence is shared 
and solutions brokered between stakeholders within a river catchment, to create 
a collective understanding of issues and ownership for changes required. 
According to commentators, the quality and availability of evidence on which to 
base policy and regulatory design is expected to be a central concern for policy 
makers seeking to implement “evidence based policy” (Solesbury, 2001). Jones 
(2007) has identified a range of policy responses to uncertainty, ranging from 
simply acknowledging uncertainty through to “adaptive management”. It is clear 
that for the policy makers interviewed, the quality and availability of evidence to 
inform policymaking has a direct impact on the choice of regulatory instruments 
deployed. Evidence may however be lacking, or contested. In some cases, a 
gradual approach to developing policy as evidence develops has been adopted, 
whereas in others where hazards are known to exist but risks are unclear, a 
precautionary approach has been selected. Policy makers have argued that 
their capacity to gradually develop consensus around accepted evidence and 
thereby bring about behaviour change is an important advantage of co-
regulatory approaches (notably for improving the sustainability of products and 
in catchment based planning). 
5.12 Capabilities for effective policymaking 
Nineteen respondents alluded to skills and processes that affect the 
effectiveness of the regulatory reform process. Some emphasised the 
difficulties in understanding the operation of the human and environmental 
systems to be influenced and highlighted a lack of tools to improve 
understanding. Unintended consequences of government intervention can 
result, which then need to be addressed. As one interviewee put it: "...you do 
some research on a problem, you find what you think is a solution, you come up 
with the policy instruments. Others think the same thing, everyone’s prepared to 
go for it. You go for it. You’ve got to find out if it works or not and what the 
unintended consequences were because otherwise, you know, there’s a 
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reputational risk if you want to suggest something else next time. You then need 
to follow up to see if there are unintended consequences that… make things 
worse because you either need to stop using the policy instrument or you need 
a mitigating one.” 
Two interviewees highlighted the Defra policy cycle (Collier et al., 2010) as an 
iterative process from which to learn (Figure 5-3). One interviewee argued that 
adopting a cautious, incremental approach to regulatory reform may well be a 
sensible strategy to deal with uncertainty and unintended consequences. This 
approach to policy making had been described in a 1970s public policy article 
"the art of muddling through", and the interviewee felt that that description of 
policymaking "very often still holds". 
 
Figure 5-3: Defra’s policy cycle (Collier et al., 2010) 
Three respondents argued that policy makers and regulators would need new 
skills in order to establish community- or industry-led regulatory approaches in 
line with current political priorities. One commented: "the more you’re taking a 
voluntary or big society or working with industry approach, the more you need to 
be able to have the softer skills and working with people. The really challenging 
thing is trying to get people to believe it’s in their interest to actually be doing 
this particularly if they don’t think it is in their interest…part of it is being able to 
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admit when government doesn’t necessarily have all the answers which I think 
is a bit of a culture shock for some people."  
Seven interviewees discussed the need to think broadly and laterally when 
considering the design of new policy. Working across policy domains to share 
experience and ideas was thought to help encourage creative thinking. One 
interviewee felt that the list of policy options provided for the interview was 
useful because it provided a more detailed explanation of variants than is often 
discussed and could act as a useful prompt, although another thought it was 
perhaps too detailed and could discourage policy makers from thinking 
imaginatively about options. For this interviewee, good policymaking required 
the policy maker to "look at each in case with its merits, think broadly, rule 
nothing out and use your nouse." 
While various processes and procedures (e.g. regulatory impact assessment) 
have been introduced to improve the quality of decision-making for regulatory 
reform, some commentators argue that good policymaking and regulation 
remains a craft (notably, Sparrow (2000)). This analysis illustrates the wide 
range of skills and processes that policy makers need to bring to bear in the 
process of instrument selection, particularly as new forms of regulation that 
depend more heavily on business and civic actors are introduced. 
5.13 Better instrument selection for environmental regulatory 
reform 
This analysis reveals the complexity of the challenge faced by policy makers in 
their efforts to reform environmental regulation. Policy makers’ choices of policy 
and regulatory instruments are influenced by the suitability of instruments to 
tackle the intended policy objectives and targeted environmental risk 
characteristics, the range of policy instruments used previously in practice, the 
strength of factors enabling instrument effectiveness in the policy context, 
instrument design characteristics delivering coherence and flexibility, and a 
range of social, legal and political factors. Policy makers’ state of knowledge 
about these decision inputs, and their capabilities in effective policymaking, 
mediate the final choices made (Figure 5-4).  
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Figure 5-4: Summary logic model of instrument selection emerging from this 
research 
It is apparent that to suggest that the task of the policy maker is simply to select 
the right intervention from the list using a stable set of rules would be a gross 
simplification of reality and would reflect outmoded faith in the role of “decision 
support systems” popular in earlier decades. Policy makers must inter alia seek 
to understand the current experience of the regulated, attempt to predict how 
actors will respond in a particular context to particular interventions, and search 
out opportunities to use existing actors and relationships to achieve their 
objectives. A piece-meal approach to regulatory reform based on analysis of 
instruments in isolation is likely to prove inadequate. An approach based on 
industry engagement (e.g. Farming Regulation Task Force) may provide a 
method to highlight cumulative burdens and also the coherence of policy mix.  
Policy maker expertise in both economic and risk analysis is necessary, and an 
exchange of concepts between specialists may prove beneficial. Policy makers 
also expressed considerable interest in the insights provided by behavioural 
economics, reflecting recent interest across UK government (e.g. Dolan et al., 
2010). This research suggest that  behavioural research (or “insights”) can 
inform all regulatory design, so to see behavioural interventions as a separate 
class of regulation is to underplay the breadth of their application. However 
understanding of how they can be applied is at an early stage, and their 
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relevance to business regulation remains unclear. Further understanding of the 
subtleties of regulatory practice, including the use of threats, knowledge 
exchange, and the role of credibility will help address this gap. 
Policy makers may be assisted in their task by cross-government regulatory 
reform programmes, such as the Red Tape Challenge (Cabinet Office, 2013a). 
Specifically, such programmes can bring to bear resources and political 
influence to change the complex network of interactions that affect 
environmental behaviour. They can also include well-publicised programmes of 
public consultation to seek views on where and how regulatory reform could 
reduce burdens on business and the public. The Red Tape Challenge 
programme includes a public website that lists all current legislation and invites 
businesses and the public to “fight back” to help “free up business and society 
from the burden of excessive regulation” by identifying “what should be 
scrapped, what should be saved and what should be simplified” (Cabinet Office, 
2013a). The tone of publicity for the review programme has raised concern 
among pro-environmental groups (see, e.g. The Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB, 2012)). A regulatory reform programme driven 
simply by a public vote on which regulations to change or remove would risk 
removing elements from this network of influences in ways that undermine 
cumulative environmental protection in detrimental ways, unanticipated by 
voters. However, the Red Tape Challenge programme also incorporates other 
elements of public and industry engagement, political scrutiny and policymaking 
by expert practitioners (Cabinet Office, 2012); elements which this analysis 
suggests are all essential for effective policymaking. While the long term impact 
of the recently completed environment element of the Red Tape Challenge 
review (Defra, 2012) cannot yet be assessed, the Environmental Data Services 
(ENDS) Report summarises opinion among stakeholders that initial fears of a 
“bonfire of environmental law” appear to be “overstated”, with recommendations 
focusing on merger and simplification of existing rules (ENDS, 2012). 
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Table 5-6: Refined version of instrument typology (modifications emphasised in grey) 
Type Variant Description Example applications 
Doing nothing - Government chooses not to act as policy objectives will be achieved without 
government intervention. 
- 
Direct 
"command and 
control" 
regulation 
Ambient pollution 
requirements 
The regulator specifies required maximum levels of ambient pollution, 
allowing flexibility to polluters to decide how to achieve that level. In the EU, 
ambient targets have been set within EU directives, which members states 
tackle through their national policy mix 
Water quality targets, air pollution targets  
Input restrictions 
and output quotas 
Restrictions are applied in the use or output of products. If a material or 
practice is considered to be sufficiently harmful its use may be restricted or 
banned entirely, with penalties enforced for violations of the ban. Where 
banned materials remain in use, their disposal will need to be carefully 
controlled. 
Restrictions in pesticide or fertiliser use, 
restrictions in production of potentially harmful 
chemicals 
Non-transferable 
emissions licences 
Typically a regulator issues a non-transferable licence, in the UK often 
referred to as a permit, to a business that gives authorisation to operate 
according to specified environmental performance requirements, for example 
maximum permitted levels of emissions. The regulator monitors the operation 
to ensure compliance, and may enforce penalties for non-compliance. 
Conditional exemption from regulation (e.g. exemption from inspections in 
response to good performance) can also act to incentivise behaviour change. 
Controls on emissions to air and water, 
controls on waste production and disposal 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
Technology and 
process controls 
The regulator sets environmental performance objectives and specifies or 
agrees appropriate processes or abatement technologies with industry. 
Variations of standards include application of “best practicable environmental 
option” (BPEO), “best practicable means” (BPM), “best available techniques 
not entailing excessive cost” (BATNEEC) and “best available technique” 
(BAT) (Gray et al., 2007).  
Mandatory use of catalytic converters in road 
vehicles, use of specific pollution abatement 
technologies, application of process standards 
(e.g. for animal housing and husbandry) 
Zoning/ location 
controls 
Human impacts on the environment in a particular area can be controlled 
through spatial controls, which can be used to mandate practices in a given 
area, locate polluters away from people and sensitive ecosystems, to prevent 
clustering of harmful activities, or (less commonly) to move people away from 
sources of harm. 
Low emissions zones in urban areas, building 
development controls, national parks and 
conservation areas, controlled fishing zones, 
marine conservation areas, nitrate vulnerable 
zones 
Economic 
instruments 
Taxes and 
subsidies 
Environmental taxes and subsidies operate by changing the market price of a 
good or service, reducing or increasing the quantity demanded and supplied 
in the market  
Taxes on emissions to air, land, and on 
resource use. Subsidies to support renewable 
energy 
Tradable rights Tradable rights systems work by specifying a quantity of allowances, eg to 
abstract water or to emit carbon, which can then be traded amongst users. 
The system is designed to create an opportunity cost of using an allowance, 
and therefore also creates benefits from not using an allowance. Trading 
allows market actors to find the allocation of allowances that maximises the 
cost-effectiveness of using the allowance 
Individual tradable quotas for fisheries, water 
abstraction rights, emissions trading eg for 
CO2, SOx, discharge to water 
Payments Conditional payments may be made to incentivise a particular activity. 
“Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) involve beneficiaries (state or 
private) paying ecosystem managers for the benefits delivered by those 
ecosystems.  
Agri-environment payments, conservation 
payments, deposit return payments 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
Insurance A business or individual may pay a premium to an insurer who in exchange 
will provide a payment should an event take place. Government may assign 
liability for damage to people or the environment creating the need for 
insurance (e.g. mandatory third-party insurance for vehicle drivers, 
environmental liability insurance), and may seek to ensure that the 
commercial insurance market is able to provide insurance for risks in lieu of 
government compensation. 
Flood insurance, Livestock disease insurance 
Information 
based 
instruments 
Targeted 
information 
provision/ 
education 
Information is made available by public or private bodies to enable 
businesses or individuals to make better-informed decisions that impact upon 
the environment. 
Training programmes, advisory bodies (eg UK 
Carbon Trust and Energy Savings Trust) 
Naming and 
shaming/faming 
Information is made available describing the environmental performance of 
businesses, through for example a publicised inventory of toxic emissions, 
with the intention of incentivising better environmental behaviour through 
avoided damage to or enhancement of corporate reputation.  
Emissions inventories, public accolades and 
prizes, adverse publicity associated with 
prosecutions 
Registration, 
labelling and 
certification 
Typically information describing the environmental performance of the 
businesses delivering a product or service is made available to consumers 
using a product label, enabling consumers to choose products with better 
environmental performance.  
Food labelling, electrical product labelling 
Codes of practice A set of rules or conventions describing good practice. May be used to clarify 
good practice to accompany mandatory rules.  
Heather and Grass Burning Code 
Co-regulation 
and self-
regulation 
Voluntary 
regulation 
A group of businesses, often organised through a trade association, chooses 
to apply environmental performance standards as a condition of membership 
of an industry group.  
Responsible Care Initiative in chemicals 
industry 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
Covenants and 
negotiated 
agreements 
In this approach government makes an agreement with target businesses to 
achieve particular standards, which forms a contract and may incur sanctions 
if the contract is not met. This may be enforced through inspection by non-
government regulators. 
Packaging reduction agreements, recycling 
agreements, pollution reduction agreements 
Private corporate 
regulation 
Businesses may choose to apply environmental standards both within their 
organisation and along their supply chain, so that the purchasing business is 
effectively acting as a regulator of suppliers’ performance. Government may 
enforce procurement standards that then propagate along supply chains. 
Food retailer sustainability programmes, 
government procurement requirements 
Private 
professional 
regulation 
A professional body acts to apply standards through  conditions of 
membership. 
Membership of professional bodies 
Self-regulation Businesses may choose unilaterally to apply environmental performance 
standards, for example by adopting an externally monitored standard such as 
ISO14001 or EU EMAS, or as a feature of corporate social responsibility 
commitments. 
Environmental management systems, 
unilateral commitments to good performance 
Civic regulation Civic organisations, for example conservation charities or local community 
groups, may apply pressure to businesses to improve environmental 
performance through scrutiny of their behaviour and publicising good or bad 
performance. 
Activities of NGOs and community groups 
Support 
mechanisms 
and capacity 
Research and 
knowledge 
generation 
Governments or other actors may undertake research to increase knowledge 
that informs better environmental decision making. 
Funding of university research 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
building Demonstration 
projects and 
knowledge 
diffusion 
Governments may choose to invest in demonstration projects to demonstrate 
feasibility, raise awareness and reduce risks of new technologies or 
processes. This investment could be managed through a specially designed 
investment institution, such as the UK's Green Investment Bank. 
Carbon capture and storage, sustainable 
agriculture practice, eco-homes and buildings 
Network building 
and joint problem 
solving 
Initiatives designed to encourage people to exchange ideas and learning to 
improve environmental performance. 
Discussion groups, conferences, networking 
events 
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5.14 Conclusions 
This research has gathered new evidence of the factors that influence which 
instruments are effective in delivering their intended environmental outcomes in 
which circumstances, and why this is the case. It also provides insight into the 
realities of policymaking by practitioners, and the skills and tools required for the 
regulatory craft. 
(1) The refined typology of instruments (Table 5-6) provides a 
comprehensive summary of policy and regulatory instruments from which 
policy makers may choose, but does not express how instruments work 
together in a mix. The typology may prove most useful as a stimulus for 
policy makers considering options for regulatory reform and provide a 
framework for organising evidence of what works, when and why; 
(2) The effectiveness of instruments in practice was reported to be 
influenced by a wide range of interactions between government, industry 
and civil actors, and by their respective motivations and capabilities. The 
relevance and strength of these factors varies from one policy context to 
the next, so the feasibility of using a given instrument depends on the 
policy context. The design of instruments, particularly with respect to 
their coherence in a mix with others and their flexibility to accommodate 
variations in actor and environmental characteristics, was also reported 
to influence their effectiveness; 
(3) Interviewees generally considered direct regulation to be necessary in 
circumstances where high impact public risks occur. The scope for the 
use of alternative approaches to direct regulation reportedly depends 
significantly on the strength of supply chain relationships, the capacity of 
the regulated sector to self-regulate, the strength of political commitment 
to regulation, and the exposure of businesses to public and NGO 
scrutiny. For some sectors regulated by Defra conditions for effective co- 
and self-regulation reportedly exist. However in others the scope for self-
regulation may be more limited. One emerging advantage of a co-
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regulatory approach over law-based direct regulation is reportedly the 
ability to accommodate changes in direction as knowledge about the 
nature of environmental problems improves. 
(4) Policy makers described iterative approaches to policy and regulatory 
design, taking place under conditions of significant uncertainty and 
influenced by social, legal and political factors.  The accounts of 
practitioners highlight their need for a wide skill set to design effective 
policy, including social science expertise in economics and risk analysis, 
organisational design, and softer skills in negotiation, openness to new 
ideas and alertness to new opportunities for alternative approaches. 
Hard rules to direct optimal instrument selection appear very difficult if 
not impossible to define; at best “rules of thumb” can be identified. The 
recurring factors identified that influence instrument selection (Figure 5-2, 
Table 5-4 and Table 5-5) could form the basis for a more systematic 
approach to analysing instrument mixes for regulatory reform, although 
its utility for policy makers remains untested. 
The analysis presented here is limited to the perspective of government policy 
makers. Regulated businesses and regulatory agencies have first-hand 
experience of the nuances of regulatory interactions, analysis of which would 
complement this research. Further qualitative research will examine and 
contrast these perspectives. 
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6 CASE STUDY: UK INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION AND REFORM 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a multiple-case study based on 30 semi-structured 
interviews with 34 senior decision makers from businesses and industry bodies, 
examining factors affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental 
regulation in practice, from the perspective of businesses affected by regulation 
in the UK, to meet Objective 4 of this research programme. This chapter was 
written for this PhD thesis by the author under normal PhD supervision 
conditions, and is presented here in a format suitable for future publication. 
6.2 Abstract 
Governments seeking to encourage economic growth and protect the natural 
environment can pursue reform programmes that improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of environmental regulation. Improvements can address many 
themes, including the selection of the best policy and regulatory instruments 
(e.g. direct, economic, voluntary) to adopt. This qualitative study examines the 
preferences and priorities for environmental regulatory reform expressed by 30 
UK businesses and industry bodies from 5 industry sectors. While some argue 
for the wider adoption of voluntary approaches, others prefer direct regulation to 
tackle poor performance and provide a level playing field. Respondents seek 
regulatory frameworks that are coherent, balance clarity, prescription and 
flexibility, are enabled by positive regulatory relationships, administratively 
efficient, targeted according to risk magnitude and character, evidence-based 
and that deliver long-term market stability for regulated businesses. Anticipated 
differences in performance between instruments could be undermined by poor 
implementation, so participants argue for greater industry involvement in 
regulatory reform to identify problems and solutions. Results support the need 
for policy makers and regulators to tailor an effective mix of instruments for a 
given sector, and for regulatory reform that tackles the details of implementation 
and major integrative challenges for government. 
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6.3 Instrument selection and regulatory reform 
Governments seeking ways to encourage economic growth face choices about 
the level of environmental protection they seek, and the policy or regulatory 
instruments they adopt to achieve these objectives. Societies create and 
enforce rules to protect the environment, which governments can codify into 
laws and statute enforced by government agencies. Alternatively, rules may be 
created and enforced by other social actors, for example in the form of 
agreements between businesses along supply chains. These different forms of 
governance for environmental protection are described here as “regulation” in 
its broadest sense (after Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999), to include both the 
influence of government and the influence of other social actors on business 
behaviour. The term “instruments” is used to describe different component parts 
of regulation, such as licences or taxes. A range of policy and regulatory 
instruments is available to policy makers and regulators, including direct 
“command and control” regulation, economic instruments, information based 
instruments, co-regulation, encouraging self-regulation, and knowledge creation 
and capacity building (Taylor et al., 2012) (Table 6-1). 
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Table 6-1: Instruments available to policy makers 
Type Variant 
Direct “command and 
control” regulation 
Ambient pollution requirements 
Input restrictions and output quotas 
Non-transferable emission licences 
Technology controls 
Zoning/ location controls 
Economic instruments Taxes and subsidies 
Tradable rights 
Payments 
Information based 
instruments 
Targeted information provision 
Naming and shaming/faming 
Registration, labelling and certification 
Co-regulation and self-
regulation 
Voluntary regulation 
Covenants and negotiated agreements 
Private corporate regulation 
Private professional regulation 
Self-regulation 
Civic regulation 
Support and capacity 
building 
Research and knowledge generation 
Demonstration projects/ knowledge diffusion 
Network building and joint problem solving 
 
Instruments are often compared (e.g. Gunningham, 2009) on the basis of their 
effectiveness in achieving intended environmental outcomes (e.g. protecting 
environmental water quality, reducing atmospheric pollution, reducing resource 
consumption), and the efficiency with which they do so. While direct regulation 
has been associated with significant improvements in environmental 
performance in developed nations, it has been criticised for poor efficiency 
compared to alternative approaches that offer greater flexibility to businesses 
on how to achieve environmental objectives. Governments have used these 
alternatives to harness the effect of social forces that influence business and 
citizen behaviour beyond direct government control, such as consumer choice, 
or the influence of businesses on each other along supply chains. 
Commentators have described this as a shift from “government” to 
“governance” (Jordan et al., 2005), while calling for the careful design of 
142 
 
coherent instrument mixes (Braathen, 2007; Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999; 
Howlett & Rayner, 2007). A growing literature examines the performance of 
different types of instrument, typically founded in economics, though we 
contend that ex-post evaluations assessing instrument effectiveness in 
achieving environmental objectives are often lacking (Taylor et al., 2012). 
Regulation should be risk-informed, so that scarce resources are targeted for 
maximum impact. Risk analysis scholars have examined governments’ 
characterisation and prioritisation of different strategic risks, (e.g. public 
exposure to engineered nanomaterials, the spread of foot and mouth disease, 
and flooding (Prpich et al., 2011)), and regulatory agencies’ risk-based 
regulation of different industries, businesses and sites (Gouldson et al., 2009). 
A substantial literature examines the enforcement and compliance strategies of 
government agencies, including advice and persuasion, rules and deterrence, 
criteria strategies, responsive, smart, risk-based or meta-regulation 
(Gunningham, 2011), which have been described as a regulatory “craft” 
(Sparrow, 2000, 2008), while research examining the role of personal 
interactions between regulators and the regulated is far more limited (e.g. Pautz 
& Wamsley, 2012; Sevä & Jagers, 2013; May & Winter, 1999; Sparrow, 2008). 
To optimise the performance of regulation, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) recommends that governments (i) commit 
to a “whole-of-government” policy for regulatory quality; (ii) adhere to principles 
of open government; (iii) establish oversight institutions; (iv) integrate early 
regulatory impact assessment and consider means other than regulation; (v) 
review the stock of regulation; (vi) report regulatory performance; (vii) have 
consistent policy covering role and functions of regulatory agencies; (viii) ensure 
effectiveness of regulatory agencies and the legal system; (ix) apply risk 
assessment, management and communication strategies; (x) promote 
coherence; (xi) foster regulatory management capacity and (xii) cooperate 
internationally (OECD, 2012). To implement such principles, governments have 
pursued broad reform programmes encompassing all policy areas. For 
example, the Dutch Administrative Burden Reduction Programme, considered a 
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world leader by the World Bank Group (Ladegaard et al., 2007), included a 25% 
burden reduction target, linked regulatory reform to the budgetary cycle and 
established an independent monitoring body (Actal, 2013). In the USA, 
Executive Order 13576 (Obama, 2011b) committed the government to ongoing 
improvement in efficiency, eliminating “wasteful, duplicative of otherwise 
inefficient programs”. In the UK, the Red Tape Challenge (Cabinet Office, 
2013a) is a rolling programme seeking to reduce burdens by improving or 
removing regulation. The UK government has a stated preference (Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a) for the use of alternatives to direct 
regulation across all policy areas and requires that alternatives are considered 
by policy makers when creating or reforming regulation (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2013e).   
Governments have also specifically targeted environmental regulation for 
reform, often seeking to improve policy integration. The Swedish Environmental 
Code consolidated fragmented regulation, implemented new processes and 
institutions and provided a platform for further improvement (OECD, 2004). EU 
reforms intended to improve integration include the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive for controlling emissions from 
installations through integrated permitting, leading to the Industrial Emissions 
Directive (European Parliament, 2010), and the consolidation of chemicals 
regulation under the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH) Regulation (European Commission, 2013d).  
Regulatory reform has targeted inter alia legal and institutional coherence, the 
practices of regulators, removing excessive bureaucracy (“red tape”) and 
improving process efficiency, and the use of alternatives to direct regulation. 
However, better evidence for what instruments work when, with whom and why 
is required. The business community is one source of evidence, and 
governments seek insight from its members on how regulatory frameworks can 
be improved. Given the potential costs of regulation for businesses, observers 
may be concerned that businesses will simply argue for less regulation, 
undermining environmental protection, and greatly limiting the scope for 
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alternative approaches that place greater responsibility for environmental 
protection in their hands. This research explores how businesses may respond 
to this engagement in regulatory reform, which may be contrasted with previous 
research examining the perspectives of policy makers (Taylor et al., 2013). It 
asks 1) What arguments are made for the suitability of different forms of 
regulation? 2) What other priorities for regulatory reform are emphasised? and 
3) What do these responses imply for future regulatory reform programmes? 
6.4 Methodology 
A multi-case study approach was adopted, based on semi-structured interviews 
with senior business representatives, and executive representatives of industry 
organisations with close understanding of the perspectives of their sector. The 
case study approach is appropriate for testing and extending theory, where 
each case is analogous to an individual experiment (Yin, 2009). The use of 
semi-structured interviews allowed respondents to reveal their opinions and for 
explanations to be elicited (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Respondents were 
presented with a typology of instruments based on prior research (Table 6-1, 
with additional explanation), invited to comment on its completeness, to provide 
examples of implemented regulation that worked well or less well and explain 
why, and comment on the need for regulatory reform (Appendix A.2). Five case 
study industries were selected to span a wide range of environmental 
regulations and types of environmental risk: (i) Construction and construction 
products; (ii) Food and agriculture; (iii) Personal care products; (iv) Waste 
management and (v) Water collection, treatment, supply and management 
(Table 6-2). This selection is not intended to be representative of all industries 
in the UK; rather it provides a range of contexts in which theories concerning 
environmental regulation can be developed and tested, in pursuit of a theory-
building research strategy. The sectors selected illustrate both product based 
and operational site based regulation; sectors with large and small businesses; 
environmental risks arising from waste, emissions to air, ground and water; and 
dispersed and point source pollution.  
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Table 6-2: Case study respondents drawn from 5 industries 
Industry sector  Interviewee organisation type
10
  Number of 
interviews  
Construction and construction 
products  
Trade association  2 
Business - large  3 
Business – small/medium sized  1 
Food and agriculture  Business/Trade association  1 
Trade association  3 
Business - large  2 
Personal care products  Trade association  4 
Business - large  1 
Business – small/medium sized  2 
Waste management  Professional body  1 
Trade association  1 
Business - large  3 
Business - small  1 
Water collection, treatment, 
supply and mgmt  
Business/ Trade association  1 
Business - large  3 
Drainage board (public body)  1 
 Total:  30 
 
The research was undertaken with the support of the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), England, with interviews 
conducted between January and June 2013. Organisations that had previously 
contributed to a Defra regulatory reform programme (Defra, 2013a) were invited 
to participate under a covering letter from the Department, explaining the 
research was being undertaken independently. Respondents were 
supplemented with organisations selected for their complementary 
perspectives, including recruitment through a personal care products trade 
show, and membership of a waste industry professional association. Thirty-four 
interviewees from 30 organisations were interviewed. Interviewees were 
typically policy leads in trade associations, senior managers or heads of 
environmental compliance in businesses. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim, except in one case where 
written notes were taken and validated with the respondent. Transcripts and 
                                            
10
 Here, small/medium-sized is defined as having 249 employees or fewer, and large as having 
more than 249 employees. 
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written notes were coded iteratively using NVIVO™ Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) (Bazeley, 2007) to structure 
emerging explanatory themes (Miles & Huberman, 1994), while recognising the 
author’s “theoretical sensitivity” (Kelle, 2005) to prior research (Taylor et al., 
2012, 2013). 
6.5 Results and discussion 
6.5.1 Refinement of typology of instruments 
Respondents were first invited to comment on the completeness of a typology 
of instruments developed from a literature review of the prior art (Taylor et al., 
2012). Their comments are summarised in Table 6-3, and suggest that with 
refinement this typology of instruments, not previously constructed or available 
for this audience, provides a sound basis for consideration of the full range of 
instruments available to policy makers and regulators. 
Table 6-3: Comments on typology 
View on 
typology 
Number of 
interviewees 
Comments and example quotes 
Looks 
comprehensive 
18 e.g. "It is comprehensive.  I think there’s no obvious error of omission 
there, in terms of the list that you’ve put forward." 
Suggested 
additions 
4 
 
Add "Registration/notification" and “Licences” (1) 
Add "Guidance Notes" and "Codes of Practice" (1) 
Add "Public Funding Initiative (PFI)" (2) 
Other 
comments on 
typology 
8 Not clear whether guidance is guidance or rules (1) 
Instruments encouraging growth should feature (1) 
Tend to talk about EU Directives, EU Regulation and UK Regulation (1) 
Should mention derogations (1) 
Instruments can be  hybrid e.g. Economic and Information Based 
elements (1) 
Not clear how Environmental Impact Assessment fits in (1) 
Proposed refinement to descriptive wording for “ambient pollution 
targets” (1) 
Typology only a little familiar (1) 
No comment 4 Did not directly answer question (1) 
Other interviewee in interview answered (3) 
Total: 34  
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6.5.2 Industry views on the suitability of regulatory instruments 
Respondents’ views on the suitability and performance of different forms of 
regulation were diverse (Table 6-5).  Respondents from 18 organisations did not 
show a clear preference between instrument types, instead seeing merits in a 
purposeful mix of different types depending on circumstances. Seven 
expressed considerable scepticism about the effectiveness of voluntary and 
self-regulation, often arguing that direct regulation was necessary to tackle poor 
environmental performance of businesses within their sector, nationally or 
internationally, to achieve a “level playing field”. Five respondents strongly 
favoured voluntary approaches over additional direct regulation for their 
flexibility and goodness of fit to industry characteristics, while some expressed 
concern that further direct regulation would risk undermining their international 
competitiveness, pushing SMEs out of business entirely. 
While case study organisations considered the choice of regulatory instrument 
to be an important aspect of regulatory design, other areas for improvement that 
typically apply to all instrument types were also emphasised (Figure 6-1). 
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Figure 6-1: Themes in addition to instrument selection discussed by 
interviewees 
6.5.2.1 Coherent regulatory frameworks 
Instruments can enable or support each other in a complementary mix, 
according to respondents. For example, construction site waste management 
plans (SWMPs, now phased out) were thought to have encouraged builders to 
pay closer attention to construction waste streams, enhancing the impact of the 
Landfill Tax (The Landfill Tax (Amendment) Regulations 2013. SI 2013/658), 
and have also become incorporated into other broader construction standards. 
The Building Regulations (The Building (Amendment) Regulations 2013. SI 
2013/1105) were argued to have enabled the development of many supporting 
instruments, including third-party inspections and product labelling.  Third party 
auditing of environmental performance has been relied upon to allow reduced 
government inspection in good performing poultry farms (Defra, 2013b). 
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Respondents emphasised the need for tailored interventions to cater for big and 
small businesses, and environmentally leading and poor performing businesses 
within a sector. The need to target a mix of instruments to tackle critical points 
in supply chains was emphasised; for example, to ensure that good 
environmental performance is designed into construction projects from the 
outset. For waste recycling, respondents discussed the need for a mix of 
instruments (including direct regulatory, economic and voluntary) along waste 
streams, to increase producer responsibility to minimise waste and encourage 
re-use, to provide coherent messages to consumers about what can be 
recycled, to improve the consistency of recycling facilities between local 
authorities, to assure the performance of recycling facilities and to provide 
confidence in standards of recycled materials. For the water industry, 
influencing the upstream behaviour of individuals and businesses, for example 
in pesticide use or in disposal of household products and pharmaceuticals down 
drains, was considered important alongside regulating the water quality 
standards achieved by water companies downstream, with the potential to 
reduce water treatment costs. 
Several respondents complained of inconsistent or overlapping environmental 
requirements set by national state bodies in various policy areas, including 
between planning permissions and environmental permits for quarrying, in 
carbon reduction policies for construction, and in carbon reduction, waste 
treatment and water quality requirements for water companies. One respondent 
from the minerals industry argued that the primacy of the local development 
planning system to make judgements that take into account all local competing 
and influencing matters had been significantly undermined by environmental 
permits and licenses from other areas of legislation.  Similar issues of 
incoherence were reported from international inconsistencies in requirements, 
for example for the labelling of chemicals, or methods for carbon reporting set 
by different countries. Overlapping requirements can arise among those set by 
industry; for example, for farms supplying multiple food retailers, each with their 
own set of standards. While some examples of coherent policy were highlighted 
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(e.g. environmental permitting of industrial installations, including waste 
incinerators; and building regulations), perceived incoherence in the regulatory 
framework was typically attributed to the failure of government to work together 
internationally, nationally or locally to reconcile conflicting policy objectives, or 
by deciding to implement new regulatory regimes rather than incorporate new 
requirements into existing frameworks (e.g. planning regulations and 
environmental permitting, in the view of some respondents). 
These results provide evidence for complementary instrument mixes, that 
achieve environmental outcomes, as anticipated by commentators 
(Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999). However, incoherence has also been 
highlighted, particularly where new regulations have been layered across 
existing regimes both nationally and internationally, echoing recent UK and 
Canadian research (Rayner & Howlett, 2009; UKELA, 2012). While 
governments have pursued various initiatives to improve integration (e.g. 
OECD, 2004; Gray et al., 2007), for these respondents there is scope to go 
further, which is likely to require better national and international integrated 
governance structures (Rayner & Howlett, 2009). 
6.5.2.2 Clarity, prescription and flexibility 
Respondents discussed the need for clarity in various aspects of the design of 
regulatory instruments. Clear objectives were expected to lead to well-designed 
instruments whose performance could be assessed easily. Some respondents 
welcomed instruments that are clear in their requirements for what regulatees 
needed to do. For example, one respondent from the farming industry believed 
the Voluntary Initiative on pesticide use (Defra, 2006) was effective because 
requirements for spraying are clearly explained and readily applied. Two 
respondents from the construction industry agreed that the Oil Storage 
Regulations (The Control of Pollution (Oil Storage) (England) Regulations 2001. 
SI 2001/2954) were effective because requirements for storage bunding were 
easily communicated and checked. One also highlighted the need for clear 
explanation of requirements for construction workers, including developing 
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illustrated, relatively long guidance materials to communicate requirements 
effectively. Respondents also sought clarity in definitions that delineate the 
boundaries of who is affected by regulations. One respondent described the 
introduction of permits for the operation of waste incinerators, which were clear 
in what operations were in scope and what would be required, enabling 
businesses to ensure compliance was achieved. In contrast, the definitions of 
what is meant by “waste”, when deposition of material in the ground may be 
considered to be landscape “restoration” or waste “disposal”, and what 
constitutes “incidental” contamination of inert waste or organic waste were all 
highlighted as points of contention leading to uncertainty about compliance 
requirements. 
However, other respondents called for greater flexibility and less prescription in 
regulatory instruments. Flexibility may be required to accommodate local 
environmental conditions, for example to allow local assessment of optimal 
biodiversity conservation measures rather than standard requirements based 
only on land area set aside from use, local protection of soil, or local 
assessment of land contamination where naturally occurring contamination may 
exceed national standards. In personal care products, flexibility was argued to 
be required to ensure expert judgement by qualified toxicologists could still be 
applied in deciding safe levels of ingredients according to a scientific risk 
assessment for the specific intended use in a particular product, rather than 
attempting to cover all possible compositions and use scenarios in legislation. 
The need for flexibility to accommodate innovation in rapidly changing waste 
management technologies, or improvements in water treatment plant operations 
was also emphasised. In the latter case, regulations based on achieving 
outcomes rather than controlling inputs were called for. Where instruments have 
clear high level objectives but room for interpretation on how these should be 
achieved, regulatory agencies may choose or be required to provide clarifying 
guidance, which reportedly can allow the scope of regulations to creep beyond 
that originally intended (if guidance becomes treated as regulatory 
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requirement), and lead to inconsistency in regulatory decisions, both being 
unwelcome among respondents. 
These results illustrate how understanding and applying regulations impose 
costs on businesses (Heyes, 2009). To reduce these costs, regulators have 
been encouraged to ensure that rules are clearly articulated and easy to 
understand (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2004; Hampton, 2005). Instruments that 
afford flexibility to businesses to decide how to achieve objectives have also 
been recommended to encourage innovation and improve cost-efficiency, for 
example through “performance based standards” (Coglianese et al., 2002) or 
within voluntary agreements (Bressers & de Bruijn, 2005). However, this greater 
flexibility may not be appropriate for firms with less resource to expend on 
designing measures to achieve compliance (Coglianese et al., 2002; Fairman & 
Yapp, 2005). These results reinforce the need for the level of prescription and 
flexibility in regulation to be tailored inter alia to the capability of the target 
audience within businesses; prescription will be necessary and welcome in 
some cases, but in others a performance based approach may prove more 
appropriate. Policy makers and regulators should take account of prescription 
and flexibility in a broad risk-based assessment of appropriate interventions that 
ensures that current risks to the environment are adequately managed, while 
enabling innovation towards better environmental performance. 
6.5.2.3 Positive regulatory relationships  
Respondents described how the quality of the relationship between regulator 
and regulatee affects how regulatees are likely to respond. For example, a 
farmer described improvements in the relationship with local environmental 
regulators since they have become more open to discussing farmers needs as 
well as environmental protection objectives, commenting  
"If you’ve got somebody that you can talk to there’s at least a chance you’re 
going to talk to them. But if you’ve got somebody that’s not going to listen to 
you, you go and carry on and do your own thing".  
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Other respondents emphasised the importance of regulators building positive 
relationships with the farming community to increase their ownership of 
environmental problems and engagement in solving them.  
Water industry respondents described close working relationships with 
regulators and government officials on long term environmental planning issues, 
and welcomed opportunities to work together to take the sector forward.  One 
commented  
"Having a positive and pro-active relationship works well, as working together is 
as much about leadership principles as technical issues. Key to this is 
involvement and open dialogue from the outset, as this then engenders 
ownership and responsibility.  What benefits all parties most is a mature 
relationship, and everything that goes with that maturity, rather than a parent 
and child relationship." 
Respondents valued easy access to regulators to enable conversations to 
clarify requirements. However, where respondents believed regulators lacked 
understanding of their industries or found decision making to lack transparency 
or accountability, this appeared to undermine working relationships. Several 
respondents complained of a lack of consistency between decisions made by 
individual officers, between officers in different regions, and in one case in 
regulatory officials from different countries, leading to additional effort being 
expended to resolve decisions. Inconsistency was often linked to a lack of 
clarity in regulations leaving too much scope for interpretation, and was most 
apparent to nationally operating businesses. 
While a significant body of research examines regulatory compliance and 
enforcement strategies (Gunningham, 2011), relatively little research has 
focused on the nature of the relationship between regulatory officers and the 
regulated, although recent work in the USA (Pautz & Wamsley, 2012; Pautz, 
2009, 2010b) has provided some empirical support for the observation (Lange & 
Gouldson, 2010) that mutual trust is necessary for modern forms of 
environmental governance. Results here suggest that trust may be undermined 
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by regulatees’ perceptions of inconsistency or lack of understanding among 
regulators, but that constructive working relationships have also been 
successfully established. 
6.5.2.4 Administrative efficiency 
The designs of regulatory administrative systems were highlighted by several 
respondents as an important cause of difficulty and irritation. For example, the 
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, a hybrid instrument that originally incorporated 
an emissions trading system and performance league table, was thought by one 
respondent to have been effective in raising awareness of the costs of energy 
among managers, while two other respondents thought that it had been over-
complex and that a simple tax would prove more effective. Regarding trading 
schemes, one respondent commented 
"They do seem to get terribly bogged down in definitional issues and trading 
arrangements and different exchanges and buy out clauses. To the extent 
where in almost all of the cases that I have worked on, the businesses affected 
end up saying, “Just give us a tax. We have to employ people just to try and 
account for our [trading scheme] exposure, or whatever.”...I must admit, as a 
policy person, I always liked the idea of trading schemes as a good thing and I 
thought it was good that the UK tended to do more of that than other countries. 
But it does seem, in practice, it gets very hard.".  
Some respondents engaged in the planning system and the regulation of 
farming highlighted issues of unnecessary bureaucracy and “box ticking”. 
Several respondents from the personal care products industry commented on 
the design of the EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH) regulation, expressing the view that while the underlying 
principle of the regulation was good, the regulation is not well designed and in 
implementation it has become excessively bureaucratic, although views on the 
severity of this problem varied. According to one respondent, similar issues can 
arise with voluntary approaches, commenting  
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"I also tend to find, certainly at government and trade association level, perhaps 
with the company level, voluntary agreements seem to be just as time 
consuming and bureaucratic as traditional regulation. Whereas, obviously, the 
idea is that they are much more, sort of, light touch."  
Three respondents from the waste industry saw potential in the use of modern 
information technology to improve regulatory efficiency, by making permit 
applications as “point and click” as possible, enabling information sharing with 
regulators through a web portal, and by developing a mobile phone app that 
could tell consumers whether particular materials could be recycled in their 
area. 
These results support other research indicating that both direct regulation and 
alternatives can impose significant administrative costs on participants (Dinica 
et al., 2007; Krarup & Ramesohl, 2002; Sovacool, 2011). While these costs 
need to be weighed against the wider social benefits of regulation, for 
participants in this study poor implementation of administrative systems was a 
significant cause of concern. Recent government initiatives have sought to 
improve the ease with which regulatees can find out about and report on 
regulation (Defra, 2013a; Netherlands Government, 2013), and greater adoption 
of service design techniques such as “customer journey mapping” (Heapy & 
Parker, 2006; Macdonald et al., 2011) could prove beneficial, though is under-
researched. 
6.5.2.5 Risk based regulation  
Respondents from all case study areas discussed the role of risk analysis in 
regulation, at various levels. Risk based regulation was discussed at the level of 
individual regulated sites. One respondent argued that the environmental 
permitting regime for industrial installations was successful as it provided for the 
determination by the regulator of the most appropriate emission limits on a site-
specific basis.  Respondents from the water industry argued that there was 
scope to better target permit requirements on discharges from different types of 
source according to environmental risk associated with their design and local 
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environmental conditions. The need for risk-based inspections was highlighted 
by several respondents. In farming, the “earned recognition” approach (Defra, 
2013b), which reduces government inspections for good performing sites with 
other third party inspections in place, was welcomed. However, one respondent 
argued that inspection was not generally risk based and instead tended to 
target the larger farms that often performed well, while neglecting smaller farms 
that needed more support to improve compliance levels. Meanwhile, a waste 
management respondent applauded the efforts of regulators to target effort 
against waste criminals, a major source of environmental risk, using proactive 
evidence gathering and action. 
Some questioned whether the relative prioritisation of government policy areas 
was risk based, arguing for example that regulatory effort should focus on the 
preservation of habitats rather than specific species, on food waste and other 
elements of sustainable consumption and production rather than carrier bags, 
and questioning whether the level of regulation for the water and waste 
industries were proportionate to their associated risks. In the personal care 
products sector, risk assessment of chemical components and mixtures is a 
central concern of direct regulations such as REACH as well as voluntary codes 
such as the International Fragrance Association (IFRA) standards. One 
respondent expressed concern that REACH was tending towards hazard rather 
than risk based regulation, resulting in regulatory effort from both industry and 
government not necessarily focusing on the chemicals that presented the 
greatest risk. Uncertainty surrounding the impact of nanomaterials on the 
natural environment was highlighted by another respondent.  
These results highlight several forms of risk based regulation, including 
strategic risk analysis by policy makers (Prpich et al., 2011), risk-based 
prioritisation of substances for regulation (Egeghy et al., 2011), and risk-based 
interventions by regulatory agencies (Gouldson et al., 2009). While in some 
areas risk-based regulation appears to have been used to good effect, in others 
respondents argued for a continued need for more effective implementation. 
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6.5.2.6 Evidence-based policy 
Gathering and brokering of scientific evidence featured in many interviews. One 
trade association described their role in gathering and sharing evidence to 
gradually persuade local authorities and recycling businesses to recycle their 
members’ products, to meet their producer responsibility obligations. Another 
trade association described current work to gather evidence on the carbon 
impact of their members’ products, in anticipation of future scrutiny. 
Respondents from the personal care products industry discussed the central 
role that should be played by evidence of environmental and health risks in the 
regulation of chemicals. In general, where evidence of the beneficial 
environmental impact of regulation was considered lacking, respondents 
anticipated that businesses would be less willing to comply with it than when a 
compelling evidence base had been presented. One respondent from the 
farming industry argued that farmers would feel more strongly motivated to 
tackle environmental problems when evidence was provided of local impacts, a 
view echoed by another who emphasised the importance of scientific evidence 
to support the regulation of pesticides. 
Some respondents thought that the UK government should review more 
systematically the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation, with one 
commenting  
"Businesses, private companies always put a lot of effort in to that process of 
doing project review and a post project assessment. Did you achieve what you 
set out to achieve, its good business management? I don’t think we have the 
same rigour with the decisions which are made by government on policy making 
and regulation." 
These results support the theory that normative motivations for compliance with 
regulation are significant among businesses (May, 2005; Winter & May, 2001) 
and link this motivation to the need for policy to be demonstrably evidence-
based (Solesbury, 2001). They also illustrate the role that regulatory actors can 
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play in developing and brokering evidence to motivate action (Davies et al., 
2010). 
6.5.2.7 Long-term stability 
Respondents from the waste management, construction materials and water 
industries emphasised the importance of long-term stability in the regulatory 
framework to enable businesses to invest in new operational infrastructure with 
confidence. The Landfill Tax, which has provided a predictably escalating price 
for putting waste to landfill for more than a decade, was considered by several 
to have been very effective in discouraging landfill and providing businesses 
with the confidence to invest in alternative waste treatment infrastructure. In the 
case of construction materials, the Building Regulations were argued to have 
provided long-term certainty in the overall objectives of government, for 
example regarding Zero Carbon Homes, while positively encouraging 
innovation through triennial reviews of accompanying product standards. In 
contrast, the respondent representing the views of suppliers to the water 
industry argued that the five-yearly review of water industry plans by regulators 
resulted in a cycle of “boom and bust” which raised the overall costs of water 
supply to consumers. 
These results echo finance industry calls for a “long, loud and legal” policy 
framework to encourage investment in renewable energy, where long-term 
stability has been found to be a critical factor for policy effectiveness (Bürer & 
Wüstenhagen, 2009; Held et al., 2006). 
6.5.3 Cross-sectoral analysis 
The small number of respondents from each sector does not justify more widely 
generalisable conclusions about whole sector preferences for different forms of 
regulation. However, respondent responses (Table 6-5, summarised in Table 
6-4) hint at industry- and business-specific characteristics that may influence 
these preferences. 
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Table 6-4: Comparison of views across sectors 
Sector Summary of views expressed by respondents 
Construction 
and 
construction 
products 
Direct regulation argued for by large constructors concerned that (smaller) competitors 
and supply chain participants will not adopt voluntary approaches, leading to reputational 
risks and an unlevel playing field. Beyond-compliance behaviour driven by customer 
(including government) demands among large constructors. Construction materials 
respondents concerned primarily about coherence of land management regulations. For 
construction materials, direct regulation can provide clear easily implementable rules 
and provide a framework within which other types of instrument, including industry led 
approaches, have flourished.  
Food and 
agriculture 
Direct regulation necessary in some circumstances to protect public good, but must be 
deployed with care to avoid undermining competitiveness. Large retailers driven more by 
consumer demand for good environmental performance beyond compliance, which in 
turn exerts pressure on supply chain. Voluntary approaches strongly favoured by 
respondents arguing sector is already heavily regulated by both government and supply 
chain, and expressing fears of direct regulation leading to economic disadvantage in 
international competition. 
Personal care 
products 
Views were mixed, reflecting varying characteristics along supply chains. Direct 
regulation via permits argued by some as optimal for industrial plants, and necessary to 
provide an international level playing field. Sectoral track record of voluntary activity (e.g. 
on HFCs, fragrance safety) demonstrates scope for self-regulation in some 
circumstances. 
Waste 
management 
Direct regulation has provided the platform on which the industry has developed and has 
generally provided stability for investment planning. Enforced direct regulation is 
required to tackle a minority of small poor performing operators, alongside earned 
recognition for larger more reputable operators. Voluntary approaches appropriate for 
tackling resource efficiency and producer responsibility objectives, where direct 
regulation would be very complex; but has proved unsuccessful in other areas. 
Water 
management, 
collection, 
treatment and 
supply 
Direct regulation provides stability for investment planning, and necessary controls for 
some high risk activities. Within this framework greater flexibility to voluntarily try out new 
approaches and earned recognition would be welcomed, accommodated by good 
relationships with regulators. Regulation that accommodates local decision making and 
accountability necessary for flood management. 
 
These results suggest that the structure of the business sector, the capability 
and attitude towards compliance of its members, the degree of national and 
international competition and the degree to which regulations are tailored to the 
sector all play a part in shaping industry attitudes towards different types of 
intervention. However, further research is required to test whether these 
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preferences are representative of industry sectors as a whole (e.g. as 
undertaken by Lüthi and Wüstenhagen for photovoltaic project developers 
(Lüthi & Wüstenhagen, 2012)). 
6.5.4 Involving the business community 
Twenty-one respondents argued for the involvement of businesses in the 
design of state environmental regulatory frameworks from an early stage of their 
development. In general this was expected to ensure that the design would be 
informed by a “real world” view of how implemented regulations would work in 
practice, a perspective which they sometimes considered lacking among policy 
makers. As one respondent put it  
"So, that’s why you get this disparity, I believe, of the real-life world because it’s 
great that you sit in your office...typing some text as a regulation, but I really do 
believe that sometimes people need to get out in the real world, out of their 
office and, probably, out of their comfort zones and go and see things, what 
they mean and understand why maybe industry or whoever is complaining.".  
By ensuring this view was provided in regulatory design, respondents expected 
that businesses would be able to contribute innovative ideas on how to meet 
environmental objectives, and fewer problems would later emerge and consume 
business and government time to resolve. Several examples were provided 
across different sectors where this was considered to have worked well, but 
other examples of poor decisions being made due to a lack of industry 
engagement were also highlighted. Business involvement was expected to help 
to ensure that where new regulation affects many different business sectors, 
some of which may not be obvious (e.g. the water industry being affected by 
waste regulation), that the impact on all sectors is taken into account. 
Respondents also highlighted risks of business involvement, including loss of 
government independence, the possibility that design is unduly influenced by 
large businesses who have the capacity to implement more complex regulations 
than SMEs who could be disadvantaged as a result, and that businesses asking 
repeatedly for clarification of requirements could lead to over-prescription by 
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policy makers. Effective cooperation between government and business 
reportedly requires mutual trust, which can be built through government 
demonstrating that it has listened to industry recommendations, even if 
ultimately they are not implemented, and by active open engagement by 
officials and politicians who are willing to participate in open debate. 
Researchers have found that voluntary agreements provide governments the 
opportunity to better understand and design interventions (Menanteau, 2003; 
Rezessy & Bertoldi, 2011). However, other stakeholders including NGOs may 
not welcome a closer relationship between industry and government, fearing 
regulatory capture (Pautz, 2010c) or loss of influence (Bomberg, 2007). The UK 
government has published best practice guidance for regulators to assess the 
impact of regulatory change (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
2013f) placing significant emphasis on early business engagement, aspects of 
which are addressed through the Environment Agency’s Regulated Business 
Forum and account management approach (Environment Agency, 2013k).  
While it can be anticipated that respondents would welcome these measures, 
some of the concerns they raise regarding policy integration may require more 
profound reform, which may challenge the “integrative capacity” (Rayner & 
Howlett, 2009) of the UK government to realign existing regulatory frameworks. 
6.5.5 Role of trade associations 
Trade associations were described actively engaging in the development and 
implementation of environmental regulation, seeking to influence government 
policy development in the interests of members, providing regulatory advice to 
members, and working with government agencies to develop guidance tailored 
to industry characteristics. Often trade associations have established technical 
committees that draw on member businesses to provide expert input to 
regulatory reform discussions with government. Trade associations have also 
sought to educate politicians, the media and general public about the 
environmental performance of their sectors. For example, one personal care 
products trade association described committing resources to informing the 
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media about members' products to help ensure debates about safety and 
environmental impact are informed by scientific evidence. Respondents 
described cases where trade associations have been able to establish 
environmental standards (e.g. British Retail Consortium packaging standards) 
and codes of practice that are followed by members (e.g. the Chemical 
Industries Association Responsible Care Programme), or to act as coordinating 
bodies for voluntary agreements with government (e.g. the National Farmers 
Union, among others, for the Campaign for the Farmed Environment). However, 
respondents noted that the ability of trade associations to fulfil this role may be 
limited by a number of factors, including competition law, whether they were 
able to establish standards that operated across national boundaries for 
businesses operating internationally, whether their members are sufficiently 
similar in size, and/or in business activities undertaken, and/or levels of 
performance to have closely aligned common interests, and the skills and 
resources of their staff. Several respondents noted that SMEs may not be 
members of trade associations so would not be reached by industry-wide 
voluntary initiatives through this route.   
Trade associations around the world have played a central role in negotiating 
environmental agreements with governments on behalf of members (Bailey & 
Rupp, 2005) and in sectoral self-regulation (Lenox & Nash, 2003; Nash & 
Ehrenfeld, 1997). In the UK today they are expected to help educate members 
and coordinate sectoral action (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
2013f; Macdonald et al., 2011). Respondents’ views support this role for some 
trade associations, but highlight that their capacity to do so depends 
significantly on the breadth of their membership and the structure of the industry 
they represent. Where sectors include a large number of SMEs who are not 
trade association members, it seems likely that policy makers and regulators 
will have to pursue alternative routes to influence business behaviour. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
Participants in this research generally saw pros and cons for all types of 
regulation and described how instruments work together in a mix, rather than 
generally favouring voluntary regulation as might have been anticipated. This is 
consistent with previous research emphasising the need for policy makers and 
regulators to choose instruments that are tailored to specific industry or 
business circumstances at a given point in time (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999).   
However, instrument selection is only one aspect of regulatory reform sought by 
respondents. In addition, the results suggest that policy makers and regulators 
should also examine whether regulatory frameworks are coherent, balance 
clarity, prescription and flexibility, are enabled by positive regulatory 
relationships, are administratively efficient, targeted according to risk, evidence-
based and delivering long-term stability for regulated businesses. Failure to 
address these concerns, which apply across the range of regulatory 
instruments, appears to have the potential to significantly undermine the 
effectiveness of environmental regulation, perhaps even to the extent that the 
expected benefits of careful instrument choice could be lost through poor 
implementation, as has been found to be the case by others (Testa et al., 
2013).  
Respondents argued for the early involvement of businesses in the design of 
regulation, particularly to provide a “real world” view of the realities of regulation 
and to provide ideas about how to achieve environmental objectives. However, 
this involvement presents significant challenges for government. Judging by 
issues raised by respondents, politicians and bureaucrats will receive a very 
broad range of reform proposals across multiple dimensions of the existing 
regulatory framework, which they must then analyse and prioritise, as has 
indeed been the case for the recent UK Farming Regulation Task Force 
(Macdonald et al., 2011). Where regulations affect multiple industry sectors 
regulatory reform becomes especially complex. While governments have 
designed regulatory reform institutions that provide mechanisms to identify and 
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prioritise problems and drive change (e.g. Ladegaard et al., 2007; UK 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013b), the complexities 
highlighted by this research support the need for better approaches to analyse 
regulatory networks, the results of which will likely challenge the “integrative 
capacity” (Rayner & Howlett, 2009) of governments to fully address issues that 
emerge. 
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Table 6-5: Attitudes towards different types of regulation expressed by respondents 
Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
A.1 Construction 
and 
construction 
materials 
Trade 
association 
(materials) 
Seeks improvements in coherence of planning and permitting, 
and in performance of the regulator. Sees limited scope for self-
regulation in sector. 
    X 
A.2 Construction 
and 
construction 
materials 
Large 
construction 
business 
Direct regulation necessary to provide level playing field with 
competitors. Concerned that voluntary measures would not be 
taken up by competitors, though own voluntary beyond-
compliance performance driven by customer demands. 
  X 
A.3 Construction 
and 
construction 
materials 
Large 
construction 
business 
Direct regulation necessary to create a level playing field with 
competitors. Is pursuing beyond-compliance environmental 
performance in response to customer demands. 
  X 
A.4 Construction 
and 
construction 
materials 
Advisor to 
materials 
businesses 
Focused on need to improve coherence of direct regulation, in 
particular between environmental permitting and planning for 
quarrying.  
  X 
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Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
A.5 Construction 
and 
construction 
materials 
Large materials 
business 
Focused on need to improve coherence of direct regulation, 
particularly between environmental permitting and planning. 
Argued that the primacy of the local development planning 
system to provide operators’ licence to operate has been 
significantly undermined by other environmental regulatory 
instruments. In favour of voluntary approaches to regulation in 
preference to prescriptive regulation, because existing regulation 
has become overly imposing on businesses. 
 X  
A.6 Construction 
and 
construction 
materials 
Trade 
association 
(materials) 
Direct regulation that clearly articulates objectives should be set 
at a high level, providing long-term clarity on intention and 
process of getting there.  High level direct regulatory framework 
can accommodate a variety of instruments e.g. subsidies, 
standards, co-regulatory guidance development to help achieve 
it. 
  X 
B.1 Food and 
agriculture 
Trade 
association 
(farming) 
Critical of fit of direct regulation to farms; supportive of earned 
recognition. Sees potential in greater use of co-regulatory/ 
industry-led initiatives, and greater use of advice and knowledge 
transfer. 
 X  
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Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
B.2 Food and 
agriculture 
Advisor to large 
agricultural 
businesses 
Legislative threat likely to be important to motivate voluntary 
action among farmers. Some voluntary approaches have worked 
well; effectiveness depends on clarity of requirements and 
presence of regulatory threat. 
  X 
B.3 Food and 
agriculture 
Trade 
association 
(retail) 
Direct regulation sometimes necessary to provide a level playing 
field, to stimulate investment, or where consumer preferences 
are not driving change. Voluntary agreements can achieve quick 
results and are adaptable, but struggle to attract smaller 
businesses, and do not provide a level playing field to reward 
better performance. 
  X 
B.4 Food and 
agriculture 
Large food 
manufacturer 
 Less regulation and more cooperation and communication 
between regulators and industry is required to allow businesses 
to flourish, for example through voluntary codes of practice. 
Food retailers will not tolerate poor environmental performance 
among food producers, so naming and shaming of poor 
performers is very effective. Industry must take on burden of 
self-regulation as government regulatory resources diminish. 
 X  
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Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
B.5 Food and 
agriculture 
Trade 
association 
(drinks) 
Industry is already heavily regulated; more regulation could push 
SMEs out of business. International regulation should be aligned 
through “equivalence” rather than “harmonisation”. Generally 
supportive of voluntary forms of regulation in preference to 
mandatory requirements, except that these are sometimes 
necessary in the interest of the coherence of international trade. 
 X  
B.6 Food and 
agriculture 
Medium arable 
farm 
Direct regulation may be necessary, but must maintain 
international competitiveness. Voluntary approaches can work, if 
there is a market driver, and should be explored first. 
 X  
C.1 Personal care 
products 
Trade 
association  
In principle, voluntary schemes are preferable, but in practice, 
especially with competition law issues, they can be difficult to put 
in place. Sectoral voluntary approaches have worked when 
science was clear and regulation was anticipated. No major 
complaints about direct regulation, though some implementation 
is over complex and hazard not risk based. Direct regulation 
should be used to create international level playing field. 
  X 
C.2 Personal care 
products 
Trade 
association  
Direct regulation has been effective, though needs to provide 
international consistency and level playing field. Sector has 
successful track record of voluntary approaches, partially in 
response to consumer pressure. 
  X 
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Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
C.3 Personal care 
products 
Trade 
association  
Supportive of well-designed outcome-based command and 
control legislation. Although aware of some success with 
voluntary approaches, concerned that not all companies would 
act without regulation. 
X   
C.4 Personal care 
products 
Advisor to 
cosmetics 
businesses 
Strong preference for risk-based direct command and control 
regulation or economic instruments. Sceptical of effectiveness of 
self-regulation, doubting that businesses in other countries will 
comply (e.g. due to lack of understanding, or litigious culture). 
X   
C.5 Personal care 
products 
Small cosmetics 
manufacturer 
Expect environmental improvement to involve more cost or more 
work, so direct regulation necessary unless objectives aligned to 
customer demands. Doubt businesses (particularly SMEs) will 
adopt voluntary approaches unless driven by customer 
environmental demands, which in UK cosmetics are weak. 
X   
C.6 Personal care 
products 
Trade 
association  
Some direct regulation has been beneficial e.g. REACH has 
resulted in better evidence sharing, though some complain of 
costs and complexity. Believes self-regulation of fragrance 
industry has worked well, providing beyond-compliance 
assurance. 
  X 
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Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
C.7 Personal care 
products 
Large fragrance 
business 
Glad that direct regulation has phased out hazardous chemicals 
previously in use, though seeks improvements in clarity and 
coherence. Argues self-regulation of fragrance industry has 
worked well. 
  X 
D.1 Waste 
management 
Trade 
association 
(waste 
management) 
Argues industry development has been driven by direct 
regulation. Still suffers from sub-legal behaviour, so sector 
typically argues for more enforcement. Voluntary approaches 
can be OK when there a small number of large businesses, but 
difficult to include long tail of SMEs. 
  X 
D.2 Waste 
management 
Large waste 
management 
business 
Direct regulation has provided platform for sector development. 
Supportive of earned recognition for large operators. Sector has 
on occasion demonstrated lack of maturity to take up voluntary 
measures. 
X   
D.3 Waste 
management 
Large waste 
management 
business 
Supportive of direct regulation, though calls for better coherence 
for incentivising infrastructure development. Not in favour of 
increased self-regulation as less scrupulous operators will 
ignore. 
X   
D.4 Waste 
management 
Large waste 
management 
business 
Supportive of greater earned recognition within permitting 
system for large operators. Scope for greater use of self-
regulation among large operators but not appropriate for SMEs, 
who may be operating outside law. 
  X 
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Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
D.5 Waste 
management 
Waste 
management 
professional 
body 
Industry is defined by regulation, and calls for regulation to be 
properly enforced. Role for voluntary agreements for resource 
efficiency and producer responsibility. 
  X 
D.6 Waste 
management 
Small waste 
management 
business 
Supportive of principle of direct regulation and calls for greater 
enforcement to provide level playing field. Self-regulation not 
appropriate as too many likely to ignore rules in pursuit of profit. 
X    
E.1 Water 
collection, 
treatment, 
supply and 
management 
Large water 
company 
Direct regulation positive and provides useful stability for 
investment. Supportive of greater opportunities to try out new 
approaches voluntarily rather than being forced by regulation. 
   X 
E.2 Water 
collection, 
treatment, 
supply and 
management 
Large water 
company 
Generally argues that existing regulation is sensible and 
appropriate, with some need for improved implementation and 
regulatory relationships to allow room to innovate to achieve 
desirable outcomes.  
   X 
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Case 
study 
ref 
Case study 
sector 
Case study 
organisation 
type 
Summary of views on different types of regulation Strongly 
sceptical of 
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
Strongly 
supportive of  
voluntary 
forms of 
regulation 
No general 
preference for or 
against 
voluntary forms 
of regulation 
E.3 Water 
collection, 
treatment, 
supply and 
management 
Water industry 
supply chain 
business & trade 
association 
representative 
Direct regulation appropriate due to high environmental risks 
associated with water industry. Good regulatory relationships 
better than threats of prosecution. Sceptical about scope for self-
regulation and voluntary approaches. 
X   
E.4 Water 
collection, 
treatment, 
supply and 
management 
Large water 
company 
Direct regulation has improved standards in some areas (e.g. 
discharges) though in others improvement is primarily driven by 
financial incentives (e.g. energy efficiency). Improvements lie in 
implementation of direct regulation. Not clear how self-regulation 
would fit in with existing regulatory framework. 
   X 
E.5 Water 
collection, 
treatment, 
supply and 
management 
Drainage board 
(public body) 
Emphasised value of local institutions directly accountable to 
land owners to manage flood risk, enabling innovation. Critical of 
layering of environmental regulation onto flood risk management 
responsibilities without additional funding, and of meaningful 
accountability of national government bodies.   
  X 
   Totals: 7 5 18 
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7 DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate existing evidence and theory in light of the 
data gathered from the research presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and to 
develop recommendations for future regulatory reform programmes based on 
this extended body of evidence, to meet Objective 5 of this research 
programme. 
The central novelty of this work is the compilation, validation and refinement of 
a new typology of regulatory instruments for policy end-users; the examination 
of the critical case of instrument selection at Defra, revealing the realities of 
policy making in practice; and a novel multiple-case study of senior business 
representatives’ views on regulation, revealing perceptions of positive and 
negative regulatory impacts, some counter-intuitive findings about preferences 
for voluntary and direct regulation, and the nuances of regulatory practice at 
ground level. 
Firstly, the range of regulatory interventions available is discussed (Section 7.2). 
Then discussion turns to factors affecting the effectiveness of regulation 
(Section 7.3); government and business preferences for types of regulation 
(Section 7.4); the use of evidence in the process of regulatory reform (Section 
7.5); business participation in regulatory reform (Section 7.6); and government 
capability in regulatory reform (Section 7.7). Finally, implications for future 
regulatory reform are proposed in Section 7.8. 
7.2 Typology of regulatory interventions 
Defra policy makers generally found the typology of instruments developed from 
a review of the prior literature (Table 2-1) to be an accurate summary of the 
range of interventions available, while proposing some refinements (Table 5-3). 
They thought the typology would serve as a useful prompt when considering 
options for regulatory reform. However, they thought that the typology would  
not help policy makers analyse mixes of instruments, and one respondent 
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considered it of limited relevance to economic as opposed to environmental 
regulation (Section 5.6). Case study business and trade association 
respondents also generally considered the typology to be comprehensive or 
proposed amendments within the overall structure (Table 6-3). A consolidated 
version of the typology, incorporating amendments suggested across all 67 
respondents consulted for this research is presented in Table 7-1. Modifications 
proposed by Defra respondents are underlined. Those proposed by business 
and trade association respondents are underlined and italicised. 
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Table 7-1: Consolidated typology of instruments 
Type Variant Description Example applications 
Doing nothing - Government chooses not to act as policy objectives will be achieved without government 
intervention. 
- 
Direct 
"command and 
control" 
regulation 
Ambient 
pollution 
requirements 
The regulator specifies allowable levels of ambient pollution, allowing flexibility to 
polluters to decide how to achieve that level. In the EU, ambient targets have been set 
within EU directives, which members states tackle through their national policy mix. 
Where emissions are from multiple sources (or “assets” in the context of the water 
industry) this approach allows the optimisation of operational performance across those 
sources to attain the desired environmental outcome. 
Water quality targets, air pollution 
targets  
Input 
restrictions and 
output quotas 
Restrictions are applied in the use or output of products. If a material or practice is 
considered to be sufficiently harmful its use may be restricted or banned entirely, with 
penalties enforced for violations of the ban. Where banned materials remain in use, their 
disposal will need to be carefully controlled. 
Restrictions in pesticide or fertiliser 
use, restrictions in production of 
potentially harmful chemicals 
Non-
transferable 
emissions 
licences 
Typically a regulator issues a non-transferable licence, in the UK often referred to as a 
permit, to a business that gives authorisation to operate according to specified 
environmental performance requirements, for example maximum permitted levels of 
emissions. The regulator monitors the operation to ensure compliance, and may enforce 
penalties for non-compliance. Conditional exemption from regulation (e.g. exemption from 
inspections in response to good performance) can also act to incentivise behaviour 
change. For some activities obtaining a “registration” that the activity is being undertaken 
may be all that is required. “Derogations” may be applied to relax rules in specific 
circumstances. 
Controls on emissions to air and water, 
controls on waste production and 
disposal 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
Technology 
and process 
controls 
The regulator sets environmental performance objectives and specifies or agrees 
appropriate processes or abatement technologies with industry. Variations of standards 
include application of “best practicable environmental option” (BPEO), “best practicable 
means” (BPM), “best available techniques not entailing excessive cost” (BATNEEC) and 
“best available technique” (BAT) (Gray et al, 2009).  
Mandatory use of catalytic converters 
in road vehicles, use of specific 
pollution abatement technologies, 
application of process standards (e.g. 
for animal housing and husbandry) 
Zoning/ location 
controls 
Human impacts on the environment in a particular area can be controlled through spatial 
controls, which can be used to mandate practices in a given area, locate polluters away 
from people and sensitive ecosystems, to prevent clustering of harmful activities, or (less 
commonly) to move people away from sources of harm. 
Low emissions zones in urban areas, 
building development controls, national 
parks and conservation areas, 
controlled fishing zones, marine 
conservation areas, nitrate vulnerable 
zones 
Environmental 
impact 
assessment 
(EIA) 
requirements 
An environmental impact assessment is required to be undertaken which must be 
approved by a regulator before a development project is permitted to proceed (e.g. under 
EU EIA Directive). 
EIA requirements for roads, forestry, 
fisheries, waste management sites 
Other types of 
licence 
A regulator issues a licence that permits the holder to undertake an activity that would 
otherwise be illegal. 
Wildlife licences, providing 
authorisation to disturb or harm wildlife 
Economic 
instruments 
Taxes and 
subsidies 
Environmental taxes and subsidies operate by changing the market price of a good or 
service, reducing or increasing the quantity demanded and supplied in the market  
Taxes on emissions to air, land, and 
on resource use. Subsidies to support 
renewable energy 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
Tradable rights Tradable rights systems work by specifying a quantity of allowances, e.g. to abstract 
water or to emit carbon, which can then be traded amongst users. The system is 
designed to create an opportunity cost of using an allowance, and therefore also creates 
benefits from not using an allowance. Trading allows market actors to find the allocation 
of allowances that maximises the cost-effectiveness of using the allowance 
Individual tradable quotas for fisheries, 
water abstraction rights, emissions 
trading eg for CO2, SOx, discharge to 
water 
Payments Conditional payments may be made to incentivise a particular activity. “Payments for 
Environmental Services” (PES) involve beneficiaries (state or private) paying ecosystem 
managers for the benefits delivered by those ecosystems.  
Agri-environment payments, 
conservation payments, deposit return 
payments 
Insurance A business or individual may pay a premium to an insurer who in exchange will provide a 
payment should an event take place. Government may assign liability for damage to 
people or the environment creating the need for insurance (e.g. mandatory third-party 
insurance for vehicle drivers, environmental liability insurance), and may seek to ensure 
that the commercial insurance market is able to provide insurance for risks in lieu of 
government compensation. 
Flood insurance, Livestock disease 
insurance 
Public-private 
partnerships/ 
Private Funding 
Initiative (PFI) 
Under a typical PFI deal, the public sector enters into a long-term contractual  
arrangement with private sector companies, which undertake to design, build, operate  
(and often maintain) an asset (National Audit Office, 2011). 
Provision of waste management 
infrastructure 
Information 
based 
instruments 
Targeted 
information 
provision/ 
education 
Information is made available by public or private bodies to enable businesses or 
individuals to make better-informed decisions that impact upon the environment. 
Training programmes, advisory bodies 
(eg UK Carbon Trust and Energy 
Savings Trust), non-statutory guidance 
provided by government 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
Naming and 
shaming/faming 
Information is made available describing the environmental performance of businesses, 
through for example a publicised inventory of toxic emissions, with the intention of 
incentivising better environmental behaviour through avoided damage to or enhancement 
of corporate reputation.  
Emissions inventories, public 
accolades and prizes, adverse 
publicity associated with prosecutions 
Registration, 
labelling and 
certification 
Typically information describing the environmental performance of the businesses 
delivering a product or service is made available to consumers using a product label, 
enabling consumers to choose products with better environmental performance.  
Food labelling, electrical product 
labelling 
Codes of 
practice 
A set of rules or conventions describing good practice. May be used to clarify good 
practice to accompany mandatory rules.  
Heather and Grass Burning Code 
Co-regulation 
and self-
regulation 
Voluntary 
regulation 
A group of businesses, often organised through a trade association, chooses to apply 
environmental performance standards as a condition of membership of an industry group.  
Responsible Care Initiative in 
chemicals industry 
Covenants and 
negotiated 
agreements 
In this approach government makes an agreement with target businesses to achieve 
particular standards, which forms a contract and may incur sanctions if the contract is not 
met. This may be enforced through inspection by non-government regulators. 
Packaging reduction agreements, 
recycling agreements, pollution 
reduction agreements 
Private 
corporate 
regulation 
Businesses may choose to apply environmental standards both within their organisation 
and along their supply chain, so that the purchasing business is effectively acting as a 
regulator of suppliers’ performance. Government may enforce procurement standards 
that then propagate along supply chains. 
Food retailer sustainability 
programmes, government 
procurement requirements 
Private 
professional 
regulation 
A professional body acts to apply standards through  conditions of membership. Membership of professional bodies 
Self-regulation Businesses may choose unilaterally to apply environmental performance standards, for 
example by adopting an externally monitored standard such as ISO14001 or EU EMAS, 
or as a feature of corporate social responsibility commitments. 
Environmental management systems, 
unilateral commitments to good 
performance 
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Type Variant Description Example applications 
Civic regulation Civic organisations, for example conservation charities or local community groups, may 
apply pressure to businesses to improve environmental performance through scrutiny of 
their behaviour and publicising good or bad performance. 
Activities of NGOs and community 
groups 
Support 
mechanisms 
and capacity 
building 
Research and 
knowledge 
generation 
Governments or other actors may undertake research to increase knowledge that informs 
better environmental decision making. 
Funding of university research 
Demonstration 
projects and 
knowledge 
diffusion 
Governments may choose to invest in demonstration projects to demonstrate feasibility, 
raise awareness and reduce risks of new technologies or processes. This investment 
could be managed through a specially designed investment institution, such as the UK's 
Green Investment Bank. 
Carbon capture and storage, 
sustainable agriculture practice, eco-
homes and buildings 
Network 
building and 
joint problem 
solving 
Initiatives designed to encourage people to exchange ideas and learning to improve 
environmental performance. 
Discussion groups, conferences, 
networking events 
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As detailed in Section 2.6 this typology was developed from the typology 
proposed by Gouldson et al. (2008), combined with the top-level categorisation 
used by the UK government (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
2013a) and direct regulatory instruments described by Perman et al. (2003). 
This research has consolidated, validated and extended this prior literature to 
develop a refined typology to inform policy making.  
The original version of the typology described in Table 2-1 has been adopted by 
practitioners since its publication in 2012 (Angus & GHK-ICF, 2013; Giddens & 
Booth, 2013). In these applications the typology has been further expanded, for 
example to show greater detail in interventions deployed by regulatory officers. 
This typology should therefore be seen as a basis for further development as 
new forms of intervention are devised by scholars and practitioners. It would 
however seem beneficial to adhere to a broad classification to help develop a 
common language and evidence base for all those who are involved in 
researching and implementing new forms of regulation. 
7.3 Factors affecting effectiveness of regulation 
The following sections discuss the various factors emphasised in this research 
that affect the effectiveness of regulation in practice. 
7.3.1 Characteristics of the regulated 
Defra policy makers emphasised the importance of the motivations and 
capabilities of regulated individuals and businesses on the effectiveness of a 
given regulatory intervention (Table 5-4). While they anticipated that in some 
circumstances leading businesses would pursue positive environmental 
behaviour independently, where environmental objectives conflicted with 
business objectives businesses were expected to do only the minimum to 
comply, or indeed to pursue deliberate non-compliance with legal requirements. 
In some sectors (e.g. UK food) policy makers expected demands for good 
environmental performance to be propagated along supply chains, potentially 
beyond national boundaries and so reaching further than national direct 
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regulation. Members of the public could influence business environmental 
behaviour through their own purchasing decisions, although this relied upon 
public understanding of and concern for environmental performance of 
particular products, which is not guaranteed. Similarly, case study business and 
trade association respondents described business environmental performance 
being driven by customer demands, legal requirements and financial 
considerations (e.g. production costs), and in some sectors described deliberate 
non-compliance and illegal behaviour (Table 6-5). 
There is an extensive literature examining what motivates businesses to pursue 
good environmental behaviour. While multiple motivations are identified, broadly 
speaking these can be grouped into legal compliance, business profitability 
(including contributory factors such as staff motivation, product innovation), 
reputational and moral/ethical motivations. For example, Masurel (Masurel, 
2007) identifies five clusters of motivations of entrepreneurs who invest in 
environmental measures, grouped around (i) market (e.g. satisfying customer 
needs, attracting new customers through reputation); (ii) employment (e.g. 
motivating and protecting employees); (iii) regulations (e.g. obeying the law and 
obtaining subsidies); (iv) social responsibility (satisfying moral duty, pursuing 
actions valued by society) and (v) internal management (serving order and 
cleanliness and leading to cost savings). Meanwhile Ditlev-Simonsen and 
Midttun (Ditlev-Simonsen & Midttun, 2011) identify ten theories from multiple 
academic disciplines for why businesses pursue social and environmental 
corporate responsibility: (i) proﬁt maximisation; (ii) shareholder value 
maximisation; (iii) to satisfy different stakeholders; (iv) to build a strong cluster 
to provide a favourable business context for the company; (v) to build positive 
reputation and brand; (vi) to develop innovative products; (vii) to resemble other 
companies; (viii); ethical/moral desire to do the right thing; (ix) under managerial 
discretion and (x) to contribute to sustainable development. Dangelico and 
Pujari (2010) examine why companies integrate environmental sustainability 
into products and operations finding that this can improve efficiency in the use 
of resources and return on investment, increased sales, development of new 
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markets, improved corporate image, product differentiation and enhanced 
competitive advantage. They find evidence that regulations are not simply 
constraints or compliance requirements, but may also offer opportunities for risk 
minimisation, preservation of revenues or reputation, or new business 
opportunities. The factors believed to influence business behaviour presented in 
Table 5-4 and Table 6-5 are consistent with these theories, though legal 
compliance, business profitability and reputational motivations tended to 
dominate moral/ethical motivations. However, the strength of these factors 
seems to vary significantly between sectors, so a strong influence in one 
industry sector (e.g. the potential for cost savings, or for gaining new 
customers) may be much weaker in another. 
Defra respondents noted that groups of businesses may or may not be able to 
organise themselves to deliver forms of self-regulation, anticipating that large 
diverse industries would find this more challenging than those with a small 
number of large players (Table 5-4). Business and trade association 
respondents noted that while some trade associations had successfully 
coordinated positive environmental behaviour among members, their ability to 
do so effectively depends on, among other things, whether their members are 
sufficiently similar to one another, and their international reach (Section 6.5.5). 
Drawing on club theory, Prakash and Potoski (Prakash & Potoski, 2007) have 
reviewed theory and evidence for the relationship between program design and 
effectiveness for voluntary environmental programmes, noting variable levels for 
effectiveness in practice and a lack of consolidated evidence to explain why this 
is the case. They propose a theoretical framework that emphasises the need for 
such programmes to mitigate two collective action problems; attracting firms to 
participate, and ensuring firms adhere to programme obligations. Programmes 
with weaker measures to enforce membership obligations on members may 
attract a larger membership as they are easier to join, be cheaper to run, but 
bring about a relatively small performance improvement per member. 
Programmes with stronger enforcement of standards may correspondingly 
attract a smaller number of members, require more resources for standards 
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enforcement, but bring about a greater improvement in performance per 
business and therefore confer greater reputational benefits to members. The 
findings presented in this thesis are consistent with this theory, in so far as 
participants expect greater effectiveness of voluntary programmes when there 
are a small number of members who are sufficiently similar to benefit from 
reputational benefits held in common. However, Prakash and Potoski point out 
that the aggregate benefit of the programme depends on both the number of 
members and their individual levels of improvement, so a large weakly enforced 
programme may be more beneficial than a small strongly enforced programme. 
Echoing conclusions elsewhere, Prakash and Potoski argue that the design of 
voluntary programmes must be tailored to the policy context and for different 
types of firm to maximise their overall performance, or they may deliver no more 
than “greenwash”.  
Together, these results provide new evidence that reinforces the need for 
regulatory interventions in the UK to be carefully tailored to the motivations and 
capabilities of the target industry sector, and to individual businesses within that 
sector, to maximise their effectiveness. Tailoring can occur at several levels. 
For example, laws may be established specifically for particular industries (e.g. 
legislation for agri-environment schemes in farming), or regulators may pursue 
particular strategies for different industry sectors and individual businesses 
within a single regulatory regime, such as the Environmental Permitting regime 
in the UK. However, tailoring may also lead to the regulatory framework 
becoming difficult to navigate and appearing inconsistent to the regulated, and 
more costly to apply for government. A careful balance must therefore be struck 
between optimising the design of regulation for specific sectors and maintaining 
an overall regulatory framework that can be readily understood by regulated 
businesses and cost-effectively applied. Trade associations or other industry-
led bodies may be able to provide governance for environmental activity within 
a sector, with the potential to provide approaches well-tailored to sectoral 
characteristics (e.g. the Red Tractor scheme in the farming sector). However, 
the willingness or ability of trade associations to establish such models of 
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governance cannot be assumed, and will depend on among other things the 
structure of their membership and their international reach.  
7.3.2 Characteristics of regulators 
Defra respondents argued that regulatory officers interacting directly with 
regulated businesses could provide credible local advice and guidance, tailored 
according to local conditions, which could bring about better environmental 
performance among the regulated. However, their capacity to fulfil this role 
would be constrained by the skills and expertise of individual officers and the 
resources available to allow them to reach target businesses, and the credibility 
of the threat of regulatory sanctions that they might impose for non-compliance 
(Table 5-4). Business and trade association respondents reported that 
relationships with regulatory officers based on mutual trust (providing 
businesses have demonstrated that they are trustworthy through reliable 
environmental performance), enabled businesses to try out innovative 
approaches to achieving environmental objectives, but that trust could be 
undermined when regulators failed to demonstrate understanding of their 
businesses, or were inconsistent in decision-making (Figure 6-1 and Section 
6.5.2.3). 
Together these results provide strong evidence for the importance of the skills 
and knowledge of regulatory officers for the effectiveness of direct regulation in 
the UK context, adding to a quite limited body of research examining the 
practice of front-line officers in environmental regulation (e.g. Pautz & Wamsley, 
2012; Sevä & Jagers, 2013; May & Winter, 1999). These skills form part of 
Sparrow’s “regulatory craft” (Sparrow, 2000, 2008), and their significance for 
respondents of the research presented in this thesis supports his argument that 
regulator capability can significantly alter the effectiveness of regulatory 
operations without change to the overarching macro-level policy framework. 
Views of respondents reinforce the significance of trust in modern governance 
models (Lange & Gouldson, 2010), and the need for regulators to adapt their 
regulatory strategy according to the characteristics of the businesses they seek 
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to regulate (Gunningham, 2011). This body of research underlines the need for 
governments to carefully manage the skills and resources of regulatory bodies 
in the face of shrinking budgets to maximise the effectiveness of direct 
regulation that can still be provided. Training and managed professional 
development for new recruits and a focus on retaining expert knowledge within 
regulatory organisations as staff change will be key.   
7.3.3 Characteristics of regulatory design 
This section discusses important aspects of regulatory design that have been 
emphasised in this research. 
7.3.3.1 Coherent regulatory frameworks 
Most Defra policy makers discussed the importance of establishing a coherent 
mix of regulatory instruments to maximise their overall effectiveness, explaining 
that instruments can be mutually reinforcing or enabling, but could also interfere 
with each other and add complexity for regulatees. They noted that government 
bodies need to coordinate policy design both nationally and locally to achieve 
coherence, and thought this had worked well on occasions, but not always 
(Section 5.9.1). 
Business and trade association respondents also emphasised the need for 
coherent mixes of instruments, for example to target different points in material 
flows along supply chains or through the natural environment. Some noted that 
this could require direct regulation to provide an overarching framework within 
which other forms of regulation (e.g. voluntary standards) would operate. In the 
cases where they considered regulatory frameworks to be incoherent, this was 
primarily blamed on the failure of local, national or international governmental 
bodies to coordinate policy design, with a lack of focus on the impact of the 
cumulative regulatory framework on affected businesses (Figure 6-1 and 
Section 6.5.2.1). 
Over recent years, new forms of policy assessment intended to improve the 
design of policy and regulation, including with respect to their integration, have 
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been advocated by governments and studied in the academic literature 
(Turnpenny et al., 2008).  Turnpenny et al. (2008) have examined attempts by 
the EU, UK, Germany and Sweden to implement integrated policy assessment, 
to assess the expected impact of change to policy or regulation before it is 
implemented, considering dimensions of integration with respect to: policy 
paradigms (e.g. economic growth, sustainable development), scope of impacts 
(e.g. social exclusion, environmental damage), policy goals, the policy-making 
process, stakeholder involvement, addressing trade-offs, learning from 
experience and use of evidence. They found that in practice, policy integration 
has proved challenging in all countries examined, and argue that improving 
integration likely depends on “micro-level” changes to the skills and resources 
of the people performing the assessment, as well as changes to the “meso-
level” organisational contexts, and the “macro-level” stakeholder networks, 
administrative and legal contexts in which they work. In the UK “regulatory 
impact assessment” (RIA), or latterly “impact assessment”, is a process 
adopted across government departments intended to ensure that the impacts of 
major changes to regulation are assessed across economic, social and 
environmental dimensions. Examining a sample of regulatory impact 
assessments over the period 2004-2007, Russel and Turnpenny (2009) 
conclude that this process alone proved insufficient to bring about integration, 
particularly with regard to sustainable development policy objectives. More 
recently, Fritsch et al. (2013) have examined impact assessments across 
multiple policy areas in the UK and EU between 2005 and 2010, finding a 
steady improvement in their quality, although EU impact assessments have 
outperformed UK in the assessment of social and environmental impacts 
alongside economic impacts. 
Scholars have gradually moved from examining the comparative theoretical 
performance of different types of instrument to analysing and optimising 
instrument mixes in practice (e.g. Rayner & Howlett, 2009). The perspectives of 
respondents for this research underline the importance of understanding 
instrument mixes in practice to enable the design of better regulation in the UK 
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and internationally. However, this seems likely to require both improvements in 
the policy analysis capability of government and in the capacity of institutions 
within which they work to enable coordinated policy design. While regulatory 
impact assessment appears to be making some progress in this respect for 
major new regulations, work is still required to improve the integration of the 
existing body of policy and regulation. To address business concerns of a lack 
of coherence of regulatory frameworks, assessment may need to focus more 
explicitly on this dimension of integration from the perspective of businesses, 
alongside the other dimensions of integration identified by Turnpenny et al. 
(2008). It may also be the case that a lack of integration results from the 
piecemeal development of items of legislation in response to issues with high 
political priority at different points in time. Improving integration may therefore 
require an approach to policy development that can accommodate new political 
priorities within an overarching stable and coherent framework. The EU Water 
Framework Directive (European Commission, 2013a), which draws together 
seven previous areas of legislation to provide a more coherent and effective 
approach, could offer useful lessons for improving the coherence of other areas 
of legislation.  
7.3.3.2 Flexibility 
Defra policy makers saw the need for regulatory instruments to incorporate 
flexibility to varying industry characteristics (e.g. technologies employed), to 
local variations in environmental conditions, and to the environmental risks 
posed by individual businesses. Policy and regulation needed to be flexible over 
time to accommodate changes in economic or environmental conditions (e.g. as 
the scale of a particular environmental problem such as landfilling waste 
increases or decreases) or changes in understanding of environmental risks or 
solutions (e.g. as business and government understanding of the market 
dynamics and environmental impacts of packaging waste improve), and some 
considered providing flexibility and also a relatively certain regulatory framework 
for businesses to be a significant challenge (Section 5.9.2).  
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For business and trade association respondents, flexibility was often discussed 
with related concepts of clarity and prescription in regulations. For some 
respondents (e.g. in the construction industry)  regulations and rules that did not 
spell out what businesses needed to do to comply were expected to create 
additional work to understand, interpret and communicate to staff, and were 
therefore less welcome than clear prescriptive rules. However for others, for 
example in the water industry for complex water processing plant, clear 
outcome-based objectives that afford greater flexibility to businesses in how to 
achieve objectives were preferred (Figure 6-1 and Section 6.5.2.2). 
Respondents from the waste management, construction and water industries 
discussed their preference for long-term stability in policy to provide predictable 
conditions for investment, and noted models (e.g. UK building regulations) that 
can accommodate some flexibility in requirements over time within a relatively 
stable framework (Figure 6-1 and Section 6.5.2.7). 
Policy makers and regulators are encouraged to provide clear rules that are 
easy to understand (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2004; Hampton, 2005). Flexibility 
can also be desirable, and could be accommodated through “performance 
based standards” (Coglianese et al., 2002) or voluntary agreements (Bressers 
& de Bruijn, 2005), but this flexibility may not be appropriate for businesses 
lacking skills or resources to design responses (Coglianese et al., 2002; 
Fairman & Yapp, 2005). These results highlight the need for policy makers to 
tailor the design of regulations and rules to the capability of target businesses, 
rather than assuming that either more or less prescription is always preferable. 
These results also echo finance industry calls for a “long, loud and legal” policy 
framework to encourage investment in renewable energy, where long-term 
stability has been found to be a critical factor for policy effectiveness (Bürer & 
Wüstenhagen, 2009; Held et al., 2006). The results also raise the possibility that 
regulatory reform could be a cause of unwelcome unpredictability for 
businesses, as well as an opportunity for improvement. Governments can strive 
to provide long-term stability for businesses. For example, the Landfill Tax was 
frequently highlighted during the course of this research as an instrument that 
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has provided a strong long-term incentive that has transformed the UK waste 
industry. Regulatory and legislative reform can be planned out over multiple 
years (e.g. REACH (European Commission, 2013d) has been implemented in 
phases starting in 2007) to provide relatively predictable changes that 
businesses can plan for. However, ultimately government must retain the 
flexibility to change strategy as social, economic or environmental conditions 
change and so cannot guarantee policy stability. 
7.3.3.3 Administrative efficiency 
Business and trade association respondents highlighted the need for efficient 
administrative systems through which regulatory instruments are implemented, 
for example for applying for permits, obtaining emission rights or reporting on 
environmental performance. Poorly designed administrative systems, some of 
which appeared to have little relevance to achieving environmental objectives 
(“box ticking”) were reported in some cases, and were a source of considerable 
annoyance and perceptions of “red tape” (Figure 6-1 and Section 6.5.2.4). 
Defra’s current Smarter Environmental Regulation Review (SERR) has explicitly 
sought to examine and improve the mechanisms through which businesses find 
out about and report on their environmental obligations (Defra, 2013a). The 
research presented in Chapter 3 and other case studies developed for the same 
purpose highlights the complexity of the overall environmental regulatory 
compliance responsibilities of businesses and the effort required by businesses 
to keep up to date and comply. Defra is now consolidating information reporting 
requirements and undertaking a major programme of reorganising and rewriting 
written guidance as it is moved onto the new single government website 
www.gov.uk.  
These results support other research indicating that both direct regulation and 
alternatives can impose significant administrative costs on participants (Dinica 
et al., 2007; Krarup & Ramesohl, 2002; Sovacool, 2011). While these costs 
need to be weighed against the wider social benefits of regulation, for 
participants in this study poor implementation of administrative systems was a 
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significant cause of concern. Recent government initiatives have sought to 
improve the ease with which regulatees can find out about and report on 
regulation (Defra, 2013a). Greater adoption of service design techniques such 
as “customer journey mapping” (Heapy & Parker, 2006; Macdonald et al., 2011) 
could prove beneficial. In this context, customer (or service, or user) journey 
mapping involves analysing the experience of people interacting with 
government to understand their sequence, the information exchanged, the 
emotional impact of the exchange, and likely courses of subsequent events 
(e.g. a site visit, leading to a requirement for corrective action, leading to 
another site visit), so that systems can be designed for maximum effectiveness 
and efficiency. While such analysis approaches are well established in the 
commercial sector, their application for public services, or for environmental 
regulation, appears to be in its infancy and is under-researched. Improving the 
user experience should however be a high priority for government, and has 
scope to significantly reduce perceptions of “red tape” without need for change 
to the underlying regulatory framework, which is likely to be much more difficult 
and time consuming to achieve. 
7.3.4 Risk-based regulation 
Defra policy makers discussed various characteristics of environmental risks 
that influence the choice of regulatory intervention and the targeting of 
regulatory resources, including risk likelihood and impact, spatial variation, who 
is affected, the number and variety of actors and mitigation actions, persistence 
and irreversibility, speed of action required and understanding of risks (Section 
5.7.2). Characterisation of risks played an important part in policy makers’ 
thinking about regulatory design, alongside economic, political and other 
considerations (Section 5.10 and Table 5-5). 
Business and trade association respondents focused on the use of risk 
characterisation to prioritise regulatory effort, including the relative prioritisation 
of environmental issues for regulation, the prioritisation of regulation of different 
substances within the same regulatory framework, and the prioritisation of 
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attention from regulatory officers across different businesses. While in some 
cases they felt that risks were being appropriately regulated, in others they 
questioned whether policy priorities and regulatory interventions were truly risk-
based (Figure 6-1 and Section 6.5.2.5). 
Scholars have called for regulation to be risk-informed, to ensure that limited 
regulatory resources are targeted to best effect, and methods for risk analysis at 
a strategic and operational level have been developed and deployed by 
practitioners (e.g. Gouldson et al. 2009; Prpich et al. 2011). Regulators have 
been urged to regulate on the basis of risk (Hampton, 2005) and risk-based 
regulation is embedded in policies of regulatory agencies. However, 
commentators have observed that regulating on the basis of risk presents 
epistemic, institutional and normative challenges in its implementation 
(Rothstein et al., 2006). Löfstedt (2013) has highlighted recent EU regulations 
and directives that are not risk or evidence based and has called for greater 
scrutiny of new regulations in this regard, to be taken forward through an 
informal European Parliamentary Working Group on Risk. Löfstedt suggests 
this group should work on improving understanding and application of the terms 
“risk” and “hazard” in European policy making, developing a clearer definition of 
the precautionary principle, exploring the scientific basis of “pet” risks of 
member states, and improving understanding and management of risk-risk 
tradeoffs. 
The responses of businesses and trade associations for this research provide 
evidence that while risk based regulation has been widely called for, and is 
understood and desired by respondents, its implementation is indeed 
challenging and has not always been successful. For UK and European 
regulation to become truly risk-based, it appears that further regulatory reform 
focused on this objective will be required; a need that must not be lost alongside 
other foci such as reducing administrative burdens. As government spending in 
England, including on environmental regulation, continues to be significantly 
constrained, the capacity of government to target the resources that remain 
according to environmental risk becomes even more important. Policy makers 
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need to ensure that regulatory agencies are afforded sufficient operational 
flexibility to target their resources according to risk, and politicians will need to 
lead public debate on relative priorities, tackling difficult trade-offs.  
7.4 Government and business preferences for types of 
regulation 
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 suggests that Defra policy makers are 
aware of a wide range of policy and regulatory instruments including direct 
“command and control” regulation, economic instruments, information based 
approaches, co- and self-regulation and support and capacity building. They 
have been seeking ways to harness the wider social influences on business 
behaviour beyond the state to encourage good environmental behaviour. They 
considered direct regulation to be necessary in many areas to reduce 
environmental risks with confidence and to tackle poor performance. 
Alternatives to direct regulation were generally also considered to be of value in 
the appropriate industry context, and co-regulation was thought to offer 
important advantages to accommodate uncertainty and develop evidence and 
solutions for emerging policy problems (Section 5.2). Policy makers included 
consideration of a range of constraints and stakeholder preferences in their 
instrument selection decisions, including the preferences of politicians, industry 
and the general public (Table 5-5). The current UK government preference for 
alternatives to direct regulation (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
2013a) was discussed by around a third of policy makers (Table 5-5). 
Case study businesses and trade associations expressed a range of views on 
which types of regulatory intervention were likely to be effective, and which 
were preferred from a business perspective (Table 6-5). Some respondents 
expressed enthusiasm for voluntary approaches to regulation, and highlighted 
examples of significant voluntary environmental action in particular sectors. 
However, other respondents were strongly sceptical of voluntary regulation, 
doubting that businesses would pursue better environmental performance 
without being compelled to do so. The ability of direct regulation to provide a 
193 
 
“level playing field” nationally or internationally, so that all businesses had to 
achieve the same environmental standards and could not avoid costs by not 
complying, was highlighted by several respondents as a significant advantage. 
In some cases (e.g. in the waste sector) direct regulation was argued to require 
firmer enforcement of regulations to tackle deliberate non-compliant or illegal 
behaviour (Section 6.5.2). While the number of respondents was too small to 
draw generalisable conclusions about the preferences for or suitability of 
different kinds of regulation for different sectors, the results suggest that the 
structure of the sector, the capability and attitude towards compliance of its 
members, the degree of national and international competition and the degree 
to which regulations are tailored to the sector all play a part in shaping industry 
attitudes towards regulation (Table 6-4 and Section 6.5.3). 
These mixed preferences, where businesses appear to see both advantages 
and disadvantages in different forms of regulation, are reflected in the academic 
literature regarding the impact of environmental regulation on firm 
competitiveness. In their recent systematic review, Iraldo et al. (2011) identify 
three major theoretical views. Firstly, the “traditionalist” view of neoclassical 
environmental economics expects that environmental regulation imposes 
additional costs on compliant businesses leading to loss of market share and 
industries relocating to territories with less stringent environmental standards 
(the “pollution haven hypothesis”). Secondly, the “revisionist” view argues that 
improved environmental performance is a source of competitive advantage, 
arising from improvements in productivity and new market opportunities (the 
“Porter hypothesis”). Thirdly the “resource-based” view sees a firm’s competitive 
advantage as an outcome of valuable organisational capabilities such as 
continual innovation rather than simply the result of its external environment; 
capabilities which may be associated with a proactive environmental strategy. 
Overall, Iraldo et al. find that none of these views succeeds over the others in 
the available empirical evidence, suggesting that instead a mix of instruments 
will prove optimal for a given industry or sector. They suggest that traditional 
(direct) regulation should often be used to guarantee a “level playing field” for 
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the later application of market-based instruments, to clearly define the “rules of 
the game”. Economic instruments are then a cornerstone for the implementation 
of “soft” instruments such as voluntary agreements, which in turn can help to 
strengthen the competitive effect of mandatory measures. The research 
presented here shows that case study businesses and policy makers tend to 
agree with this view. 
Examining SME attitudes towards environmental regulation, Petts (2000) found 
that among a sample of SMEs in England and Wales, non-management 
participants sought strong enforcement and penalties from direct regulation, 
while managers demanded consistent regulation to provide a level playing field. 
Respondents in Petts’ study thought SMEs were typically not pursuing self-
regulation, and a balance of direct regulation and self-regulation received only 
cautious support. More recent UK research suggests that SMEs are motivated 
primarily by regulatory compliance, are unlikely to self-regulate, and that 
voluntary approaches are not generally likely to be effective, though may be 
effective when SMEs have the right combination of capability and pro-
environmental orientation (Lynch-Wood & Williamson, 2013). These findings are 
echoed by Wilson et al. (2012) who found that a sample of UK SMEs had low 
levels of understanding of environmental legislation and their resultant 
obligations, and recommend that inspections and audits remain a key part of 
regulators’ enforcement strategies for SMEs, to improve the probability of 
legislation improving business environmental behaviour. While the research 
presented here has not focused on SMEs, where SMEs have been discussed 
respondents have tended to agree with these views of their motivations and the 
consequent suitability of regulatory interventions.  
It has been argued that in reality we should not expect any single type of 
regulatory intervention to emerge in general as better or worse performing than 
another. As Gunningham (2009) puts it, following a review of four decades of 
environmental law and regulation in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions:  
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“Stepping back from the detail of these developments and the particular 
successes and failures of individual instruments, the broader question remains: 
what sorts of architectures are likely to work best in terms of effectiveness, 
efficiency and political acceptability? Unfortunately, the general answer to such 
questions is it all depends.” 
Instead, the challenge for policy makers and regulators is to design a coherent 
set of interventions tailored to the particular circumstances of the target industry 
sector or businesses. The views of Defra policy makers and businesses and 
trade associations captured in this research provide new evidence to support 
this view for the UK. Policy makers and regulators seeking to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of regulation should consider alternatives to direct 
regulation as part of a policy mix. However, they should anticipate that 
businesses may not respond positively to an approach that fails to recognise 
the part played by direct regulation in providing minimum standards and a level 
playing field on which other instruments can be built. This research has not 
directly examined the perspectives of other stakeholders, such as members of 
the public or NGOs, who may emphasise other factors driving their preferences 
between forms of regulation, such as the democratic legitimacy or transparency. 
These views will also influence the development of future environmental 
governance. 
7.5 The role of evidence for regulation and regulatory reform 
Defra policy makers discussed the significant role that the state of knowledge 
about environmental issues plays in instrument selection and regulation 
(Section 5.11). While some believed that good evidence exists to support their 
decision making, for others evidence was lacking, for example because 
assessing impact is intrinsically difficult or because policies have not been in 
place long enough to assess their effects. Evidence may be contested, which 
some argued could undermine regulatee’s willingness to comply. Under these 
conditions of uncertainty, some policy makers described adopting an 
incremental approach to developing policy as evidence emerges and other 
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actors (e.g. industry or NGOs) develop their positions on particular issues. 
Others described the need for a precautionary approach to deal with known 
hazards with uncertain associated risks. For some, an important advantage of 
co-regulation is the opportunity provided to develop evidence collaboratively 
with regulatees. 
Several case study trade associations described their activities to develop and 
use evidence in the interests of their members (Figure 6-1 and Section 6.5.2.6). 
Examples were provided of evidence of environmental impact being gathered to 
respond to or in anticipation of scrutiny from customers and the media, and to 
influence other organisations in the supply/waste management chains of 
members. Several respondents argued that better evidence in support of 
regulations would improve the willingness of businesses to comply, and while 
noting that some regulatory regimes were demonstrably evidence based, others 
were considered to lack evaluation to demonstrate their impact on 
environmental outcomes and on costs to businesses affected. 
Government departments including Defra are committed to decision making 
based on evidence (Solesbury, 2001), and invest in evidence generation in 
priority policy areas (Defra, 2011b). Decision making must accommodate the 
often significant uncertainties surrounding the impact of environmental 
regulation on society and the environment. A variety of risk analysis and 
decision making techniques have been developed that can help policy makers 
in this task, following an iterative cycle of problem formulation, risk assessment, 
options appraisal and taking action to address risk (Gormley et al., 2011). The 
above results provide evidence that at a given point in time Defra policy makers 
choose regulatory instruments in part on the basis of government’s current state 
of knowledge about the environmental problems being tackled, adopting an 
iterative approach to risk assessment and appraisal of regulatory options. 
Judging when a risk assessment justifies a firm legislative regulatory response, 
and when to allow further time for evidence to be gathered, is a central 
challenge for policy makers. Some regulatory frameworks, such as REACH, 
have a built-in process for evidence gathering and decision making to 
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accommodate current uncertainty; co-regulation can also accommodate 
evidence gathering.  
These results also illustrate how actors other than government, including 
businesses and trade associations, may invest in evidence generation and 
dissemination to support their interests, described elsewhere as “brokering” 
(Davies et al., 2010). Gulbrandsen (2008) contrasts two approaches adopted by 
scholars to study the interface between science and policy. Under the “rational-
instrumental” approach, science provides verifiable facts on which policy 
makers make decisions. Scholars adopting the “political-institutional” 
perspective challenge an assumption of the rational-instrumental approach: that 
the influence of science is independent of the processes through which it is 
communicated by knowledge producers into the policy-making process. Instead 
they focus on analyzing the role of political actors, interest groups, and 
institutions in turning knowledge into policy. The results here suggest that in 
practice policy makers and other actors are engaged in a process of evidence 
generation and sharing that requires a political-institutional perspective to be 
fully understood. 
Theories of motivation for compliance with regulation have been broadly 
categorised (Winter & May, 2001) as “calculated” (fear of detection of violations 
and resultant punishment), “normative” (feeling a civic duty to comply) and 
“social” (feeling a social pressure to comply, driven by a desire for approval and 
respect of significant people with whom regulatees interact). The normative 
motivation is thought to be related in part to a sense of civic duty to obey laws 
and general ideological values, and in part to the fairness and reasonableness 
of the rule given the harm caused by violations. Both policy makers and 
business and trade association respondents highlighted the importance of 
evidence that regulation was effective in reducing environmental harm to the 
willingness of regulatees to comply, providing further evidence in support of this 
normative element of compliance motivation. 
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Together with the initial observation from which this thesis originates, that 
evidence to inform environmental regulatory reform is often lacking, these 
results underline the continuing need for open and impartial evidence gathering, 
analysis and synthesis to inform the design of effective environmental 
regulation. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has 
for many years provided independent recommendations on health policy in the 
UK, but similar institutions are lacking in other policy domains. A recent initiative 
to establish new independent “What Works” institutes for other areas of social 
policy, including crime reduction, active and independent ageing, early 
intervention, educational attainment and local economic growth (H. M. 
Government, 2013), could valuably be extended to inform environmental 
regulation. 
7.6 Business participation in regulatory reform 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Defra has sought direct involvement of industry 
representatives to understand the structure and impact of environmental 
regulatory frameworks on different sectors. In Section 5.11, Defra policy makers 
argued that an important advantage of co-regulation (particularly targeted at 
improving product sustainability) has been the opportunity it provides to develop 
an agreed evidence base with businesses, as well as building “buy-in” with 
industry stakeholders. More broadly, Defra policy makers had found that 
understanding the economic and environmental systems that they are aiming to 
influence can be a significant challenge (Section 5.12). In Chapter 6, business 
and trade association respondents generally argued for the early involvement of 
industry in the design of regulation, to provide a “real world” view of its likely 
impact that they sometimes considered lacking among policy makers (Section 
6.5.4). They expected greater business involvement to provide innovative ideas 
for meeting environmental objectives and to reduce the number of problems 
that would later emerge in implementation. However, some respondents from 
this group highlighted risks of business involvement, including a loss of 
government independence, and of undue influence of larger firms that would 
disadvantage smaller businesses.  
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New UK government guidelines on consultation for policy making and 
implementation emphasise the need for “greater focus on robust evidence, 
transparency and engaging with key groups earlier in the process”, and requires 
policy makers to consider use of more informal forms of consultation such as 
web-based forums and working groups rather than relying on written 
consultations (Cabinet Office, 2013b). Regulatory impact assessment provides 
a process that is intended to ensure that the impacts of regulation on multiple 
parties, including industry groups, have been taken into account in policy 
formation. In the UK, the quality of RIAs for sustainable development policy has 
been found historically lacking (Russel & Turnpenny, 2009), though RIA quality 
in general is thought to be improving (Fritsch et al., 2013). The results 
presented in this research underline the great complexity of the regulatory 
frameworks within which businesses now operate, and suggest that better 
methods for analysing this complexity so that it can be redesigned are required 
(Section 5.12). Industry involvement that focuses on providing a detailed 
perspective on regulation in practice seems essential to achieve the necessary 
level of understanding. This perspective should complement, but cannot 
substitute, the knowledge and understanding of policy making and “the 
regulatory art” provided by practitioners from government and non-state 
governance organisations. More broadly, industry involvement should occur 
alongside involvement of other stakeholders (e.g. NGOs) in an open policy-
making process.  
It should be noted that running and participating in regulatory reform 
programmes requires a significant commitment or resources from government, 
businesses and other stakeholders affected. The impact of an individual 
regulatory instrument can vary significantly between industry sectors, and each 
sector will be subject to a particular combination of instruments in a unique mix. 
Analysing these industry-specific variations to identify the need for reform is a 
major challenge, so government must be adept at identifying where regulatory 
reform is needed most. While a law-by-law review programme, as implemented 
through the Red Tape Challenge, may provide a mechanism for identifying 
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problem areas, an industry sector by industry sector approach may prove more 
effective at addressing the issues of coherence among instruments that are 
highlighted within this research. A sector-based approach does present new 
challenges in itself, however, for example how to prioritise and sequence 
analyses for different sectors and mitigate the risk that a beneficial change for 
one sector does not have unintended negative impacts in another. In practice, a 
combination of industry-by-industry and law-by-law analysis seems likely to 
prove necessary. 
7.7 Government capability in regulatory design 
Defra policy makers discussed the challenges of policy making under conditions 
of uncertainty, and some highlighted a lack of tools to help analyse the human 
and environmental systems affected by policy and regulation, with the attendant 
risk of unintended consequences of intervention. Policy makers need to think 
broadly and creatively, and to be able to communicate and cooperate effectively 
with other actors involved in achieving environmental objectives, particularly 
when pursuing co-regulatory approaches (Section 5.12). 
Business and trade association respondents typically blamed a perceived lack 
of coherence in regulatory frameworks on the failure of policy makers to work 
together across policy domains, or failing to incorporate new requirements into 
existing regimes (Section 6.5.2.1). From their perspective, policy makers need 
to understand when prescription and flexibility are appropriate for different types 
of regulated business (Section 6.5.2.2). They need to be able to design 
frameworks that enable positive regulatory relationships to develop (Section 
6.5.2.3), are administratively efficient (Section 6.5.2.4), risk-informed (Section 
6.5.2.5), evidence based (Section 6.5.2.6) and provide a stable policy 
environment in the face of changing environmental and socio-economic 
conditions (Section 6.5.2.7). Business and trade association respondents 
generally felt that greater business involvement in the policy making process 
would help policy makers to gain a better appreciation of the impact of policy 
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and regulation on businesses, which they expected to improve the design of the 
resultant regulations (Section 6.5.4). 
A wide range of tools is available for policy makers for the purposes of 
integrated policy assessment for sustainable development, including 
assessment frameworks, participatory tools, scenario analysis tools, multi-
criteria analysis tools, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis tools, 
accounting tools, physical analysis tools and indicator sets, and model tools (de 
Ridder et al., 2007). However, researchers have found a gap between the tools 
available and the simpler approaches adopted by policy makers in practice (de 
Ridder et al., 2007). This could be attributable to a lack of experience of those 
undertaking the assessment, limited commitment to completing the 
assessment, limited time, data and other resource constraints, the complexity of 
the policy, planning and decision-making environment and/or major differences 
in the tools developed by researchers and consultants and the simpler 
approaches adopted by practitioners (Lee, 2006). It is not possible to conclude 
from the research presented in this thesis whether Defra policy makers have 
examined the full range of tools available and found them lacking, or whether 
there are other causes for the reported lack of tools to help with policy analysis. 
A closer examination of this gap would be a valuable line of future research. 
Specifically, tools to help policy makers to analyse mixes of instruments 
experienced by different sectors, and the effect of instruments acting across 
multiple sectors, are required.  
The Civil Service Reform Plan (H. M. Government, 2012) sets out the current 
government’s plans to improve the performance of the UK Civil Service in the 
context of demands for change from the public and civil servants, a large 
budget deficit, and a growing and aging population, and the consequent need 
for major changes to the delivery of public services. It summarises the 
Government’s policy agenda as “based on transparency, behaviour impacts, 
and payment by results, instead of top down targets, regulation and increasing 
public spending” (H. M. Government, 2012). Reform measures include “open 
policy making”, through which policy analysis may be undertaken by bodies 
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other than the Civil Service (e.g. academics and think tanks), more sparing use 
of legislation, funding and regulation and greater use of behavioural insight, 
transparency and digital engagement to achieve policy objectives, greater focus 
on understanding “what works”, strengthening policy implementation and 
improving strategic thinking and horizon scanning. The recently revised Civil 
Service competency framework for policy makers states that “Policy 
Professionals bring together evidence, politics and delivery to support Ministers 
in achieving outcomes for government” (UK Civil Service, 2013). It emphasises 
the need for policy makers to develop and use a sound evidence base, 
understand and manage the political context, and plan from the outset how the 
policy will be delivered.  
Requirements for the use of evidence, risk analysis, implementation of workable 
(potentially co-designed) systems, use of digital technologies and evaluation 
and iterative improvement align closely with the skills called for by participants 
in the research presented here. While arguing for greater involvement of those 
involved in the delivery of implemented policies in their design, the Civil Service 
Reform Plan says little about improving the implementation of state regulation. 
As long as state regulation continues to feature in the policy mix, policy makers 
will continue to need to understand how regulation works in practice, to ensure 
effective regulatory relationships (Section 6.5.2.3 and 7.3.2). Inter-agency 
knowledge sharing networks that spread understanding between policy 
designers and regulatory practitioners are likely to be key. Secondments that 
exchange staff between regulatory and policy making organisations and into 
industry are also likely to be of value, to exchange practical understanding of 
the operations and challenges of working in different parts of the policy design 
and regulatory implementation chain. 
7.8 Implications for regulatory reform 
This section draws together findings from the preceding discussion, 
summarising their implications for regulatory reform initiatives pursued by 
governments. 
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Use and further development of typology: The typology of instruments 
presented in Table 7-1 provides a firm basis to inform policy makers and 
regulators considering options for new regulation or the reform of existing 
regulation. Informal feedback from policy makers and regulators on the 
guidance document developed from this research programme (Appendix E) 
indicates that it is a useful framework for structure thinking and evidence. 
However, over time new forms of instrument will no doubt develop. Therefore 
an ongoing process of development and evidence-gathering will be necessary 
to ensure the typology is kept up to date. 
Adopting alternatives to direct regulation: The evidence gathered through 
this research indicates that alternative instruments other than direct regulation 
have a place in achieving environmental policy objectives. However, their 
suitability depends on a range of factors that vary between industry contexts, 
including among other things the characteristics of the targeted environmental 
risks, the size, motivations and capabilities of regulated businesses, their 
willingness and capacity to organise themselves for joint environmental action, 
and the characteristics of the markets in which they operate; and these factors 
will change over time. This research suggests that before the process of 
instrument selection is undertaken a realistic assessment of government and 
industry capability to implement each type of instrument must be undertaken, as 
a lack of capability can significantly undermine the effectiveness of any chosen 
approach. Rather than considering instruments in isolation, those seeking to 
improve the design of regulatory frameworks need to understand and improve 
the full mix of instruments that a business faces, which is likely to include a 
base of direct regulation to provide a “level playing field” and minimum 
standards, upon which other instruments are built. Successful implementation of 
regulatory frameworks by government and/or industry depend on the capability 
of actors involved, so close attention must be paid to capability as a deciding 
factor in the choice of instruments pursued. 
Generation and use of evidence: This research has found that while 
improving, the evidence base for regulatory effectiveness is fragmented, may 
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be contested and is often lacking. More ex-post evaluations of regulatory 
effectiveness are required to test the effectiveness and efficiency of 
interventions in practice, to inform future regulatory design and assess the 
accuracy of ex-ante regulatory impact assessments. Better evidence for 
effectiveness and efficiency may also increase willingness of businesses to 
comply with regulation, in turn increasing its effectiveness in achieving intended 
objectives. Co-regulation can provide a useful mechanism for generating new 
evidence in collaboration between industry, government and other stakeholders. 
Evidence may be generated and brokered by different stakeholders in 
regulatory reform to support their own interests, so a rigorous transparent 
process of evidence generation, gathering, assessment and synthesis is 
required to ensure the best possible view of the weight of evidence is 
established to inform the political process of policy making. 
Addressing multiple dimensions of reform: This research has identified a 
range of factors affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of regulatory 
frameworks in practice, including their coherence, flexibility and the efficiency of 
their implemented administrative processes, the extent to which they truly 
reflect the principles of risk-based regulation, and the resources and capabilities 
of government or non-government regulatory officers and governance 
organisations. While these factors are linked to the underlying legal framework, 
they are frequently not defined in law but instead reflect how the law has been 
implemented through institutions. While approaching regulatory reform 
programmes on the basis of a statute-by-statute review may provide a 
convenient method for planning, simple metrics of “success”, such as the 
number of lines of regulation that have been removed, are unlikely to provide a 
good measure of whether regulation has been improved. Instead, a fuller 
(though proportionate) appraisal covering the multiple dimensions suggested by 
integrated assessment scholars is likely to be required. 
Analysing instrument mixes for industry sectors: Given that the suitability of 
different forms of regulation depends significantly on characteristics that vary 
between industry sectors, it seems likely that regulatory reform proposals need 
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to be analysed on an industry-sector by industry-sector basis to maximise 
regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. However, this approach in turn presents 
challenges as many regulations affect multiple industry sectors, so change 
designed for one sector may have adverse effects on others. While regulatory 
impact assessment methods require that impacts on multiple sectors are 
required, how to undertake this complex analytical task requires further 
research beyond the scope of this thesis. Recent work by Weber et al. (2013) 
examining the policy mix for controlling noise in the Netherlands provides a 
useful starting point for further work in other policy domains and industries. 
Policy makers are likely to require supportive organisational arrangements, for 
example that encourage inter-departmental working and that explicitly 
incorporate the resolution of trade-offs between different policy domains 
championed by different political leaders, to be able to develop more integrated 
regulation in future. 
Involving the business community: Case study businesses and trade 
associations frequently called for their earlier and greater involvement in the 
design of regulation. These calls are echoed in recent UK government guidance 
on consultation, which also calls for more collaborative consultation approaches 
beyond the traditional review of consultation documents. While recognising that 
policy makers and regulators must ensure that such involvement is transparent, 
and balanced with involvement of other stakeholders affected by regulatory 
reform, this research suggests that such involvement would be particularly 
useful to aid policy makers and regulators in understanding the interface 
between business and regulatory institutions. This perspective will help to 
identify areas of incoherence and to improve the administrative efficiency of 
implemented regulation, and provide greater insight into the important role 
played by front-line regulatory officers.    
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by summarising how the research presented in this thesis 
meets the objectives described in Chapter 1 (Section 8.2). It summarises the 
novelty and contribution of this work (Section 8.3), and provides a critical review 
(Section 8.4), and suggestions for further research (Section 8.5). Finally it 
summarises recommendations to government and industry that have arisen 
(Section 8.6).   
8.2 How this research fulfils its objectives 
This section reviews how the research described in this thesis has met each 
research objective set out in Section 1.3. 
Objective 1: Identify the total range of instruments available to policy 
makers and regulators and the factors thought to affect their effectiveness 
and efficiency in practice. 
Objective 1 is fulfilled by Chapter 2. A novel typology of instruments was 
developed from the prior art (Table 2-1), and evidence of what types of 
instrument have worked when and why was examined, drawing on international 
experience and recent examples from the UK. Important factors affecting their 
effectiveness in practice identified from this review are presented in Section 2.8, 
and include characteristics of instrument design (coherence and flexibility), 
characteristics of the regulated (motivation and capacity) and characteristics of 
regulators (motivation, risk-based decision making capability, technical 
knowledge and negotiation skills). Finding evidence to be frequently lacking, 
this review characterised the types of evidence required to enable regulatory 
reform and characterised gaps. Ethnographic research was proposed as an 
important approach to examine the particular evidence gap concerning nuances 
of regulatory practice. 
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Objective 2: Examine the regulatory frameworks in place for illustrative 
case study business sectors in the UK. 
Objective 2 is fulfilled by Chapter 4. Five case study sectors were examined, 
summarising for each sector important industry characteristics, the regulatory 
framework, and providing example views from industry on the structure of 
legislation, how businesses locate and use guidance, information reporting 
obligations and compliance assurance requirements. These high-level case 
studies provide practical examples of instrument mixes in place, grounding the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 and providing context for the views 
expressed by policy makers and industry representatives in Chapters 5 and 6. 
They illustrate that for these industries businesses typically are required to fulfil 
a large number of environmental regulatory obligations, originating from multiple 
laws and implemented through multiple government agencies. Understanding 
and complying with these obligations reportedly required significant resource 
commitment from businesses, which may prove challenging for smaller 
businesses where resources are limited. Problems identified by respondents 
included those arising from incoherence in obligations and processes between 
regulatory regimes, lack of clarity in requirements and definitions, and difficulties 
in finding information about obligations through multiple government channels. 
Various proposals for improving regulatory frameworks were made, including to 
the design of statute, to the responsibilities ascribed to implementing agencies, 
and to the design of regulatory processes and information provision. 
Objective 3: Identify the factors that policy makers believe affect the 
selection, effectiveness, and efficiency of policy instruments. 
Objective 3 is fulfilled by Chapter 5. Thirty-three Defra policy makers were 
interviewed to explore the range of instruments available to achieve policy 
objectives, validating and extending the typology of instruments developed to 
meet Objective 1 (Table 5-3 and Table 5-6). Policy makers were found to be 
seeking to harness the influence of non-governmental resources to encourage 
good environmental behaviour (Figure 5-2). The relevance of each influence 
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varies as risk and industry characteristics vary between policy areas (Section 
5.7 and Table 5-4). The typology of policy and regulatory instruments was 
refined (Table 5-3 and Table 5-6). Direct regulation was considered necessary 
in many areas, to reduce environmental risks with confidence and to tackle poor 
environmental performance, while co-regulatory approaches may provide 
important advantages to help accommodate uncertainty for emerging policy 
problems, providing a mechanism to develop trusted evidence and to refine 
objectives as problems are better understood. The case study found that the 
choice of instruments made by policy makers arose from consideration of (i) the 
characteristics of policy and environmental risk management objectives, (ii) 
target actor attitudes, capabilities and interactions, (iii) policy instrument options 
known, (iv) instrument design objectives and (v) social, legal and political 
selection factors. The choices policy makers then made were influenced by their 
state of knowledge for each of these dimensions, mediated by their capabilities 
in policy making (Figure 5-4). 
Objective 4: Identify the factors that businesses believe affect selection, 
effectiveness and efficiency of instruments. 
Objective 4 is fulfilled by Chapter 6. Thirty-four respondents from 30 UK 
businesses and industry bodies from 5 industry sectors were interviewed to 
gather their perspectives on the range and suitability of policy and regulatory 
instruments.  The typology of instruments developed for Objective 1 was further 
validated and refined (Table 6-3 and Table 7-1).  While some respondents 
argued for the wider adoption of voluntary approaches, others preferred direct 
regulation to tackle poor performance and provide a level playing field (Table 
6-5). Respondents sought regulatory frameworks that are coherent (Section 
6.5.2.1), balance clarity, prescription and flexibility (Section 6.5.2.2), are 
enabled by positive regulatory relationships (Section 6.5.2.3), administratively 
efficient (Section 6.5.2.4), targeted according to risk magnitude and character 
(Section 6.5.2.5), evidence-based (Section 6.5.2.6), and that deliver long-term 
market stability for regulated businesses (Section 6.5.2.7). The findings suggest 
that theoretical advantages of different forms of regulation may be undermined 
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by poor implementation. Respondents argued that greater industry involvement 
in regulatory design could improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Section 
6.5.4). Anticipated differences in performance between instruments could be 
undermined by poor implementation, so participants argue for greater industry 
involvement in regulatory reform to identify problems and solutions. Results 
support the need for policy makers and regulators to tailor an effective mix of 
instruments for a given sector, and for regulatory reform that tackles the details 
of implementation and major integrative challenges for government. 
Objective 5: Evaluate existing evidence and theory in light of the data 
gathered from these case studies, and develop recommendations for 
future regulatory reform programmes. 
Objective 5 is fulfilled by Chapter 7. The case study respondents have validated 
and extended the typology of instruments developed under Objective 1, which 
provides a firm basis for policy making by practitioners, although it should be 
expected to evolve as new governance models are developed (Section 7.2). 
The research provides new evidence in support of well-established theories of 
motivation for sustainable business motivation (Section 7.3.1) while drawing 
attention to the characteristics necessary for trade associations to lead 
voluntary action for their members, which cannot be assumed to always be in 
place (Section 7.3.1). New evidence is provided for the impact of regulatory 
officers on regulatory effectiveness, underlining the importance of their 
relationships with the regulated, trust, and the ability to cooperate with good 
performers while tackling poor performance with firm enforcement (Section 
7.3.2). Regarding regulatory design, respondents have emphasised the need 
for greater coherence in some aspects of the UK regulatory framework (Section 
7.3.3.1), echoing other research (UKELA, 2012). New evidence for the need for 
careful tailoring of the prescription and flexibility of regulation according to the 
sector targeted has been presented (Section 7.3.3.2), while drawing attention to 
the need for the better design of regulatory administrative systems and further 
research into how to achieve this (Section 7.3.3.3). While respondents called for 
regulation to be risk based, in line with well-established regulatory theory and 
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principles, it appears that further work is required to achieve this in practice, so 
achieving risk-based regulation should remain a focus of regulatory reform 
(Section 7.3.4). New and perhaps counter-intuitive evidence for mixed 
preferences for different forms of regulation among businesses has been 
gathered through this research, supporting theories calling for a tailored mix of 
interventions that includes direct regulation to provide minimum standards and a 
level playing field, upon which other forms of environmental governance can be 
built (Section 7.4). The research has provided evidence for the availability of 
evidence influencing instrument selection decisions by policy makers, while 
evidence is brokered among regulatory stakeholders, and can affect compliance 
motivations among the regulated (Section 7.5). While in theory various tools 
exist to support policy design, policy makers have reportedly found them 
lacking, and greater involvement of businesses in regulatory design has been 
called for by business respondents (Section 7.6 and 7.7). Section 8.3 below 
highlights particular points of novelty and contribution among these findings, 
while Section 8.6 summarises recommendations arising for government and 
industry. 
8.3 Summary of novelty and contribution 
The key areas of novelty and contribution of this research are as follows: 
 The research has been undertaken using a novel methodology that 
includes close working with a government department through an 
industrial placement, providing an “insider’s view” of the realities of 
government policy making and regulation. 
 The research developed and refined a typology of regulatory instruments 
based on the prior art (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
2013a; Gouldson et al., 2008; Perman et al., 2003) through validation 
with 67 practitioners from government and industry (Table 5-3, Table 6-3, 
Table 7-1). This has been developed into guidance for practitioners now 
in use at Defra (Appendix E). 
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 The research provides new data and insight into instrument selection at 
Defra, which is a critical case for UK environmental policy making 
(Chapter 5), and new data and insight into industry preferences for 
instrument selection in the UK context (Chapter 6). 
 The research provides a considerable body of evidence for the impact of 
a range of factors on regulatory effectiveness in the UK context, including 
the quality of relationships between regulatory officers and the regulated 
(Section 7.3.2), the coherence of the regulatory framework (Section 
7.3.3.1), the suitability of the level of flexibility or prescription in rules for 
regulated businesses (Section 7.3.3.2), and the administrative design of 
regulation at the interface between businesses and regulators (Section 
7.3.3.3). 
 The research provides evidence concerning risk characterisation by 
policy makers, regulators and businesses for regulation, demonstrating 
the challenges of risk-based regulation in practice (Section 7.3.4). 
 The research provides evidence that, to maximise effectiveness and 
efficiency, regulatory frameworks should be tailored to the target 
businesses, utilising a mix of instruments rather than any one 
intervention being more or less effective in general (Section 7.4). 
 The research provides evidence for the tactical development and 
communication of evidence of business environmental impact among 
stakeholders, and the effect of evidence for the effectiveness of 
regulation on motivations for compliance (Section 7.5). 
 The research highlights the need for policy makers and regulators to 
work collaboratively with the business community in the process of 
regulatory reform, to gain insight into the impact of regulation on 
business operations (Section 7.6), and provides new evidence that 
improved processes and skills in business engagement and regulatory 
analysis may be required by government to enable greater use of non-
governmental forms of environmental governance (Section 7.7). 
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8.4 Critical review 
While critically reviewing this thesis a number of themes arose, which are 
discussed below. 
Firstly, the new data in this thesis have focused on two groups of stakeholders 
in regulatory reform: policy makers (Chapter 6) and industry (Chapters 4 and 6). 
Other groups whose perspectives are likely to be of particular relevance to this 
research include governmental and non-governmental regulatory bodies, and 
representatives of civil society, such as environmental non-governmental 
organisations and consumer groups. While in principle policy makers should 
understand and take into account these perspectives when designing policy, 
and have reflected these perspectives in their accounts of instrument selection 
in this thesis, it is likely that new insight would be gained from gathering data 
from these groups directly. This was not possible within the time available for 
this research. 
Secondly, while the researcher sought where appropriate to challenge opinions 
expressed by interviews by respondents to test their validity, and other sources 
of evidence have been used to triangulate findings where possible, the new 
research presented here represents the views expressed by respondents. 
Researchers have found that parties affected by regulation may pursue 
strategic behaviour to influence its formulation (Bailey et al., 2002), and such 
strategic behaviour may be reflected in responses provided by business and 
trade association interviewees. Similarly, responses provided by Defra 
respondents may provide an incomplete view of reality. These limitations are 
reflected in the claims made for the validity of this research; however, with 
greater access to relevant data more triangulation may have been possible, for 
example to compare claimed performance of instruments with other 
evaluations. 
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8.5 Suggestions for further research 
Further research in the following areas is suggested: 
 Further research to develop and use methods for analysing mixes of 
policy and regulatory interventions is required, to develop tools to support 
policy makers, regulators and other stakeholders in regulatory reform 
efforts. This would include examination of the utility of service design 
techniques (Heapy & Parker, 2006) to support the redesign of the 
interface between the regulated and regulators. It would also include 
examination of the reasons for any gap between the theoretical literature 
on policy appraisal and the work of practitioners, and recommend how 
any gaps identified could be bridged. 
 The case study of instrument selection in practice provided at Chapter 6 
provides a valuable insight into the work of Defra. Other important UK 
organisations for this research for which further case study research 
would be relevant include the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC), the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG), and the Environment Agency. Of these, the case of instrument 
selection at the Environment Agency would perhaps be of greatest 
complementary value, providing a contrasting insight into instrument 
selection at the industry sector or individual business level. Similarly, the 
perspectives of environmental NGOs and consumer groups would also 
likely add valuable new dimensions to the work presented here. 
 Further research examining the effectiveness of front-line environmental 
regulatory officers is required, for both those within government agencies 
and those employed in assurance roles in non-governmental regulatory 
institutions, building on the limited body of work of authors such as Pautz 
and Sparrow (e.g. Pautz & Wamsley, 2012; Sevä & Jagers, 2013; May & 
Winter, 1999; Sparrow, 2008). 
 In general, further research is required that examines the chain of cause 
and effect between regulatory interventions and environmental 
outcomes, to improve the evidence base for comparing the effectiveness 
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and efficiency of different instrument types. A case study/multiple-case 
study approach (Yin, 2009) providing ex-post evaluations of nationally 
significant instruments would be particularly valuable to inform regulatory 
reform, as would systematic reviews to synthesise as far as possible 
evidence from multiple cases. 
8.6 Recommendations to government and industry 
As described in more detail in Section 7.8, the following recommendations are 
made to government and industry: 
 Use and further development of typology: The typology of instruments 
presented in Table 7-1 provides a firm basis to inform policy makers and 
regulators considering options for new regulation or the reform of existing 
regulation. It should be developed further as new instruments are 
developed, and used as a structure for categorising evidence for 
instrument effectiveness and efficiency. 
 Adopting alternatives to direct regulation: The evidence gathered 
through this research indicates that alternative instruments other than 
direct regulation have a place in achieving environmental policy 
objectives, but their suitability depends on context. Individual instruments 
need to be understood as part of a mix, which is likely to include a base 
of direct regulation to provide a “level playing field” and minimum 
standards, upon which other instruments are built. Close attention must 
be paid to capability of government and regulatory actors as a deciding 
factor in the choice of instruments pursued. 
 Generation and use of evidence: This research has found that while 
improving, the evidence base for regulatory effectiveness is fragmented, 
may be contested and is often lacking; more ex-post evaluations of 
regulatory effectiveness and efficiency are required. Better evidence may 
also increase willingness of businesses to comply with regulation, in turn 
increasing its effectiveness. 
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 Addressing multiple dimensions of regulatory reform: Regulatory 
reform programmes need to address a range of factors affecting the 
effectiveness and efficiency of regulatory frameworks in practice, 
including their coherence, flexibility and the efficiency of their 
implemented administrative processes, the extent to which they truly 
reflect the principles of risk-based regulation, and the resources and 
capabilities of government or non-government regulatory officers and 
governance organisations. 
 Analysing instrument mixes for industry sectors: Regulatory reform 
proposals are likely to need to be analysed on an industry-sector by 
industry-sector basis to maximise regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, 
though this presents significant analytical challenges. Policy makers are 
likely to require supportive organisational arrangements to enable cross-
departmental coordination and resolution of political tradeoffs to make 
more integrated regulatory design possible. 
 Involving the business community: Greater, earlier, but transparent 
involvement of businesses in regulatory design, as recommended by 
recent UK government guidance, could particularly help policy makers 
and regulators to identify areas of incoherence and to improve the 
administrative efficiency of implemented regulation, and provide greater 
insight into the important role played by front-line regulatory officers.    
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Appendix A : Interview briefing notes 
A.1 Interview briefing note for Defra interviews 
Environmental policy instrument selection – what works when and why? 
Briefing for Defra policy maker interviews, September – October 2011 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to contribute to this research.  
Working within the Better Regulation Team and with [...] and their teams, I have 
been developing a guidance document about instrument selection, exploring 
which policy instruments work when, and why this is the case. This includes a 
typology of different policy instruments available to policy makers, which I would 
like to check with you to make sure the structure makes sense and is 
representative of the options that you think can be used, and to explore what 
determines when different instruments are appropriate. The typology is included 
at the end of this briefing note in Table 1*, and I would be grateful if you could 
review it prior to our meeting. 
I am also compiling a list of example policy instruments that have been effective 
in the UK, to provide evidence to show how instruments work in practice. I 
would therefore like to discuss with you the best examples to include from your 
perspective, from which Defra colleagues can learn for future policy design and 
regulatory reform. 
We are planning to issue a first version of the instrument selection guidance 
document in October. Following this I will research and develop a supporting 
database of example instruments, and update the guidance in 2012 and 2013. 
This research forms part of my PhD research programme at [...], and is 
sponsored by Defra. This will include publishing a written thesis and papers for 
academic journals. I would like to record our conversation so that I can focus on 
the interview as we speak, and then return to the recording for future reference 
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and analysis.  
I will keep the recording confidential to me and my supervisors at [...], and I will 
anonymise information you provide in any written material I publish. I will 
provide you with the opportunity to review the use of data you have provided 
before I publish, and you can withdraw your data at any time prior to publication. 
I will only use direct quotes from you with your express permission.  
If you are not happy to be recorded, please let me know at the start of the 
discussion and I will take written notes instead.  Your participation in the 
research is entirely voluntary, so if you would like to withdraw please just let me 
know. 
Your input will be invaluable to help develop a robust and evidence-based view 
of what policy instruments work when and why, helping to inform future 
policymaking across Defra and beyond. 
Questions for discussion 
Q1) Before we meet I will review the main areas of policy that I understand fall 
within your responsibility, and will begin the discussion by checking this 
understanding with you. 
Q2) The typology of instruments in Table 1 provides a broad categorisation of 
types of policy option that policy makers can choose from. Do you think this 
typology is comprehensive? Can you identify any significant gaps? 
Q3) I wish to compile a set of examples of policy instruments from UK 
environmental policy that have worked in practice, to use as data to compare 
with theories of what works when and why. Which policy instruments are you 
aware of that have worked well? Why has this been the case, and how has their 
effectiveness been demonstrated? 
Q4) Which policy instruments are you aware of that have worked less well? 
Why do you think this has been the case? 
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Q5)  Do you think policy in your area could be improved? Is there scope to 
make more use of approaches other than direct regulation? 
 
Q6) Thinking about the typology of instruments and the examples you have 
identified, which factors do you think determine whether or not a policy 
instrument will be effective for a given policy context? 
* The briefing note included a copy of Table 2-1. 
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A.2 Interview briefing note for business and trade association 
interviews 
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Appendix B : Regulatory instruments for multiple-case study industries 
The following tables provide summaries of key regulatory instruments for each of the case study sectors examined in Chapter 
6, prepared in advance of research interviews to provide contextual knowledge. 
B.1 Construction and construction products regulatory instruments 
 
Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Direct 
regulation 
Environmental permitting regulations 2010 (EA or LA) - implement EU IPPC Directive 2008, which in turn will be absorbed into the Industrial 
Emissions Directive 2010 (along with Waste Incineration Directive (including sewage), large combustion plants, VOCs and titanium dioxide industry). 
Planning permission, which may include species surveys, EIA etc. 
Water Act 2003 - Water abstraction licence/exemptions e.g. for dewatering - with Water Industry Act 1991 - requirement for water resources 
management plan from water companies, and drought plans. 
Waste duty of care requirements. 
Environmental Permitting Regulations - Discharge to water (note requirement to contact sewerage undertaker to discharge to sewer). 
Building Regulations 2000 esp. Parts D (Toxic Substances); G (Sanitation, Hot Water Safety and Water Efficiency); H (Drainage and waste disposal); 
L (Conservation of fuel and power). 
Construction Products Regulations. 
Construction Design and Management Regulations. 
Environmental Impact Assessment - under Town and Country Planning Regulations - including need for wildlife surveys. 
Sustainable Drainage System (SuDS)/ National Standard for Sustainable Drainage/ Flood and Water Mgmt Act 2010. 
Contaminated Land regulations (Part 2A of Env Protection Act 1990). 
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Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Flood defence consent from EA (main rivers)/local river authority. 
Hazardous waste regulations. 
Nuisance monitoring. 
Site Waste Management Plans. 
Tree preservation orders. 
Wildlife protection – licensing. 
Economic 
instruments 
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme. 
Landfill Tax. 
Renewables Obligation/ Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs). 
Government procurement standards. 
Other incentives for sustainable buildings -  Warm Front ,  Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) ,  Community Energy Saving Programme 
(CESP), Feed-in Tariff, Renewable Heat Incentive , The Green Deal. 
Information 
based 
instruments 
Energy Performance Certificates. 
PEFC - sustainable forestry standard. 
FSC - sustainable forestry standard. 
Co- and self-
regulation 
Contaminated Land: Applications in Real Environments (CL:AIRE) - Definition of Waste Code Of Practice (DoWCoP). 
Code For Sustainable Homes. 
Considerate Constructors Scheme. 
Halving Waste to Landfill Commitment. 
ISO14001. 
BREEAM. 
CEN350 - EU standard on construction product sustainability. 
BES6001 and BS8902 - building product sustainability standards. 
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Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Support and 
capacity 
building 
Waste and Resources Action Programme (WRAP). 
Zero Carbon Hub - towards Zero Carbon Homes by 2016; zero carbon requirement is under consultation to be built into the building regulations part L 
http://www.building.co.uk/sustainability/sustainability-news/government-commits-to-zero-carbon-homes-by-2016/5052153.article. 
Contaminated Land: Applications in Real Environments (CL:AIRE). 
B.2 Food and agriculture regulatory instruments 
 
Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Agriculture Food and drink manufacturing Food and drink retail 
Direct 
regulation 
Control of Pesticides/Plant Protection Products 
Regs – pesticide use. 
Nitrate Pollution Prevention Regulations – 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones. 
Environmental Permitting Regulations/ Sludge 
Use in Agriculture/ Hazardous Waste/ 
Environmental Protection (Duty of Care) – 
waste/agricultural waste. 
Environmental permitting for intensive farms – 
including emissions and waste. 
Water Resources Act/Regulations – water 
abstraction. 
Water Resources (Control of Pollution)(Silage, 
Environmental Permitting Regulations/ IPPC – 
permitting of higher risk sites e.g. large dairy 
manufacturing – including waste disposal e.g. 
spreading waste on land. 
Water Resources Act/Trade Effluent Regulations – 
discharge consents. 
Water Industry Act/Water Resources Regulations – 
water abstraction. 
Waste Regulations (duty of care), Hazardous Waste 
regulations. 
Packaging Regulations/Producer Responsibility 
Regulations – including compliance schemes. 
Ozone Depleting Substances/ Fluorinated 
Waste regulations. 
Packaging Regulations/Producer 
Responsibility Regulations – including 
compliance schemes. 
Environmental Permitting. 
Planning system – planning permission. 
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Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Agriculture Food and drink manufacturing Food and drink retail 
Slurry and Agri Fuel Oil) Regulations 2010 
(SSAFO). 
Habitats and species conservation and species 
licensing and protection e.g. Wildlife and 
Countryside Act, Conservation of Habitats and 
species, Badgers Act, Hedgerows regs, Town 
and Country Planning Act. 
Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment 
Scheme cross compliance requirements – 
Statutory Management Requirements (SMRs), 
Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition 
(GAEC) requirements, requirements for 
permanent pasture – these capture the 
requirements of the law listed elsewhere. 
Food and animal disease controls/ Animal 
movements controls. 
Animal health and welfare requirements. 
Greenhouse Gas Regulations – refrigeration. 
Planning system – planning permission. 
Economic 
instruments 
Environmental Stewardship scheme – Entry 
Level and Higher Levels. 
Water abstraction rights trading. 
Carbon reduction commitment Energy Efficiency 
Scheme/Climate Change Levy Regulations – food 
and drink scheme. 
Water abstraction rights trading. 
 
Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy 
Efficiency Scheme. 
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Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Agriculture Food and drink manufacturing Food and drink retail 
Information 
based 
instruments 
Assured Food Standards (Red Tractor). 
Linking Environment and Farming (LEAF). 
Soil Association Organic Standard. 
Freedom Food (RSPCA monitored). 
Supermarket own-brand assurance schemes. 
Co-regulation 
and self-
regulation 
Campaign for Farmed Environment 
Voluntary Initiative (on pesticide use). 
ISO14001 (marginally relevant). 
Courtauld Commitment (packaging waste in 
food producers and retailers). 
Federation House Commitment (water use 
reduction in food and drink). 
Climate Change Agreement – food and drink, 
pigs and poultry schemes. 
Carbon Disclosure Project. 
ISO14001. 
Courtauld Commitment. 
Carrier bag voluntary phase out. 
Carbon Disclosure Project. 
ISO14001. 
Own unilateral commitments – e.g. Marks and 
Spencer Plan A. 
Support 
mechanisms 
and capacity 
building 
WRAP – agriculture. 
Farming Advice Service. 
WRAP – agriculture/ retail. WRAP – retail. 
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B.3 Personal care products regulatory instruments 
 
Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Direct 
regulation 
Environmental permitting regulations 2010 (EA or local authority) - implement EU IPPC Directive 2008, which in turn will be absorbed into the Industrial 
Emissions Directive 2010 (along with Waste Incineration Directive (including sewage), large combustion plants, VOCs and titanium dioxide industry). 
Planning permission, which may include species surveys, EIA etc. 
Water Act 2003 - Water abstraction licence/exemptions e.g. for dewatering - with Water Industry Act 1991 - requirement for water resources 
management plan from water companies, and drought plans. 
Waste duty of care requirements (tracking where waste goes). 
EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (as amended) and the REACH 
Enforcement Regulations 2008. 
Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011 (as amended). 
Packaging (Essential Requirements) Regulations 2003 (as amended). 
Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 (as amended). 
Water Resources (Abstraction and Impounding) Regulations 2006 (as amended). 
Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999 (as amended). 
Biocidal Products Regulations 2001 (as amended). 
Cosmetics Directive (76/768/EEC) (implemented in the UK through the Cosmetic Products (Safety) Regulations 2008 (as amended)), [primary purpose 
of which is to protect human safety] - being replaced by Regulation (EC) No. 1223/2009 in July 2013. 
Aerosol Dispensers Directive 75/324/EEC - amended 94/1/EC and 2008/47/EC EU Aerosol Directive. 
Economic 
instruments 
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme. 
EU ETS + Climate Change Agreements (voluntary agreements). 
EC Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste/ Packaging Waste Recovery Notes (UK). 
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Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Information 
based 
instruments 
On-pack recycling labelling scheme. 
Soil Association Certification. 
European Eco-label - including for Soaps and Shampoos. 
EU Organic Leaf label. 
Co- and self-
regulation 
International Fragrance Association (IFRA)/ Research Institute for Fragrance Materials (RIFM). 
Responsible Care Initiative - Chemicals Industries Association. 
Support and 
capacity 
building 
WRAP – packaging. 
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B.4 Waste management regulatory instruments 
 
Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Direct 
regulation 
Duty of care – waste transfer notes. 
Hazardous waste – tracking cradle to grave. 
Waste electrical and electronic equipment – extended producer responsibility. 
Packaging waste producer responsibility – compliance schemes. 
Batteries and accumulators responsibilities. 
Restriction of hazardous substances – to make them easier to recycle. 
Environmental Permitting – permitting of waste sites. 
Planning system – planning permission. 
Designated conservation areas & species licensing. 
Contaminated land regulations. 
Economic 
instruments 
Landfill Tax. 
Packaging Recovery Notes – part of packaging waste producer responsibility. 
Renewables Obligation/Certificates (ROCs). 
Landfill allowance trading scheme (ending 2013). 
Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme. 
Rewards & incentives pilots for recycling e.g. Nectar points at Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead. 
PFI for waste infrastructure development, Green Investment Bank. 
Information 
based 
Love Food Hate Waste & Recycle More campaigns. 
On-Pack recycling labelling scheme. 
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Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
instruments EA naming and shaming. 
Co-regulation 
and self-
regulation 
Courtauld Commitment (retail packaging waste). 
Halving Waste to landfill Commitment (construction waste). 
ISO14001 and other environmental management system standards. 
Support 
mechanisms 
and capacity 
building 
WRAP – waste management. 
 
  
257 
 
B.5 Water collection, treatment, supply and management regulatory instruments 
 
Instrument 
type 
Instrument name 
Direct 
regulation 
Environmental Permitting Regulations - Discharge to water (note requirement to contact sewerage undertaker to discharge to sewer). 
Environmental permitting regulations 2010 (EA or LA) - implement EU IPPC Directive 2008, which in turn will be absorbed into the Industrial 
Emissions Directive 2010 (along with Waste Incineration Directive (including sewage), large combustion plants, VOCs and titanium dioxide industry). 
Planning permission, which may include species surveys, EIA etc. 
Water Act 2003 - Water abstraction licence/exemptions e.g. for dewatering - with Water Industry Act 1991 - requirement for water resources 
management plan from water companies, and drought plans. 
EU Drinking Water Directive 1998/ Water Supply (Water Quality) Regs 2000. 
EU Water Framework Directive 2000 -> Water Industry Act 1991/Water Resources Act 1991. Water Framework Directive absorbs Freshwater Fish 
Directive, Shellfish Water Directive and Dangerous Substances Directive by December 2013. 
EU Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive 1991 -> Urban Wastewater Treatment Regulations 1994 as amended 
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (including protected species + SSSIs). 
Sewerage Sludge Directive 1986 -> Sludge (Use in Agriculture) Regs 1989. 
Flood and water management act 2010 , including Nation\al Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy run by EA. 
Economic 
instruments 
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme. 
Co- and self-
regulation 
Federation House Commitment – food and drink sector water efficiency. 
Support and 
capacity 
building 
Waste and Resources Action Programme (WRAP) – business water efficiency. 
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Appendix C : Qualitative analysis overview 
This appendix provides a top-level summary of the coding used to analyse interview transcripts to produce the analysis 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and an example transcript from a research interview. A confidential appendix is available for 
thesis examiners containing data in the form of interview transcripts and framework matrices. However this information has not 
been made publically available to protect the anonymity of respondents. 
C.1 : Defra case study thematic analysis 
 
Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW1.01: Comments on typology Section 5.6 Comments on typology table 
FW1.02: Use of economics terminology Section 5.7.1 concepts - externalities - selected from text search  
concepts - information failure - selected from text search 
concepts - market failure - selected from text search 
concepts - polluter pays - selected from text search 
concepts - property rights - selected from text search 
concepts - public goods - selected from text search 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW1.03: Character of environmental 
harms 
Section 5.7.2 concepts - character of harms - impact and likelihood of risk 
concepts - character of harms - number and variety of actors and mitigation actions 
concepts - character of harms - persistence and irreversibility 
concepts - character of harms - spatial characteristics 
concepts - character of harms - speed of action required 
concepts - character of harms - understanding of risk 
concepts - character of harms - who is affected by risk 
FW1.04: Industry motivation and 
attitude towards compliance 
Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Industry - corporate social responsibility  
Industry - degree of acceptance and buy-in  
Industry - deliberate non-compliance   
Industry - financial and economic drivers  
Industry - other motivations  
Industry - realities of decision making  
FW1.05: Industry capability Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Industry - ability to understand regulations  
Industry - good management practice  
Industry - managing risks  
Industry to Regulators - providing information 
Regulators and Policy Makers on Industry - educating 
FW1.06: Individual motivations 
capability and attitudes to compliance 
Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
concepts - nudge and behavioural interventions  
Public - degree of acceptance and buy-in  
Public - motivation  
Regulators and Policy Makers on Public - explaining risks and educating 
Regulators and Public - engaging and enforcing 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW1.07: Regulator capability Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Policy Makers on Regulators - delegation of responsibilities  
Regulators - capacity and capability in implementing policy  
Regulators on Industry - powers to control behaviour  
Regulators on Industry or Public - credibility in providing advice and leading change 
FW1.08: Strength of regulatory threats Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Regulators on Industry - ease of enforcement  
Regulators on Industry - threat of harder regulatory framework  
Regulators on Industry - threat of regulatory enforcement action or punishment 
FW1.09: Strength of investor or insurer 
influence 
Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Investors on Industry - pursuing opportunities and managing risks  
Insurers on Industry and Public - providing insurance for environmental risks 
FW1.10: Strength of NGO scrutiny Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Media on Industry and Government - amplify pressure to improve environmental performance
  
NGOs on Industry - pressure to improve environmental performance  
NGOs on Politicians and Policy Makers - influencing policy 
FW1.11: Strength of public buying 
power and other influences 
Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Industry on Public - encouraging compliance 
Public on Industry - changing buying patterns  
Public on Industry - monitoring performance  
Public on Industry - taking legal action  
Public on Industry - trust in environmental claims 
FW1.12: Supply chain influence Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Government on Industry - purchasing conditions  
Industry on Industry - supply chain influence  
Policy Maker on Industry - influencing operation of supply chains  
Regulators on Industry - controlling marketability and performance standards  
Regulators on Industry - naming and shaming 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW1.13: Strength of political influence Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Politicians on Industry - expressing desire for industry change 
FW1.14: Industry capacity to self-
regulate 
Section 5.8 
Table 5-4 
Industry with Industry - self-regulating 
FW1.15: Coherence of mix of 
instruments 
Section 5.9.1 Mix of instruments - instruments complement each other  
Mix of instruments - instruments enable each other  
Mix of instruments - instruments interfere with each other  
Mix of instruments - instruments preclude others  
Policy Makers with Policy Makers - coordinating policy design  
Regulators with Regulators on Industry - coordinating effort 
FW1.16: Flexibility of instruments Section 5.9.2 Court on Regulation - clarify meaning through case law  
Policy Makers on Regulation - flexibility to change design over time  
Regulations on Industry - flexibility to environmental variation  
Regulations on Industry - flexibility to industry characteristics  
Regulators on Industry - less regulation if risk reduced by other factors 
FW1.17: Costs Section 5.10 
Table 5-5 
concepts - costs 
concepts - burdens 
concepts - benefits  
concepts - risk - from text search 
FW1.18: Fairness Section 5.10 
Table 5-5 
concepts - fairness - level playing field  
concepts - fairness - other contexts 
FW1.19: Impact on innovation Section 5.10 
Table 5-5 
concepts - innovation - enabled by regulation  
concepts - innovation - other contexts 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW1.20: Political preferences Section 5.10 
Table 5-5 
Policy Makers - preferences for types of regulation  
Policy Makers on Politicians - credibility in providing guidance  
Politicians on Policy Makers - expressing preferences in regulatory design 
Politicians on Policy Makers - preference for non-regulatory approach 
FW1.21: EU or WTO compliance Section 5.10 
Table 5-5 
EU on Policy Makers - allows flexibility in form of regulation  
EU on Policy Makers - enforcing implementation of rules  
EU on Regulation - determines form of regulation  
EU on Regulation - influences effectiveness  
Industry and NGOs on EU - influences policy debate  
Policy Makers on EU - influencing policy  
WTO on Regulation - influences allowable approaches 
FW1.22: Ethical preferences Section 5.10 
Table 5-5 
concepts - ethics 
FW1.23: Industry and public 
preferences 
Section 5.10 
Table 5-5 
Industry with Politicians, Policy Makers and Regulators - expressing preferences 
Public with Politicians, Policy Makers and Regulators - expressing preferences 
FW1.24: Availability of evidence Section 5.11 
 
Policy Makers - anticipating and evaluating impact of interventions  
Policy Makers with stakeholders - disputing evidence  
Strategies for lack of evidence - coregulation  
Strategies for lack of evidence - gradual policy development  
Strategies for lack of evidence - precautionary approach 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW1.25: Capability of policy makers Section 5.12 Policy Makers - capability - new skills required  
Policy Makers - capability - regulatory reform process  
Policy Makers - capability - thinking broadly  
Policy Makers - capability - understanding the regulated system  
Policy Makers - capability - unintended consequences  
Policy Makers - capability - value of experience 
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C.2 Business and industry body thematic analysis 
 
Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW2.01: Comments on typology Section 6.5.1 Typology views – looks comprehensive 
Typology views – no comment 
Typology views – other comments on typology 
Typology views – suggested additions 
FW2.02: Coherent regulatory 
frameworks 
Section 6.5.2.1 Gov regulators - Able to reconcile local conflicting objectives 
Gov regulators - Reconcile multiple environmental objectives 
Policy makers - Reconcile multiple objectives 
Instruments - Cater for big and small businesses 
Instruments - Cater for leaders and laggards 
Instruments - Coherent across whole environment 
Instruments - Coherent with each other 
Instruments - Enable each other in a mix 
Instruments - Target appropriate products or processes 
Instruments - Work in a mix along supply chain 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW2.03: Clarity, prescription and 
flexibility 
Section 6.5.2.2 Instruments - Appropriately detailed 
Instruments - Avoid unnecessary complexity 
Instruments - Clarity of definitions 
Instruments - Clear on whether mandatory of voluntary in requirements 
Instruments - Flexible and nimble 
Instruments - Focus on outcomes 
Instruments - Measurable 
Instruments - Tailored to local env conditions 
Instruments - Transparent 
Instruments - Understandable and clear on what to do 
Instruments - Well publicised 
FW2.04: Positive regulatory 
relationships 
Section 6.5.2.3 Gov regulators - Consistent in decisions 
Gov regulators - Coordinated within and between regulatory bodies 
Gov regulators - Easy to contact 
Gov regulators - Gain buy-in from regulatees 
Gov regulators - Have necessary skills 
Gov regulators - Interpret legislation correctly 
Gov regulators - Keep up with industry innovation 
Gov regulators - Provide information about regulatory compliance 
Gov regulators - Transparent in decision making 
Gov regulators - Understand industry characteristics 
Instruments - Act as honest broker 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW2.05: Administrative efficiency Section 6.5.2.4 Instrument improvements - detailed procedural 
Instruments - Enabled by information technology 
Instruments - Not bureaucratic or costly 
FW2.06: Risk based regulation Section 6.5.2.5 Gov regulators - Make risk informed decisions 
Gov regulators - Target resources according to risk 
Instruments - Targeted and proportionate to environmental risk or impact 
FW2.07: Evidence based policy Section 6.5.2.6 Instruments - Based on scientific evidence 
Instruments - Credible with regulated 
Policy makers - Capable of making risk-based decisions 
Policy makers - Understand science 
FW2.08: Long term stability Section 6.5.2.7 Long term stability 
FW2.09: Involving the business 
community 
Section 6.5.4 Policy makers – Negotiate regulatory design with industry 
Policy makers – Conduct balanced consultations 
Policy makers - Engage industry effectively in policy and regulatory design 
Policy makers - Understand how policy is implemented 
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Theme/ framework matrix name Thesis cross-
reference 
Codes included within theme 
FW2.10: Role of trade associations Section 6.5.5 Other industry bodies - Capability to participate in technical discussions 
Other industry bodies - Influence beliefs of public and media 
Other industry bodies - Influence policy development 
Other industry bodies - Provide regulatory advice to members 
Trade associations - Capability to participate in technical discussions 
Trade associations - Coordinate international activity 
Trade associations - Coordinate sector activity 
Trade associations - Design regulation and supporting guidance 
Trade associations - Enable performance benchmarking 
Trade associations - Enforce compliance with standards for members 
Trade associations - Influence beliefs of public and media 
Trade associations - Influence policy development 
Trade associations - Provide regulatory advice to members 
Trade associations - Provide stronger voice for sector 
Trade associations - Represent views of various industry subsectors 
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C.3   Example interview transcript 
The following text is a verbatim transcript of a research interview with a director 
of a large waste management business, provided here to illustrate the structure 
and content of a typical interview. 
START AUDIO 
Interviewer: So as that explains, doing a PhD sponsored by DEFRA.  
The question is really, when is it appropriate to use different 
types of regulation for different markets?  So, as illustrated 
in the back here, you have this range of different ways of 
doing things, from your direct permitting, licensing type 
based approaches, through some of the economic 
approaches based around taxes and subsidies and so on. 
Then things like labelling and methods that are intended to 
raise different people within the supply chain’s 
understanding of environmental impact, I suppose.  Then 
various either government negotiating... 
 
Respondent: Appealing to people’s better... 
 
Interviewer: Appealing to people’s better, exactly. 
 
Respondent: ...When all else fails... 
 
Interviewer: Self regulation is also within the list.  Then finally 
approaches that are based around trying to increase the 
capacity of the regulated I suppose.  Really the question is 
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we’re trying to understand when are those different 
approaches likely to be appropriate? 
So the way that I’m approaching this at the moment is, I’m 
looking at a number of different case study industries.  I’ve 
arranged it so that I’m looking at food and agriculture; 
personal care products, so soaps and things like that; 
construction, and then a sort of cross-cutting water and 
waste.  So obviously I’ve got some questions it would be 
great to work through them.  I hope you don’t mind if I tap a 
way a little bit as we talk. 
 
Respondent: No help yourself. 
 
Interviewer: But it would be very helpful if you could start off by just 
giving me a very brief summary of...  I mean I’ve looked at 
what [W003 organisation] is.  I’ve got your report in my bag.  
It would be really helpful to understand how you’ve arrived 
at the position that you’re in. 
 
Respondent: What me personally?  
 
Interviewer: Yes.  
 
Respondent: Oh, okay.  Goodness gracious.  I’ve been in [W003 
organisation] for 11 years this summer and for the past 
eight of those eleven as the Managing Director.  [content 
redacted to protect anonymity] 
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Oh gosh.  I’ve been in the waste industry forever.  Initially in 
vehicle operations, moving across then into the commercial 
world of selling and then back into general management in 
the early ‘90s.  So I’m one of these dinosaurs that can 
remember when there was virtually no regulation.  We were 
all worried about the introduction of regulation in 1974. I 
can remember back that far. 
 So we’ve seen a fair bit of regulation one way and another.  
Interested in how environmental regulation has progressed 
significantly in certain areas and less so in other areas.  
We’re in an interesting period for regulation against a 
backcloth of some requirement to deregulate, the Red Tape 
challenges that are being brought up. 
But what we’re seeing in our sector is the emergence of 
different interpretations of environment regulation, or 
application of environmental regulation in Wales, in 
England and in Scotland.   
Again it’s a very interesting period of time with the 
emergence of banning.  With the emergence of much more 
centralised direction around collection methodology.  To the 
absence of clarity around ongoing fiscal measures i.e. 
Landfill Taxes effectively hitting a ceiling in the not too 
distant future. 
 
Interviewer: I saw that you also previously were [senior role in trade 
association]  
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Respondent: Last year, yes I was [senior role in trade association].  
[content redacted to protect anonymity].  So again 
interesting to observe some of the ways in which DEFRA 
go about managing the love/hate relationship with the 
waste sector.  How it looks after the Environment Agency in 
terms of its role as a regulator for the sector. 
Again it’s been interesting to observe the challenges that 
the department has had to face up to, in the sense of 
democratic and local accountability, versus European 
direction and directive.  Balancing that against industry 
interest and the development of the industry, in it moving 
away from tried/tested collect and dispose methodologies, 
essentially centred around landfill.  Again in the last five to 
eight years that’s really picked up a pace. 
 
Interviewer: You’ve touched on a load of very interesting things there 
before we’ve even started, which is fantastic.  This is 
possibly slightly irrelevant but if I was just to try to run, off 
the top of my head, the main regulatory instruments that I 
think that you’re subject to. 
So I think you’ve got the Environmental Permitting regime, 
plus also the planning system as being sort of main chunks 
of direct regulation.  I guess there are also pieces related to 
that around hazardous waste and water pollution 
potentially. 
I think you then get into on the fiscal things you’ve got 
Landfill Tax, as you’ve already mentioned, plus also 
Renewable Obligations.  Some would argue that packaging 
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recycling note type stuff fits into that world as being a sort 
of trading system. 
On the information side, perhaps less than in other 
industries, but I suppose there’s a lot of stuff directed 
towards the public to try and get them to change behaviour.  
Also things like on packaging, recycling labels to say, 
“Yes.” Or “No.” you can’t recycle particular materials, into 
the co-regulation, self-regulation.  I’m aware of the various 
things that WRAP get up to around stuff like Courtauld 
Commitment, zero waste to landfill and those sorts of 
things. 
Also the more self-regulatory stuff around environmental 
management systems, ISO 14001, and that kind of thing.  
Already mentioned WRAP as kind of a way of trying to build 
capacity.  Are there other big chunks that I’ve missed out of 
that list? 
 
Respondent: For me the only other big chunk and it may be embedded in 
what you were saying a little earlier.  But for me, particularly 
in the last years with [W003 organisation], the rules, the 
regulations around public procurement, I think, have been a 
significant barrier to progress.  Rather than the ambition 
that they had, which would be a significant beneficiary to 
the development of new and alternative infrastructure. 
 
Interviewer: I’d like to come back to that.  First of all though, that list that 
I obviously haven’t given you a very great deal of time to 
look at it.  But does that seem like a reasonably 
comprehensive...? 
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Respondent: It is comprehensive.  I think there’s no obvious error of 
omission there, in terms of the list that you’ve put forward.  
This is a more subjective rather than objective one.  That is 
I don’t think that any administration really genuinely 
understands the impact that it has on the ability of these, 
very well meaning, instruments to be successful or fail by 
not being consistent. 
You’re talking to an industry that actually, pretty much 
without exception, welcomes regulation in all of its forms.  
But is constantly disappointed by the regulation 
inadvertently either conspiring to delay, planning is a good 
example or procurement is another good example.  Or not 
actually delivering what is required on the ground because 
the regulation gets, shall we say, compromised by example 
by localism agenda which is much spoken about.  But 
nobody really understands what it means. 
I think from an industry player perspective localism means 
serving the local community.  I think from a local 
community’s perspective it’s a means of saying “No.”  So 
you end up with polarised views on the same subject which 
is interesting 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  More interesting comments, determined to stick to the 
time.  So can you think of examples of regulation that have 
worked well and that you’d point to as being good, 
ultimately effective in achieving the intended environmental 
objective? 
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Respondent: I think that it is clear that Landfill Taxation has had an effect 
in the sense that, over time, it has made a low cost disposal 
option higher cost, which has enabled competing and more 
environmentally and socially attractive solutions to come to 
pass.  So that’s one that’s worked.  I would argue that 
current and previous administrations could have used that 
instrument more aggressively.  It’s been in for a long time.  
It is only just now providing that kind of economic hurdle 
that enables alternative technologies to come through to 
market. 
However still we see a similar economic instrument which 
has been less successful, from the view of the waste 
management industry, and that’s the ROC and Renewables 
Regime.  That even today is largely unclear as to its long 
term future.  But in terms of economic consequences on 
some of the capital investments that are being considered, 
is an absolute key long term instrument. 
So again you come back to the broad statement I made a 
little earlier around governments not recognising, that 
without this consistency, they can actually undermine what 
is a very valuable instrument, in terms of shifting materials 
away from an old solution into something that’s newer and 
more preferable going forward. 
 
Interviewer: So when you say consistency, what sorts of facets of 
consistency...? 
 
Respondent: If we take ROC regime there is no certainty beyond the end 
of this decade, as it were, as to its ongoing monetary value.  
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The threat, and this is an implied threat, that it as a subsidy 
and support regime can be reviewed pretty much at any 
time, which leads to uncertainty, which leads to more 
challenging circumstances when you go to seek funding for 
these pieces of infrastructure.  So who’d have thought, in 
this country, that funders would have a conversation about 
political risk associated with these kind of economic support 
regimes. 
What I’m finding and what I’m observing is that you end up 
perhaps with competing and conflicting economic support.  
So at the front end of a process you have a PFI credit 
system.  Yet at the back end of a process you have this 
energy support system.  One is taking credit away from the 
other.  What do I mean by that?  Local authorities are being 
given economic value for the ROC or the renewable 
support income that’s got nothing to do with, if you like, the 
waste related support that PFI credits are supposed to 
provide.   
I think that this lack of a helicopter view over fiscal support, 
from central government, for environmental initiatives, 
actually result in us all, whether we’re tax payers, rate 
payers, electricity bill payers, we’re all overpaying. 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  When you say a helicopter view so is that...? 
 
Respondent: So I think the Treasury should be taking a view across all of 
these aspects.  That the support mechanism should not be 
driven by DECC, in the case of an energy support 
mechanism by way of example. 
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Interviewer: Okay.  So it’s the co-ordination between central 
government departments? 
 
Respondent: I think it’s co-ordination between central government 
departments.  Then I think it’s when one of them is looking 
at the subsequent procurement of assets for environmental 
improvement.  Whether they’re recycling facilities, energy 
plants, anaerobic digestion plants, is that the procurement 
should then look across the entire fiscal support structure 
and not team and lade.  I am actually one of a number of 
people who’d actually prefer to see that procurement done 
centrally, rather than locally. 
 
Interviewer: When you say locally, through local authorities? 
 
Respondent: Correct.  They’re generally not equipped to make these 
kinds of procurements decisions.  Local in this procurement 
context is probably not the most efficient way of doing it, 
either in time or cost terms. 
 
Interviewer: Yes, because you’re having to have multiple conversations 
with lots of different...? 
 
Respondent: Well you have multiple conversations with different 
authorities.  So if we take a recent procurement process, 
we’re procuring with an authority.  But that authority is 
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having then to also have its own negotiations with people in 
DEFRA and indeed people with the Treasury.  Then in 
parallel we are both having conversations with the people 
who fund these kinds of assets.  Then there are 
conversations with the public at large over the 
infrastructure.  So there are a huge amount of 
conversations going on. 
For what is a relatively, at least in concept, simple 
procurement i.e. “Today I’m disposing of my waste to 
landfill.  That’s not acceptable going forward.  I’d like to 
dispose of it through separate or alternative uses, that 
maximise recycling and subsequently maximise the 
diversion from landfill.” which as a concept could take 
anywhere between five and eight years to deliver.  That’s 
just the procurement.  Then you have to build it. 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  So would that procurement process include getting 
planning permission? 
 
Respondent: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: Okay. 
 
Respondent: Then the planning is really extremely difficult subject 
because I’m sure there are many companies, in many 
sectors that say, “We’re different and we’re special.  We 
should have, therefore, different planning arrangements in 
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place.”  But I do happen to think that we are different.  We 
are special. 
It was interesting in your introduction that you quite rightly 
put your sectors that you’re looking at in segments and 
silos and you’ve put us in with the water.  Well why not put 
us in with the energy sector.  My point being is that we are 
a fundamental utility.  In terms of if we fail, as an industry, 
to deliver what we’re obligated to do, either through 
contract or otherwise, we actually have an effect on the 
quality of life here, The Winter of Discontent, and all that 
good stuff. 
Therefore assets and infrastructure related to the reuse, 
recover, recycle of materials that have been discarded, 
waste management parlance, why shouldn’t those assets 
be treated in the same vein as electricity provision, water 
provision.  But it’s not done like that.  I think the industry 
suffers unnecessarily so and its clients therefore suffer 
unnecessarily so, from over politicisation of the collection of 
dustbins from people’s front or back gardens.  It sounded 
like a bit of a rant.  It wasn’t supposed to. 
 
Interviewer: No.  Do you have a sense of why we’ve ended up in the 
situation where there is that difference? 
 
Respondent: Again, it’s my supposition of course and that is that many 
things are centralised these days, education, health.  So 
many local authorities the one thing that remains, is their 
touchstone with the voting public, is the collection and 
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treatment of refuse.  It’s almost the last thing that they will 
guard jealously and not give up.   
Somebody was telling me that in Scotland they have I think 
it is 36 local authorities.  I don’t know whether that’s 30 too 
many or too few.  But they have 100 different collection 
methodologies in Scotland.  That is a clear reflection of 
seeking to introduce things that are of import to the local 
community, and/or the people who represent them. 
I’m not saying that is replicated throughout the rest of the 
United Kingdom.  But I can assure you that there are a 
myriad of different ways of collecting waste which in 
themselves, in isolation, look pretty good.  But it is, at the 
end of the day, collecting waste.  There should be a huge 
amount of common collection methodologies that would be 
efficient.  Would be low cost.  Would not be detrimental to 
the public at large, but would, as a consequence, provide 
efficiencies in the subsequent recycling, recovery and/or 
treatment of the materials collected, as an example. 
So for me I think the question of we’ve over localised our 
business, as it were, to the point where you have national 
or country regulation and legislation.  But you’re trying to 
apply it on a localised basis.  It doesn’t work particularly 
well. 
Well I’ll give you an example in where I live how difficult it is 
for a local planning committee, staffed by well meaning, 
publicly elected people, who are hearing planning 
applications for the construction of private dwellings.  Then 
they’re looking at a planning application for a half a million 
tonne energy from waste plant which attracts tremendous 
local angst.  How are they equipped, emotionally or indeed 
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from an understanding point of view to objectively opine on 
that? 
So what happens is, more often than not, they can’t make a 
decision that will satisfy the local community.  So they 
reject.  Then there’s an appeal which takes time and 
money.  That appeal if it is successful then probably gets 
further appealed.  In the meantime what’s happening to the 
material that it was supposed to recycle and recover and 
divert? 
The planning again is something that I think the waste 
management sector, for key pieces of infrastructure, should 
be taken out of the hands of the local community. 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  I think there are several PhDs just in that subject in 
itself. 
 
Respondent: I’m sure there are. 
 
Interviewer: So in terms of examples of things that have worked.  You 
started off by saying Landfill Tax had been effective.  
Renewables Obligation Credits would be effective if it 
wasn’t unclear about what the future was.  You talked 
about planning and centralisation, not centralisation.  Are 
there other examples that particularly stand out as being 
effective that spring to mind? 
 
Respondent: I really struggle. 
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Interviewer: So are there then other examples of things that are less 
good that you would particularly draw out? 
 
Respondent: Again I think, as with all of these things, there’s never a 
right perfect and there’s never a wrong and totally imperfect 
solution.  I think that the mistake that we all make, when 
you consider either command and control regulation or 
economic instruments, is the time they take to take effect.  
There are no quick wins in our particular sector.   
That is something that I think has caught the public.  It’s 
caught the political classes.  It’s caught the investors and 
operators, caught us all out when we assumed that with 
PFI credits, as an example, we can now procure in the 
certainty that it’s affordable. 
But planning is a challenge or permitting is a challenge.  Or 
the procurement process starts to skew into actually 
encouraging certain technology or techniques over others, 
which in themselves are very laudable.  But actually when 
you look to invest in infrastructure and assets, most people 
want to invest in infrastructure and assets that they know 
work.  Rather than things that are unproven, again adding 
to the timescale.  So I think that this is a more global 
statement as it were. 
We are talking about instruments.  We’re talking about 
initiatives that actually, in terms of impact, are almost 
generational.  It’s interesting your comment I was picking 
up on one thing about labelling.  As we’ve seen with recent 
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events and horses and beef, labelling is not in itself going 
to do anything much. 
This is a personal opinion, I often wonder and I’m guilty of it 
as much as anybody else, is we talk about the public, but 
actually all we’re doing is we’re representing the industry 
view.  Not the public’s view, the industry’s view.  Or the 
politicians are actually only representing the political 
perspective.  They’re not truly representing the public, 
because the reality of the public today, in my opinion, and 
specifically around waste.  The majority of the people want 
two things.  They want their waste collected regularly.  
Whether that’s weekly or fortnightly is a debate for those 
that read the Daily Mail. 
They really want somebody else, “The Council” to take care 
of it once it’s collected.  They don’t really want to get 
involved in the debate around “Do I have a blue bin, a black 
bin, a green bin, a six bin, a four bin, a fortnightly collection 
system.  Just get on and do it.” 
They don’t really want to get involved in the debate around 
technologies.  Is anaerobic digestion better than Open 
Windrow Composting?  Is that better than IVC?  “Or really 
should we burn it all?  They don’t really want to be involved 
in that debate. 
Where they do want to get involved is where it goes in 
terms of a physical location, because unlike many of our 
continental cousins, the UK mentality around house 
ownership, house value is a really sensitive issue.  An 
Englishman’s home is his equity release as it were.  
Therefore any development that impacts on or is perceived 
to impact on house value will get a “No.” 
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But I can assure you that once these assets are built and 
are operating, provided that the operators operate them 
properly and professionally, they just become a feature of 
the local landscape.  There are hundreds of installations 
that are in very close proximity to people’s houses, where 
they work, where they are educated.  Nobody even knows 
they’re there. 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  This is kind of two questions in one, but are there 
particular bugbears or particular areas that you think are 
ripe for improvement, within the current regulatory 
framework?  Within that is there scope to use different 
approaches to direct regulation or what do you think? 
 
Respondent: Again in terms of if you want pace, so if you want to get 
pace in terms of change then there are two things to be 
done for me.  That is prohibiting certain activities, so 
banning things from landfill with clearly defined timescales 
for implementation.  A well thought through fiscal regime 
around taxation that encourages materials out of pure 
disposal into recycling, into energy recovery, etc. 
I don’t think that the waste industry per se should be 
involved in or need to be engaged in the packaging end.  
Because there are other industries that should be engaged, 
should be similarly incentivised to reduce the amount of 
packaging, to increase the amount of, if you like, reuse or 
recyclability of that packaging post consumer.  Our industry 
will manage those consequences. 
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Interviewer: When you say develop a fiscal regime that encourages 
different use.  So where would that apply? 
 
Respondent: We should be actively encouraging more material out of 
landfill through taxation and banning. 
 
Interviewer: So more or higher Landfill Tax. 
 
Respondent: Yes.  We should be, in my view, encouraging the 
construction of energy generating infrastructure to take 
some of those materials.  I think there should be, whether 
it’s tax incentives or incentives around funding to 
encourage the UK growth of UK based recycling, because 
at the moment the majority of the materials that are 
collected and aggregated for recycling are exported.  We 
should have a fiscal policy that encourages self-help, as it 
were, in that context. 
 
Interviewer: So do you think...all of those things sound quite 
government driven.  Do you think there’s scope for the 
industry to do more self-regulation perhaps more on the 
pollution emission side of things? 
 
Respondent: I think when you are in danger of polluting the environment 
I don’t think that you should rely on self-regulation.  There 
is a significant amount of money in our industry.  It is 
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attractive to less scrupulous operators to...  So I’m not in 
favour of increased self-regulation. 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  Brilliant.  So final question, I’ve gone over.  I’m four 
minutes over. 
 
Respondent: You’re alright.  I haven’t dropped my gong yet. 
 
Interviewer: Okay.  I suppose this is more just reflecting back on the 
things that you’ve said.  So what do you think the main 
factors are that determine whether a particular instrument is 
effective or not? 
 
Respondent: I think looking back the UK would have, were it not for the 
imposition of the Landfill Directive, carried on quite 
comfortably collecting and land filling the majority of the 
waste that’s discarded by householders and industry. 
So to that end I think, that having been put in a position 
where that’s no longer acceptable, the UK can actually take 
a lead in this interest.  It’s a bit shooting oneself in the foot 
as it were, in the sense that our industry has always relied 
on volume.  “So more waste please, more rubbish please 
and I’ll make more money.”  But I think that the UK should 
be really, really focused on packaging, reducing it.  It 
should be focused on packaging, making sure it’s reusable.  
Then I think it should be then focusing on actively 
promoting the growth of UK based manufacturing whose 
input stock, feed stock is “waste.” 
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Then after that is energy recovery.  Example, we’re thinking 
in the next three to five years we’ll see some, probably not 
all, but some of our coal fired power stations close.  How 
much would it cost to put the appropriate environmental 
abatement equipment into those assets?  Then feed those 
assets with energy bearing waste.  I would suggest not a 
great deal. 
It might help in terms of our exposure to increasing fuel 
poverty and our exposure to increased cost of fuel, 
because we’re having to import more, etc, etc.  It’s not the 
answer but it will contribute to it.  But I’m really a great fan 
of stopping, in a proper way, the ongoing export of 
materials that are capable of being recycled into other 
products.  We should be doing that here and then exporting 
those goods because we’re pretty good at doing that. 
 
Interviewer: So that in terms of factors affecting effectiveness.  That 
sounds like a lot of that is about a whole, I keep putting 
words in your mouth which I’m not supposed to do.  It’s a 
whole system thing of saying it’s about building the 
infrastructure to let... 
 
Respondent: If you step back and you look at, this is maybe looking at it 
slightly differently, but we look at waste then we think about 
the impact on the environment, rightly so.  We think about 
waste collection methodologies.  We think about how we 
can get rid of it.  We try and influence behaviour through 
collection methodologies, through labelling, through PR 
campaigns etc. 
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There is something like; these are my number so big health 
warning, 45/50m tonnes of materials thrown away every 
year.  That’s ignoring mining wastes and slurries and 
sludges.  Of that material, I don’t know; let’s say half of it is 
capable of being reused.  So we’ve got now 25m tonnes of 
virgin material or raw material.  So look at it from a raw 
material basis and start saying, “What industry do I need to 
encourage to be in place to use that as a raw material? 
“What industry do I need to put in place so I get rid of it 
cheaply?”   
So should this be looked at stepping all the way back from 
a government perspective?  This is something that is 
around about the potential to start contributing to the 
rebuilding of the industrial manufacturing base.  That’s a 
raw product that you haven’t got to go and get out of the 
ground, or buy from some other foreign country.  It’s here.  I 
am getting on my soap box now. 
 
Interviewer: No, it’s good stuff. 
 
Respondent: What can’t be reused or recycled you can recover energy 
from.  I’ll throw that in the mix. 
 
Interviewer: Does that basically mean this would then be a growth world 
for the waste management industry? 
 
Respondent: It would be potentially again the industry needs to start 
thinking differently.  It’s potentially growth in the context of 
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value but at the expense of volume.  At the moment our 
value proposition is based around “Just send me more.”  
What I’m suggesting is “You can send me less but I can get 
more value out of it.” 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  So everyone’s happy. 
 
Respondent: Should be.  If you look at and I don’t know if you’ve been 
able to speak to other waste management companies, but 
we’re all tussling with this shift from volume to value.  At the 
moment we’re in the middle and we’re in the dip, because 
three/four years ago the value was going to be in the value 
that I could get for my recycled paper, for my recycled 
plastic.  But that commoditised world market has pretty 
much collapsed in the last two years.  So our value of that 
material, our value proposition is around about 40% less 
than what we thought it was going to be.  Oops. 
What we’ve not however then is we’re not able to replace 
that value because it’s a world commodity issue.  But 
energy then is the next if you like subsidy or substitute 
value.  But we’ve still yet, as an industry, to grasp that 
many of us either don’t own or operate an energy plant.  
But we’re busily building them.  So by 2018 there’ll be a 
significant amount of waste to energy plants in the UK. 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  One of my supervisors is an economist.  He’ll love 
that bit.  That has been extremely helpful.  Thank you very 
much. 
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Respondent: The light going out is just if we stand still long enough it 
does that automatically.  It wasn’t a signal. 
 
Interviewer: It’s all going on in the brain is what’s happening.  Fantastic. 
 
Respondent: Sure. 
 
Interviewer: So I’m doing hopefully 30 odd interviews with lots of 
different people which I’ll then, as it says in there, ultimately 
turn into some sort of paper.  But what I’ll do, within that 
process, is if there are particular pieces where I think I’ve 
understood something from you, and I want to check it then 
I’ll come back to you.  Often it makes these things good if 
they can have real quotes in them.  But if I wanted to quote 
you directly I’d come back and check that with you.  It 
wouldn’t be attributable. 
 
Respondent: What I’ve said to you today I shall say to anybody both 
privately and publicly.  In fact I’m on a platform next week 
where I’m one of the speakers to talk about energy from 
waste, and should we be exporting or not? 
 
Interviewer: That’s also very helpful to know.  Makes the writing process 
a bit less angst driven than it is. 
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Respondent: There’s nothing there that I would be concerned about 
having my name put against it.  Or indeed I can assure you 
what I’ve said is pretty much what the company strategy is 
also moving towards.  Okay. 
 
Interviewer: Brilliant. 
 
Respondent: Good. 
 
Interviewer: Thanks very much. 
 
Respondent: Absolute pleasure. 
END AUDIO 
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Appendix D : Confidential data appendix 
A confidential appendix is available for thesis examiners containing data in the 
form of interview transcripts and framework matrices. However this information 
has not been made publically available to protect the anonymity of respondents. 
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Appendix E : Instrument selection guidance for Defra 
The following slide set was developed by the author to provide a suitable output 
for Defra policy makers and other environmental regulators summarising some 
of the findings from this research. 
The document is available for download here: 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=11687_InstrumentSelectio
nGuidance041113-external.pdf  
 
 
20 ways to influence 
business behaviour
A short guide to instrument selection 
for policy makers and regulators
4th November 2013
Draft for discussion
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This pack helps policy makers and 
regulators think of ways to influence 
business behaviour to achieve 
environmental objectives
20 different ways to influence business 
behaviour are described and compared
Step-by-step discussion questions help 
you think through which options could 
work for the businesses you are targeting
Cross-cutting themes help you think 
through effective implementation
Useful models help you analyse 
businesses and compare options
You could use it to stimulate your own 
thinking, to spark ideas with colleagues in 
a workshop, or with external stakeholders 
It is structured to read from end to end, 
but you can also dip in to the most useful 
bits
Links to more detailed information are 
provided throughout
What’s inside?
2
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knowledge
Technology
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Natural 
environment
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/ financiers
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community 
groups, media
Other 
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trade groups
Products and 
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Requirements
Products and 
services
Requirements
Investment & 
returns
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pressure & 
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involvement Sectoral
cooperation & 
competition
Technology 
controls
Ambient 
pollution 
requirements 
Input restrictions 
and output 
quotas
Non-transferable 
emission licences
Zoning/ location 
controls
Taxes and 
subsidies
Tradable rights
Payments
Covenants and 
negotiated 
agreements
Voluntary 
regulation
Civic regulation
Regulation by 
professions
Private corporate
regulation
Self-regulation
Research and 
knowledge 
generation
Demo projects/ 
knowledge 
diffusion
Network building  
and joint problem 
solving
Registration, 
labelling and 
certification
Naming and 
faming/ shaming
Targeted 
information 
provision
9
Sustainable resource/ 
ecosystem service 
use constraints
H
M
H
M/L
M/L
M/L
Type of instrument 
used or supported
Ways government can 
influence business 
behaviour
Types of risk to target Effectiveness Costs and efficiency Industry suitability
1: DIRECT 
“COMMAND AND 
CONTROL” 
REGULATION
Require businesses to 
comply with rules, 
enforced with 
sanctions
Target at highest impact 
risks.
Relatively high, if enforced. Relatively costly to 
government and business. 
Typically less flexible for 
businesses.
Widely used. Enforcement 
more difficult for multiple 
small businesses.
2: ECONOMIC 
INSTRUMENTS
Change economic 
incentives for 
businesses
Can be targeted at major 
risks.
Relatively high; outcome less 
certain than direct regulation.
Can be costly to  businesses 
and government. Allow 
greater flexibility to 
businesses.
Widely used. Typically target 
specific products or 
emissions (e.g. waste to 
landfill, water use).
3: CO-REGULATION Negotiate with a group 
of businesses to agree 
targets to be achieved
Typically targeted at 
lower risks.
More likely to be effective if 
participation provides 
business advantage (e.g. 
reduced costs, more sales).
Typically lower cost to 
government than direct 
regulation but can still be 
costly for businesses. Afford 
greater flexibility.
Easier where industry has 
capacity to coordinate own 
activities. Large businesses 
typically easier to engage 
than small businesses.
4: INFORMATION 
BASED 
INSTRUMENTS
Provide better 
information to  
customers and other 
stakeholders
Typically targeted at 
lower risks.
Less certain; dependent on 
environmental concern of 
customers/ consumers.
Lower cost to government. Customers / consumers 
need to  prefer products 
with better environmental 
performance.
5: CIVIC AND SELF-
REGULATION
Promote or reinforce 
other social influences 
on good 
environmental 
performance
Typically supported by 
government for lower 
risks. Can be useful for 
exploring new or poorly 
understood problems.
More likely to be effective 
where better environmental 
performance provides 
business advantage (e.g. 
reduced costs, more sales).
Typically zero/ low cost to 
government but can still be 
costly for businesses. Afford 
greater flexibility.
Dependent on presence/ 
strength of influence of 
external stakeholders.
6: SUPPORT AND 
CAPACITY BUILDING
Improve knowledge 
and skills of businesses 
to promote better 
practices or better 
technology
Typically target R&D 
resources at highest 
priority risks.
Difficult to predict and 
measure, with some failures 
likely.
Costs can be significant e.g. 
for demonstration projects. 
Used for many industries.
• The purpose of this guide is to help policy makers and regulators develop ideas for achieving 
policy objectives that make use of the full range of policy and regulatory instruments at your 
disposal (e.g. emission licenses, tradable permit schemes, product labelling, voluntary 
agreements). 
• It could be used to design new measures, or to identify better ways than at present to 
achieve objectives that harness the influence of non-government actors. It is intended to 
spark thinking and debate. You could use this guide to help stimulate your own thinking, or to 
support a discussion with your team or other stakeholders. 
• The content focuses on describing the range of instruments that could be used and exploring 
when they are suitable. It focuses on instruments to tackle environmental risks, though many 
of the approaches described can also be used for other policy objectives.
• It is assumed that the reader already has a good understanding of the policy objectives to be 
met, the forms of market failure (e.g. polluters not compensating for damage caused) or 
other policy considerations that lead to the need for intervention, the stakeholders involved 
and the environmental, social and economic systems that connect them together. It is also 
assumed that the option of doing nothing has been considered but is unacceptable.
• In line with the Defra Policy Cycle, instrument ideas sparked from this guide will need to be 
developed into full proposals and their impact assessed. This development process is beyond 
the scope of this guide. 
About this guide
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Contents of this guide
1: Instrument 
options
The main types of instrument
20 ways to influence business behaviour
How instruments influence business behaviour
2: Instrument 
selection 
questions
How strongly do instruments need to influence business behaviour?
Could government negotiate targets with a group of businesses?
Could  signals about customer preferences be strengthened?
Could community/civic group/other stakeholder influences be strengthened?
Could shareholder influence be strengthened?
Could private business initiatives be encouraged or strengthened?
Are better business skills or knowledge required?
Could economic incentives/prices be altered to change behaviour?
Is scientific knowledge of problems and solutions lacking?
3: Cross-cutting 
themes
Enhancing instrument effectiveness
Providing flexibility and certainty
Providing a good user experience
Piloting, testing and assessing
Section 1 
provides a 
summary of 
the main types 
of instrument 
available, and 
when they 
might be 
appropriate
Section 2 
provides a set 
of key 
questions to 
consider when 
selecting 
instruments
Section 3 
discusses 
some 
important 
themes that 
can apply 
across all 
types of 
instrument
4
1: Instrument options
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Instrument 
options The main types of instrument
6Find out more: SNIFFER ER30: 2 - Choose and Design Interventions
Type of instrument 
used or supported
Ways government can 
influence business 
behaviour
Types of risk to target Effectiveness Costs and efficiency Industry suitability
1: DIRECT 
“COMMAND AND 
CONTROL” 
REGULATION
Require businesses to 
comply with rules, 
enforced with sanctions.
Target at highest impact 
risks.
Relatively high, if enforced. Relatively costly to 
government and business. 
Typically less flexible for 
businesses.
Widely used. Enforcement 
more difficult for multiple 
small businesses.
2: ECONOMIC 
INSTRUMENTS
Change economic 
incentives for businesses.
Can be targeted at major 
risks.
Relatively high; outcome less 
certain than direct regulation.
Can be costly to  businesses 
and government. Allow 
greater flexibility to 
businesses.
Widely used. Typically target 
specific products or 
emissions (e.g. waste to 
landfill, water use).
3: CO-REGULATION Negotiate with a group 
of businesses to agree 
targets to be achieved.
Typically targeted at 
lower risks.
More likely to be effective if 
participation provides 
business advantage (e.g. 
reduced costs, more sales).
Typically lower cost to 
government than direct 
regulation but can still be 
costly for businesses. Afford 
greater flexibility.
Easier where industry has 
capacity to coordinate own 
activities. Large businesses 
typically easier to engage 
than small businesses.
4: INFORMATION 
BASED 
INSTRUMENTS
Provide better 
information to  
customers and other 
stakeholders.
Typically targeted at 
lower risks.
Less certain; dependent on 
environmental concern of 
customers/ consumers.
Lower cost to government. Customers / consumers 
need to  prefer products 
with better environmental 
performance.
5: CIVIC AND SELF-
REGULATION
Promote or reinforce 
other social influences on 
good environmental 
performance.
Typically supported by 
government for lower 
risks. Can be useful for 
exploring new or poorly 
understood problems.
More likely to be effective 
where better environmental 
performance provides 
business advantage (e.g. 
reduced costs, more sales).
Typically zero/ low cost to 
government but can still be 
costly for businesses. Afford 
greater flexibility.
Dependent on presence/ 
strength of influence of 
external stakeholders.
6: SUPPORT AND 
CAPACITY BUILDING
Improve knowledge and 
skills of businesses to 
promote better practices 
or better technology.
Typically target R&D 
resources at highest 
priority risks.
Difficult to predict and 
measure, with some failures 
likely.
Costs can be significant e.g. 
for demonstration projects. 
Used for many industries.
Instrument 
options 20 ways to influence business behaviour
5: CIVIC AND SELF-REGULATION
Voluntary regulation A group of actors agree standards to which individual 
businesses can sign up.  Becomes a form of co-regulation if 
government involved.
Civic regulation Community or pressure groups agree performance standards 
with particular firms
Regulation by 
professions
A professional body applies standards through conditions of 
membership
Private corporate
regulation
One firm defines standards with which suppliers are required 
to comply in order to maintain business
Self-regulation Businesses  independently adopt environmental standards,
unilaterally or with external verification
6: SUPPORT AND CAPACITY BUILDING
Research and knowledge 
generation
Governments or other actors undertake research to increase 
knowledge that informs better environmental decision 
making
Demonstration projects/ 
knowledge diffusion
Governments invest in projects to demonstrate feasibility, 
raise awareness and reduce risks of new technologies or 
processes
Network building  and 
joint problem solving
Initiatives designed to encourage people to exchange ideas 
and learning to improve environmental performance
1: DIRECT “COMMAND AND CONTROL” REGULATION
Technology controls Requirements for businesses to use specific technologies in 
their operations or products e.g. catalytic converters
Zoning/ location 
controls
Performance requirements linked to a specific geography, e.g 
to locate polluters away from sensitive ecosystems
Non-transferable 
emission licences
Licence to operate according to environmental performance 
requirements, with compliance monitored and penalties 
enforced. Inspection requirements could be reduced for good 
performers through ‘earned recognition’
Ambient pollution 
requirements 
Specify required maximum levels of ambient pollution, 
allowing flexibility to polluters to decide how to achieve
Input restrictions 
and output quotas
Restrictions are applied in the use or output of products/ 
resources
2: ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
Payments Conditional payments made to incentivize a particular activity 
e.g.  provision of ecosystem services
Taxes and subsidies Change the market price of a good or service, changing the 
quantity demanded and supplied in the market
Tradable rights Specify a  capped quantity of allowances, e.g. to abstract 
water or to emit carbon, which can then be traded among 
users
4: INFORMATION BASED INSTRUMENTS
Targeted information 
provision
Information provided to enable businesses or individuals to 
make better-informed decisions that affect the environment
Registration, labelling 
and certification
Product labelling, and associated standards, enabling 
consumers to choose products with better environmental  
performance
Naming and faming/ 
shaming
Publicising environmental performance information, 
incentivizing better behaviour to avoid damage to or to 
enhance reputation
7
3: CO-REGULATION
Covenants and 
negotiated 
agreements
Government makes a contractual  agreement with regulated 
businesses to achieve particular standards
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Instrument 
options
How instruments influence business behaviour 
(1 of 2)
This simple model illustrates 
important influences on business 
environmental performance.
Key questions
Who are the businesses you are 
targeting? What drives their 
environmental behaviour? Who 
influences their behaviour most?
Find out more
Defra pro-environmental behaviours framework
Defra REAs: 1 - Business drivers for alternatives to 
regulation and 6 - Economic impacts of 
environmental regulatory policy
Business
Skills and 
knowledge
Technology
CustomersSuppliers
Natural 
environment
Shareholders
/ financiers
Citizens, civic/ 
community 
groups, media
Other 
businesses/ 
trade groups
Products and 
services
Requirements
Products and 
services
Requirements
Investment & 
returns
Reputational 
pressure & 
stakeholder 
involvement Sectoral
cooperation & 
competition
Sustainable resource/ 
ecosystem service 
use constraints
8
Business
Skills and 
knowledge
Technology
CustomersSuppliers
Natural 
environment
Shareholders
/ financiers
Citizens, civic/ 
community 
groups, media
Other 
businesses/ 
trade groups
Products and 
services
Requirements
Products and 
services
Requirements
Investment & 
returns
Reputational 
pressure & 
stakeholder 
involvement Sectoral
cooperation & 
competition
Instrument 
options
How instruments influence business behaviour
(2 of 2)
Technology 
controls
Ambient 
pollution 
requirements 
Input restrictions 
and output 
quotas
Non-transferable 
emission licences
Zoning/ location 
controls
Taxes and 
subsidies
Tradable rights
Payments
Covenants and 
negotiated 
agreements
Voluntary 
regulation
Civic regulation
Regulation by 
professions
Private corporate
regulation
Self-regulation
Research and 
knowledge 
generation
Demo projects/ 
knowledge 
diffusion
Network building  
and joint problem 
solving
Registration, 
labelling and 
certification
Naming and 
faming/ shaming
Targeted 
information 
provision
Each type of instrument 
acts on particular levers of 
business behaviour
9
Sustainable resource/ 
ecosystem service 
use constraints
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2: Instrument selection questions
10
Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
What environmental risks  need to be managed?
What are their expected impact and probability?
To what extent can risk occurrence be tolerated?
Regulation should be targeted according to risk. Direct regulation provides strong controls and a  level playing field, but can be costly
In general, direct regulation is expected to provide the strongest controls on environmental risk, but is also costly to the regulated and 
government.  It can provide a level playing field between competing firms, and tackle illegal behaviour. Direct regulation should be 
targeted at the highest risk activities, to provide the strongest controls where they are needed most. Other forms of regulation (see later 
slides) generally provide weaker controls and therefore are suitable for tackling smaller risks or to enhance the effectiveness of direct 
regulation.  
Find out more
Defra Guidelines for environmental risk assessment and management: 
Green leaves III
SNIFFER ER30: 4 – Promote Compliance and 6 - Regulatory Strategy
Defra REAs: 4 – Earned Recognition
How strongly do instruments need to influence 
business behaviour?
Forms of direct 
regulation
When they are used
Technology controls Better performing technology exists but businesses are unwilling to adopt, typically due to additional costs. Can force a transition 
to wider adoption e.g. Energy saving lightbulbs; catalytic converters
Zoning/ location 
controls
Specific geography needs additional protection e.g. for unusual or fragile ecosystems; to prevent pollution hotspots. Typically 
linked to other instruments for that area e.g. vehicle technology controls in low emission zones.
Non-transferable 
emission licences
Specific business operations sites present risks to the environment e.g. through emissions to air or water.  Operations are 
monitored and sanctions may be imposed for failure to meet requirements.
Ambient pollution 
requirements 
Pollution typically arising from multiple sources must be kept within limits. An overall requirement is set requiring other 
instruments to be deployed to ensure it is met.
Input restrictions and 
output quotas
Natural resources are not being used sustainably (e.g. over-fishing; over abstraction of water), or use of specific materials present 
risks to the environment (e.g. Polychlorinated biphenols).
11
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Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
Do businesses have representative bodies that can 
coordinate joint action? How much of the sector can they 
represent? Can government present a credible threat of 
harder regulation to incentivise participation?
Negotiation can be used to design interventions tailored to characteristics of particular sectors
Negotiating with a group of businesses to achieve environmental objectives may provide a relatively quick way to 
bring about change, that is tailored to the specific characteristics of a sector. The target industry needs to have a 
representative body (e.g. a trade association, or a specially formed group) that can negotiate on its behalf and 
monitor compliance, which may be easier to achieve in sectors with a few large businesses than those with many 
small businesses. 
Voluntary regulation may prove effective where participation provides business and environmental benefits, for 
example cost reductions through resource efficiency.  WRAP have established agreements e.g. for waste reduction.
Covenants and negotiated agreements offer stronger assurance that objectives will be met , as targets are 
contractually binding.  For example, Climate Change Agreements are agreed between DECC  and industry bodies to 
allow a reduction in Climate Change Levy in return for reaching emissions reduction targets. The Law Commission is 
considering how ‘conservation covenants’, which involve landowners making an agreement a conservation 
organisation or a public body to protect  the conservation value of a site, could be enabled through law.
Businesses may prove more willing to participate in these forms of regulation when there is a credible threat of 
harder regulation (e.g. through a new tax or direct regulation) being introduced if the instrument proves ineffective. 
Find out more
Defra REAs: 2 – Voluntary Agreements  and other business designed 
approaches
Waste and Resources Action Plan voluntary agreements
Climate Change Agreements
Law Commission consultation on Conservation Covenants
Could government negotiate targets with a group 
of businesses?
12
Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
Do customers choose between the products of target 
businesses on the basis of environmental performance?
Is government a major buyer in the target sector?
Businesses may be driven to improve environmental performance by their customers
Customers may be concerned about the environmental impact of the products and services that they buy, so they 
buy better performing products in preference to poorer performing products. Their suppliers therefore have an 
incentive to differentiate their products and services on this basis. For example, in the UK many consumers are 
concerned about the environmental impact of food, and food products that claim better environmental performance 
have been developed in response to this demand.
Registration, Labelling and Certification schemes (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil, EU Ecolabel) improve the ability of customers to buy in response to environmental performance, providing 
incentives for businesses to improve the environmental performance of their products. These approaches can be 
encouraged and supported by government. In some markets (e.g. construction) the government is a major buyer, so  
it may be possible to bring about change along supply chains by changing environmental standards required by 
government procurement.
However, customer concern for environmental performance is much less evident for some products than others. For 
example, in the UK few cosmetics brands make explicit claims about environmental performance. So the strength 
and therefore relevance of customer-driven instruments depends strongly on levels of customer concern for a given 
product.
Find out more
Defra REAs: 2 – Voluntary Agreements  and other business designed 
approaches
Forest Stewardship Council , Marine Stewardship Council
EU Ecolabel
Assured Food Standards Red Tractor
Could signals about customer preferences be 
strengthened?
13
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Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
Do local community groups  or civic groups have a 
significant influence on business behaviour? What should 
government do to strengthen their influence? Which 
other stakeholders could assist, and how?
Local community or civic groups can have a significant influence on the behaviour of some businesses, as can other 
stakeholders including individual citizens and the media
Community and civic groups, ranging from international NGOs to small local community groups, can play a role in 
influencing business environmental behaviour. For example, WWF initiated international action with major 
businesses to establish the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. At a more local level, the Wildlife Trusts have worked 
with businesses to restore biodiversity for land affected by industrial activity. These kinds of activities can be broadly 
described as ‘civic regulation’.
Government can act to strengthen the influence of such groups. For example, Defra is currently piloting Local Nature 
Partnerships, which give formal recognition to groups of public, private, NGO and local community organisations to 
influence local decision-making relating to the natural environment and its value to social and economic outcomes.
Government may be able to gather, share or publicise information directly or to be used by other stakeholders. 
There may be scope to make publically available useful information currently held within government, as outlined in 
Defra’s Open Data Strategy, or to encourage or require disclosure of environmental performance by businesses. 
Individual citizens may be able to help to monitor business performance, for example by reporting apparent bad 
behaviour to regulators (e.g. reporting flytipping)  or helping to monitor environmental conditions (e.g. spotting the 
presence of non-native species).
Find out more
Defra information on Local Nature Partnerships
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
Surrey Wildlife Trust manages  Nutfield Marsh
Reporting flytipping with a smartphone at Birmingham City Council
Reducing the Impact of Non-native Species in Europe (RINSE) app
Could community/civic group or other stakeholder 
influences be strengthened?
14
Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
Do target businesses, or their customers or suppliers, have external 
shareholders? Are shareholders likely to change their investment 
behaviour on the basis of environmental performance of their 
investments?
What information could government gather or share that would enhance 
this effect?
For some sectors, shareholders may prove an important influence on business environmental behaviour
Shareholders in publically listed businesses can influence business behaviour through their investment decisions. 
Investors may prefer businesses with better environmental performance because,  for example, they believe they are 
less likely to be affected by surprises that affect share value e.g. environmental accidents, or winning new work.
Many businesses do not have external shareholders. Nevertheless, their customers or suppliers may do, in which 
case their behaviour may be influenced indirectly along their supply chain.
Regulators can publicise information about good or bad business environmental performance through Naming and 
shaming/faming with the intention of influencing shareholders. Some non-government bodies develop indices to 
help inform shareholders e.g. Carbon Disclosure Project. Government may be able to gather, share or publicise 
information directly or to be used by other stakeholders. There may be scope to make publically available useful 
information currently held within government, as outlined in Defra’s Open Data Strategy.  Legislation could also be 
used to increase transparency of business  environmental performance, e.g. as required for UK listed companies’ 
greenhouse gas emissions reporting under the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013.
Find out more
Defra Open Data Strategy
Carbon Disclosure Project
Defra environmental impact measuring and reporting guidance
Could shareholder influence be strengthened?
15
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Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
Are businesses exhibiting self-regulation or private 
corporate regulation?
What evidence exists that these approaches are 
delivering sufficient controls on environmental risk?
Government can encourage good environmental management approaches developed by the private sector
Businesses may decide independently of government to pursue better environmental performance, for example to 
achieve improvements in resource efficiency, or to attract customers who are concerned about environmental 
performance. 
Under self-regulation businesses may choose to develop their own environmental management strategies and 
procedures, often implemented through an environmental management system (EMS). They may choose to adopt 
an externally verified standard such as ISO14001, to assist in setting it up and to provide reassurance about its 
quality to customers or other stakeholders. In addition, a business may choose to impose good environmental 
performance requirements on its suppliers, described as private corporate regulation. This could include 
requirements to comply with bespoke standards developed by the business, or to adopt externally-verified 
standards such as ISO14001.
Policy makers and regulators can encourage these approaches where they already exist, for example simply by 
publicising good performers (Naming and faming/shaming). Where they are confident that these initiatives are 
providing sufficient controls, government may choose to reduce its own direct regulatory effort e.g. by reducing the 
number of inspections, an approach sometimes known as ‘earned recognition’.
Find out more
Defra REAs: 2 – Voluntary Agreements  and other business designed 
approaches
Defra REAs: 4 – Earned Recognition
Defra research on benefits of environmental mgmt systems for SMEs
Earned recognition and Red Tractor Assurance
Could private business initiatives be encouraged or 
strengthened?
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Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
How well do businesses understand the environmental 
impact of their operations and how they could improve?
Who can help transmit this knowledge to them; who 
would they trust to do so?
Some instruments are specifically designed to improve business skills and knowledge
The effectiveness of businesses in protecting the environment is affected by the skills and knowledge of the people 
who work in them. Government measures to increase skills and knowledge can help to improve the effectiveness of 
other forms of regulation:
During inspections: Inspectors can provide advice to businesses on good practice while checking compliance e.g. 
with non-transferable emissions licences of as part of registration, certification and labelling schemes.
Targeted information provision: Marketing campaigns can increase general awareness of environmental issues. e.g. 
Love Food Hate Waste
Regulation by professions: People can learn skills through professional accreditation e.g. Chartered 
Environmentalist. Government can support this,  e.g. by requiring professional accreditation as a condition of 
permits.
Network building and joint problem solving: Government can support professional networks that provide training 
or work jointly on problems e.g. WRAP
Demonstration projects and knowledge diffusion: Where uncertainty about new technologies is inhibiting business 
adoption, government can support projects that demonstrate them working in practice.
Find out more
Love Food Hate Waste
Chartered Environmentalist
Waste and Resources Action Programme
DECC activities to support  development of carbon capture & storage
Are better business skills or knowledge required?
17
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Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
Can environmental impacts be linked to specific traded 
business inputs or outputs? Will businesses change use 
in response to changed prices?
If a market does not exist, could one be created?
Creating a market for or changing the prices of business inputs or outputs can drive significant behaviour change
While direct regulation can provide strong controls for environmental risks, it may offer limited flexibility for 
businesses to choose the most efficient way to achieve a given environmental objective for their specific 
circumstances. Economic instruments work by changing prices for business inputs or outputs (including pollution) to 
alter their demand or supply. Businesses can decide the most efficient way to respond to these signals, so some may 
choose to absorb price changes without changing behaviour, while others may change rapidly in response. Economic 
instruments therefore generally provide less certainty about how a given business will behave compared to direct 
regulation.
Find out more
OECD work on market based instruments for environmental policy
Defra payments for ecosystem services research pilots
Could economic incentives/ prices be altered to 
change business behaviour?
Types of economic 
instrument
When they are used
Taxes and 
subsidies 
Specific inputs (e.g. solar panels for energy production) or outputs (e.g. waste to be put to landfill) which are traded and 
closely linked to environmental impact can be taxed or subsidised to alter demand/supply.
Tradable rights Rights to use quantities of specific of inputs (e.g. water) or produce quantities of specific outputs (e.g. carbon dioxide) 
are issued and then traded among businesses. Total quantity used/produced is capped by size of rights issue.
Payments Businesses are paid in proportion to their provision of goods or services that are environmentally beneficial e.g. For 
maintaining woodland that provides flood protection, recreational value and habitat for biodiversity.
18
Instrument 
selection 
questions
Key questions 
Which aspects of environmental problems or their 
solutions are well understood? 
Where is knowledge weaker? 
Who is best placed to improve understanding?
Some instruments are specifically designed to generate new scientific knowledge about environmental impacts 
and the solutions to reduce them, while others can have built-in features to improve knowledge
In some areas of environmental policy, scientific knowledge to inform the design of environmental regulation is 
lacking. Research and knowledge generation, for example through government funding of university research 
programmes, is an instrument that can be used to address such areas of uncertainty. Government may choose to 
adopt a precautionary approach where potentially large risks have been identified, for example by not allowing an 
activity to be pursued until sufficient research has been undertaken to demonstrate that it is safe.
Some instruments can have built-in features that help to improve knowledge. For less severe environmental risks, 
Voluntary Regulation may provide a  useful platform for government and businesses to work together to improve 
shared understanding. For example the Courtauld Commitment, a voluntary agreement focused on reducing 
packaging waste, has included research to examine how the environmental impact of packaging can be measured 
and reduced. This has allowed government and participating businesses to agree better objectives for successive 
phases of the programme, as shared knowledge has increased. 
Direct regulation can also be designed to gradually improve understanding of environmental impacts, for example by 
requiring businesses to undertake environmental risk assessments to allow products to be marketed (e.g. REACH). 
Find out more
Defra Guidelines for environmental risk assessment and management: 
Green leaves III
Defra's evidence investment strategy
Is scientific knowledge of problems and solutions 
lacking?
19
302 
 
 
 
 
 
3: Cross-cutting themes
20
Cross-
cutting 
themes
Enhancing instrument effectiveness
Key questions
Does the design of implemented instruments enable, 
exemplify, encourage and engage?
Should the skills and experience of regulatory officers/ 
inspectors be enhanced?
Research, including from behavioural economics, provides insights into the drivers of human behaviour, which can 
be incorporated into the implemented design of all instruments to ensure they are effective in practice
Find out more
Guidance from Institute for Government – MINDSPACE
SNIFFER ER30: Better Regulation evidence
The MINDSPACE mnemonic provides prompts for how people may respond to the design of regulation. For
example, ensuring information is provided by a source trusted by the intended audience, or publicising
commitments made, may improve effectiveness. Government can design interventions that engage, enable,
encourage and exemplify (the ‘4Es’) good environmental performance. Regulatory officers are most effective when
they have the skills and experience to put these and other insights into practice when they interact with regulatees.
Messenger we are heavily influenced by who communicates information
Incentives our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental 
shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses 
Norms we are strongly influenced by what others do
Defaults we “go with the flow‟ of pre-set options
Salience our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us
Priming our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues
Affect our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions
Commitments we seek to be consistent with our public promises, and 
reciprocate acts
Ego we act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves
MIND
SPACE
EngageEnable
Exemplify
Encourage
• Legislation
• Regulation
• Incentives
• Information
• Deliberation
• Permission
• Co-production
• Leading by example
• Policy consistency
• Organisational learning
• Infrastructure
• Facilities
• Design
• Resources
Evaluate
• Evidence-based 
innovation
Explore
• Insight
21
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Cross-
cutting 
themes
Providing flexibility and certainty
Key questions 
What flexibilities need to be accommodated by the mix 
of regulations for target businesses? 
How much certainty can be provided?
Instrument design needs to balance long-term certainty with flexibility to change
Environmental regulations can have a significant effect on business investment decisions. For example, the Landfill 
Tax has created incentives for waste management companies to invest in alternative waste processing technologies 
as alternatives to putting waste to landfill. Unpredicted changes to regulation can undermine business willingness to 
invest in technologies that could improve environmental performance, and businesses prefer less regulatory 
uncertainty.
However, environmental, social and economic conditions change over time, and regulation may need to change to 
reflect this. A balance needs to be struck between providing certainty in regulations, and accommodating change 
through flexibility.
Certainty and flexibility can be accommodated in many forms of regulation. The Building Regulations (direct 
regulation) incorporate a 3-yearly review of standards, allowing product innovation and some stability in 
requirements. The Landfill Tax (an economic instrument) has a variable rate which can be adjusted from year to year, 
and has followed a consistent upwards trajectory over recent years. Voluntary regulation can offer opportunities for 
rapid adaptation to changing circumstances, negotiated with participating businesses.
Find out more
Defra REAs: 3 - Results orientation, timeframes and stability in 
regulatory policy
22
Cross-
cutting 
themes
Providing a good user experience
Key questions 
How would target businesses prefer to interact with 
government? How smoothly does this work at present? 
How could it be improved?
Instruments should be designed to minimize administrative costs for businesses
Administrative processes associated with any regulatory instrument should be designed to make them as easy to use 
as possible for participating businesses. Many businesses are now accustomed to using email and internet to 
communicate and share information, and well designed web-based processes can significantly reduce costs for 
businesses compared to paper-based approaches. Businesses can struggle to find out about and keep up to date 
with their environmental obligations, so it is key to ensure that information is provided in forms that are easy to find 
and easy to understand. 
The single government website, www.gov.uk, is becoming the one-stop-shop for citizens and businesses seeking to 
interact with government on the internet, so guidance and other web-based materials need to be designed to fit this 
approach. Registration and reporting processes should also be designed to minimise the administrative burdens on 
participating businesses, making use of modern web-based technologies wherever appropriate.
Find out more
Defra Smarter Environmental Regulation Review phase 1 report
Government Digital Service Design Principles
Defra REAs: 5 – Environmental policy integration
SNIFFER ER30: 3- Deliver Interventions
23
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Cross-
cutting 
themes
Piloting, testing and assessing
Key questions 
How could you test your ideas for improvement through 
piloting?
How will the effectiveness of implemented instruments 
be measured?
Wherever possible, changes to the regulatory framework should be piloted . Effective measurement  of outcomes 
is essential for ongoing improvement
Pilots provide opportunities to try out changes on a small scale, to test their effectiveness and identify unanticipated 
consequences. Learning from pilots can then be incorporated into larger scale implementation.
Irrespective of the form of regulation adopted, it is essential that the impact of any given regulation is measured so 
that its effectiveness and efficiency can be assessed and learnt from. This will require a set of performance indicators 
to be monitored across the chain cause and effect from regulatory instrument, through changes to business and 
citizen behaviour, to the resulting impact on environmental quality.
Find out more
HM Treasury guidance on evaluation – the Magenta Book
BIS Better Regulation Framework Manual
SNIFFER ER30: 5 - Evaluate
24
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Appendix F : Cranfield University Ethics Policy 
Cranfield recognises that it has an obligation to all its stakeholders to observe 
and maintain the highest ethical standards. These standards must be upheld in 
the day-today activities of all members of the University*. They embrace the 
Seven Principles of Public Life (the Nolan Principles) of selflessness, integrity, 
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. In addition, 
helping students to acquire a sense of professional and personal ethics in their 
work is an important part of the educational process the University offers. 
The Cranfield University Ethics Policy articulates the general principles that will 
guide all members of the University in meeting these standards. They are 
developed into more specific practices relevant to particular areas of activity 
(e.g. teaching, research etc) and particular members of the University (e.g. 
students, staff etc) in the Schools and Administrative Departments. 
The Seven Communities 
The University serves six (often overlapping) communities and in its daily 
operation interacts with a seventh, its suppliers. It is the University’s 
responsibilities to these seven communities that form the underlying basis for 
this code of ethics. 
Students 
The University seeks to offer a rewarding experience to all its students to 
support their future careers, on courses clearly described in the University’s 
Prospectuses. Courses are based on the transmission of up-to-date knowledge 
on fundamentals and their application, informed by the University’s work. 
Employers 
The University seeks to meet the needs of all employers, both as sponsors of 
students and as employers of graduates. It aims to create graduates who can 
move smoothly into employment, contribute swiftly to the improved performance 
of their organisation, and rapidly rise to senior positions. 
Research Clients 
The University seeks to bring its full capabilities to its research programmes for 
all clients, in both the public and private sector. It seeks both to generate new 
knowledge and to apply existing knowledge, wherever in the world that may 
have been created, to create new insight and opportunities for the clients. 
* Members of the University include all officers, staff, students, alumni, 
members of Court and Council, as defined in Statute II. 
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Teaching Clients 
The University seeks to bring all its knowledge and experience to the design, 
delivery and assessment of all its teaching programmes. In particular it seeks to 
produce high quality graduates while giving value for money to all clients of 
taught programmes, both in the public and private sector in the UK and 
overseas. 
Academic Community 
The University seeks to fulfil its responsibility to the wider academic community, 
both undertaking all its academic work to the highest professional standards, 
and contributing wherever possible to the development of that community 
worldwide. 
Wider Community 
The University seeks to contribute fully to the development of its Local Regions, 
the UK and Europe, and to be perceived as one of the leading International 
institutions in each of its chosen fields. 
Suppliers 
The University seeks to co-operate with all its suppliers. It expects value for 
money, good service and fair treatment from all its suppliers and recognises its 
suppliers need for fair terms of trade. 
Professional Conduct 
All members of the University shall seek to conduct their work in a thoroughly 
professional manner to the benefit of all the communities that the University 
seeks to serve. More specifically, they will not claim knowledge, competence or 
qualifications they do not possess and they will take every precaution to ensure 
that their views are not subject to misrepresentation, and to immediately take 
steps to correct any misrepresentations. In their work members will not seek to 
harm anyone, but where irreconcilable conflicts arise, members will seek to 
resolve these with integrity. Integrity implies not merely honesty but fair dealing 
and truthfulness. 
Teaching 
In its teaching the university will endeavour to: 
 Seek to bring all its knowledge to the design, delivery and assessment of 
all its teaching programmes; 
 Describe clearly and appropriately the level and content of all courses; 
 Recruit and admit only such students who are believed, by those 
admitting them, to be appropriately qualified, willing to study diligently, 
and able to satisfactorily complete, the course; 
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 Not discriminate on the basis of the student’s source of funding, or on the 
basis of their race, colour, nationality, ethnicity, religious views, sexuality, 
disability or marital status; 
 Assess fairly and honestly all students and maintain honest feedback to 
students concerning their progress; 
 On completion of the course describe honestly and fairly the student’s 
performance on the course. 
 
Research 
 
In their research all staff and students will endeavour to: 
 Maintain professional standards including honesty and integrity; 
 Properly document all results; 
 Evaluate critically all results; 
 Attribute honestly the contribution of others; 
 Wherever possible report all results openly, bearing in mind the 
University’s commercial considerations and sponsors’ needs for 
confidentiality.  
In addition all staff will endeavour to: 
 Educate and develop new research workers to an understanding of good 
research practice; 
 Secure and store primary data for an appropriate period of time. 
Support Services 
In the delivery of all services in support of the work of the University all staff will 
endeavour to: 
 Seek at all times to deliver a prompt quality service; 
 Not treat any clients in a way they would not personally wish to be 
treated by others; 
 Give value for money; 
 Project at all times a caring image of a University that seeks to help and 
support. 
Consultancy 
In its consultancy the university will endeavour to: 
 Only offer consultancy and advice within the area of the consultant’s 
knowledge and field of expertise; 
 Maintain professional standards including honesty and openness; 
 At all times respect client confidentiality, unless expressly permitted by 
the client to divulge any details; 
 Give value for money. 
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Students 
The University would wish to recruit only those students who will: 
 Abide by the regulations of the University; 
 Observe the University’s Codes of Practice and Policy Statements 
including that on Free Speech; 
 Conduct themselves in a manner which neither brings discredit on the 
University nor harm to its members. 
Ethical Quick Test 
 Is the action legal? 
 Shall I be proud of it? 
 Will I feel bad about it? 
 Does it comply with the University’s values? 
 How will it look to my friends and family? 
 How will it look in the Media? 
 If you know it’s wrong don’t do it. 
 If you’re not sure, ask. 
 Keep asking until you get an answer that enables you to answer the 
questions above to your satisfaction. 
Implementation of the Code 
These fundamental principles should govern the conduct of each member of the 
University. Whilst the Principles defined above apply to all activities, there are in 
addition a number of areas where more detailed ethical principles and practices 
have been set out. These include inter alia the University’s Financial and 
Personnel Manuals, the Student Handbook, and for research the relevant UK 
Research Council publication (e.g. EPSRC’s “Good Practice in Scientific and 
Engineering Research, 2002-2006”, MRC’s “Good Research Practice 2000”, 
Wellcome Trust’s “Guidelines on Good Research Practice 2005”, and the Joint 
Code of Practice for Research issued by the BBSRC, DEFRA, FSA and NERC, 
April 2003). Each School or Administrative Department must ensure that all 
members of the University are made aware of both the Code itself and any local 
amplifications of it.  
In the event that any member has any query or concern regarding the Code, or 
their obligation under it, they should immediately consult either their Head of 
School or Department, or (for staff) their Personnel Officer, or (for students) 
their Head of Registry.  
Approved Council, December 2000; updated September 2003 
 
